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This dissertation addresses the broad question: How do the discourses of climate 
change and conflict travel across time and space to become policy, programming, and 
ultimately a development initiative that exist on the ground? To answer this question, I 
broke the research into three separate papers. The first examines how the US policy 
community approaches, understands and seeks to address the discourses of climate-
security. The second examines the ways in which climate change affects conflict outcomes 
in Karamoja, Uganda. And the third, using the efforts of Mercy Corps in Karamoja as a 
case study, examines the realities and opportunities in addressing climate-conflict from a 
development perspective. Clear across all components of this research, and linking the 
three manuscripts, is the salience of scale in climate-conflict, the paradox of how the ‘threat 
multiplier’ discourse both oversimplifies and blurs the legibility of the relationship between 
climate change and conflict, and the need to further deconstruct climate-conflict in the 
context of particular places. The central contribution of this dissertation as a whole is to 
elucidate the challenges facing institutions who have the mandate of addressing climate-
conflict and wider climate-security connections. While the lessons of this project have 
academic implications, the evident challenges facing practitioners in conceptualizing and 
addressing the link between climate change and conflict, should serve as an argument for 
the policy and implementation community to critically examine how their efforts are 
affected by the discourses and scales of climate-conflict and climate-security.  
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
  
 2 
Introduction   
 
The body of research examining climate change and conflict has been marked by 
considerable attention to if and how climate change and its associated biophysical 
impacts affect conflict outcomes (Buhaug et al., 2014; Buhaug, 2014; Burke, Hsiang, & 
Miguel, 2015; Hsiang, Burke, & Miguel, 2013; Kelley, Mohtadi, Cane, Seager, & 
Kushnir, 2015). In addressing this question, the literature has focused on both trends at 
global and regional levels (e.g., Hsiang et al., 2013) and outcomes in particular places 
and contexts (e.g., Gleick, 2014; Johnstone & Mazo, 2011; Sternberg, 2012 Feitelson, 
Tamimi, & Rosenthal, 2012; Ide et al., 2014; Milman & Arsano, 2014; Selby & 
Hoffmann, 2014). While these complex questions warrant attention and debate, that 
debate has largely overshadowed other questions of potentially greater relevance to 
addressing the challenges posed by potential connections between climate change and 
conflict (Lewis & Lenton, 2015). One critical area of inquiry that remains under-
addressed is that of organizational efforts to understand and address the impact of climate 
change on conflict outcomes. This dissertation focuses on that gap by focusing on 
organizational efforts targeting the presumed connections between climate change and 
conflict. Specifically, I seek to address the question, How do the discourses of climate 
change and conflict travel across time and space to become policy, programming, and 
ultimately a development initiative that exists on the ground?  
The papers in this dissertation address this broad question by focusing on the 
efforts of Mercy Corps, an international humanitarian and development NGO, in its 
efforts to address the connection between climate change and conflict (hereafter referred 
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to as climate-conflict)1 in Karamoja, Uganda. I focus on two particular programs being 
implemented by Mercy Corps: Building Resilience Against Climate Extremes and 
Disasters (BRACED) and the third iteration of Peace in East and Central Africa (PEACE 
III). I seek to understand how these programs come to be across a continuum that invokes 
discursive formation and problem identification, policy design, program funding and 
design, project implementation, and evaluation.  
By collecting data across the various stages – and places – of development 
processes, I was able to elucidate contextual factors that define both the organizational 
discourses of and the responses to climate-conflict. In the first paper of this dissertation, I 
focus on the US Government’s approach to climate-conflict. I demonstrate that though 
there are no sectoral consistencies to policy approaches to climate-conflict, there are three 
primary ways this policy community understands and seeks to address climate-conflict: 
1) An issue of adaptation and resilience; 2) A potent political argument; and 3) An issue 
of limited salience. Of these approaches, the most common is the first framing. And 
amongst that population there was a common line of reasoning: they described climate 
change as a threat multiplier, then expressed a need to minimize or mitigate these threats, 
and ultimately described a lack of clarity and even confusion in how to do so.  
That lack of clarity was the impetus for the next stage of the research (i.e., the 
work focused on Mercy Corps). It was also telling. While there was widespread demand 
for policy and programming that addressed climate-conflict, that demand was simply 
unmet. Understanding why this demand is unmet is essential to the dissertation. As I 
explain throughout the chapters, the discourse of climate change as a “threat multiplier”, 
                                               
1 I use this terminology for brevity. Clearly, as is expressed throughout the dissertation, the 
relationship is far more complex and not unilear.  
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which appears on the surface to be a very broad, enabling construction of the climate-
conflict relationship, complicates implementation by limiting this relationship in its 
causal directionality, its scale of analysis, and its assumed outcomes. This challenge of 
conceptualization reverberated across all stages of policy development and program 
implementation. 
In the second paper, I turn to how climate change and conflict interact in 
Karamoja. Karamoja, a traditionally pastoral and agropastoral community had, until 
relatively recently, experienced high rates of intertribal conflict fueled by, amongst other 
issues, a commercialization of cattle raiding, a breakdown of traditional governance 
systems and an influx of small arms. As is explained in this paper, though presently 
stable, Karamoja is still experiencing insecurity. However, this insecurity is far less 
severe and on more localized scales than it had been during the years defined by large-
scale and violent cattle raiding. The data demonstrate that though the severity of conflict 
has decreased in tandem with an increase in the severity climate change, the effects of 
climate change are, in fact, interacting with contemporary manifestations of conflict in 
the region.   
 The effects of climate change, in combination with other changes in land use and 
access, are part of what I deem ‘the shifting landscapes of Karamoja’. That is, increasing 
presence of commercial resource extraction, land grabs, and shifts to sedentary 
livelihoods have put a series of pressures on the land and those reliant on primary 
production, resulting in manifestations of conflict at more localized scales than had 
existed during the peak of violence. Critically, though, and mirroring other examples in 
the climate-conflict literature (e.g., Adano et al., 2012; Detges, 2014; Sternberg, 2012)  it 
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was not necessarily the places experiencing acute climate change impacts that were 
experiencing the conflict outcomes. In Karamoja, this spatial complexity is a central 
reason why the demand for policy and programming that addresses climate-conflict is 
unmet.  
In the final paper, I explain the multiple, overlapping barriers to addressing 
climate-conflict with policy and programming. This paper demonstrates how the complex 
spatiality and temporality of climate-conflict complicate conceptualizations of this 
relationship and efforts to address it. Though I employ data from all stages of research in 
this chapter, these barriers are explained largely in the context of my experiences with 
Mercy Corps. I also demonstrate that when climate-conflict is harnessed for 
peacebuilding, and when the complexity of scale are considered in development 
programming, there exist clearer opportunities for intervention.   
Connecting all of these papers are themes of scale and the impact of discourse on 
policy formation and program implementation. Evident in the data collected for this work 
is that the spatial complexity of climate-conflict inhibits conceptualization of the 
relationship, whereas its temporality complicates how development organizations can 
respond to climate-conflict. Likewise, while the threat multiplier discourse provides 
clarity for global and more abstract conceptualizations of climate-conflict, it offered little 
to, and indeed may have even detracted from, ground-level efforts to conceptualize and 
address climate-conflict.  
The next section situates the broad project of this dissertation in the intersection 
of political ecology, conflict and the environment, and critical development studies. I 
then turn to a literature review on the connection between climate change and conflict, 
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directly addressing key themes and frameworks that link the multiple papers within my 
dissertation. Following this literature review, I turn to a detailed description of the 
research sites. Finally, I turn to the broad methodology that informed the papers focused 
on those research sites.  
 
Methodological & Theoretical Orientation  
This research is informed by literatures at the intersection of political ecology and 
environmental security (e.g., Barnett, 2001; Conca & Wallace, 2009; Floyd, 2008; Levy, 
1995; O’Lear, 2016; Dalby, 2016; Wolf, 2009). As a field, political ecology seeks to 
connect the impacts of environmental degradation with social, economic, and political 
drivers (Forsyth, 2003; Robbins, 2004; Simon, 2008; Watts, 2015)  As described by  
(Robbins, 2004, p.14) “The term political ecology is a generous one that embraces a 
range of definitions… Some definitions stress political economy, while others point to 
more formal political institutions; some stress environmental change, while others 
emphasize narratives or stories about that change.”  Emerging from its roots in 
approaches to the political economy of environmental change and degradation (e.g., 
Blaikie & Brookfield, 2015; Watts, Bohle, May, & Action, 1993; Watts, 1983; Wisner et 
al., 2004), today political ecology calls into question how power dynamics operating 
across scales alter environmental outcomes in particular places often from a political 
economic perspective(Sheppard, 2009). Political ecology explicitly considers why 
resource management and influences on resource management are not contained to the 
‘local’ and that environmental degradation can best be understood through multiple, 
overlapping scales of analysis. For example, in his study on soil erosion in developing 
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countries, Blaikie (1985) demonstrates that the place where environmental degradation 
occurs may not be where the source of degradation is located. Rather environmental 
degradation is an outcome, and a factor in, broader inequalities.  
The academic focus on connections between environmental change and conflict is 
neither new, nor contained within political ecology. As environmental issues gained 
traction in political discourse following the publication of Silent Spring (Carson, 1962) 
and during the second wave of the environmental movement, discussions surrounding the 
degradation of the environment were being brought up in the context of national security 
(Trombetta, 2008 citing Brown, 1977; Falk, 1971).  However, it was not until the 
publication of Our Common Future in 1987 that the issue of environmental security was 
brought into the mainstream of both the environmental and security communities 
(Brundtland, 1987; Trombetta, 2008). At the core of the conversation was the idea that 
global environmental change, specifically global environmental damage (e.g., destruction 
of the ozone layer), created new types of vulnerabilities by threatening the environmental 
systems on which humans rely (Trombetta, 2008).   
This body of work was influential on highly publicized non-academic writing that 
in turn, greatly informed the environmental security discourses of the mid 1990s (most 
notably, Kaplan (1994). Kaplan’s article ‘The Coming Anarchy,’ published in the 
February 1994 issue of The Atlantic Monthly, influenced the thinking of the Clinton 
Administration (R. Kaplan, 1994). At the same time, this piece and others like it were 
heavily criticized as a variation of environmental determinism that misrepresented the 
linkages between the environment and security (see, for example, Deudney, 1990; 
Gleditsch, 1998; Levy, 1995). While influential, the impact of Kaplan’s work remains a 
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site of critique in policy and implementation communities. For example, even more than 
twenty years after its publication, ‘The Coming Anarchy’ was critiqued throughout my 
data collection in various organizations for altering the discourses of environmental 
security, and therefore climate security, in an unhelpful manner too reliant on linear 
explanations to capture the complexity of this relationship.  
In this dissertation, I interrogate this wider environment and conflict literature 
through a branch of political ecology that examines how environmental degradation does 
– or does not – affect conflict (see, for example, Barnett, 2001; Barnett & Adger, 2007; 
Benjaminsen, Alinon, Buhaug, & Buseth, 2012; Le Billon, 2001; Nordås & Gleditsch, 
2007; Peluso & Watts, 2001; Raleigh, Choi, & Kniveton, 2015) and how the sources of 
that degradation are themselves shaped by larger political-economic processes 
(Abrahams & Carr, 2017; Adano et al., 2012; Benjaminsen et al., 2012; Carr, 2013, 2014; 
Dalby, 2015; Sneddon & Fox, 2006; Watts, 1983). As a field, political ecology has been 
central in pushing back on more determinist narratives (Dalby, 2014, 2016a; Floyd, 2008; 
Gleditsch, 1998; Hartmann, 2010; Hayes & Knox-Hayes, 2014; McDonald, 2013; Selby 
& Hoffmann, 2014a; Swyngedouw, 2010), demonstrating how climate change affects (or 
fails to affect) conflict in particular places (Ide et al., 2016; Krampe, 2014; Milman & 
Arsano, 2014; Snorek, Renaud, & Kloos, 2014), and calling attention to the risks of 
securitization (Faris, 2007; Graeger, 1996; Hartmann, 2014; Selby, 2014; Selby & 
Hoffmann, 2014b; Swyngedouw, 2010). This literature argues that without underlying 
vulnerabilities driven by political, social, and economic power structures, biophysical 
impacts worsened by a global climate change would have limited impact conflict 
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dynamics  (Barnett & Adger, 2007; Le Billon, 2001; Raleigh & Urdal, 2007). As 
described by (Le Billon, 2001, p. 575) 
An expanded political ecology approach also allows for a reformulation of the 
dominant arguments on contemporary resource wars. Rather than simply being 
driven by need (resource scarcity) or greed (resource abundance), conflicts may 
be viewed as a historical product inseparable from the social construction and 
political economy of resources. 
 
This dissertation, pays close attention to the discourses of climate-conflict and 
their role in policy and program development. As such, this work is informed by the 
subset of critical development studies focused on discourses, discursive formation, and 
discourse analysis that are generated in the Global North and are applied to interventions 
in the Global South (e.g., Escobar, 1988; Ferguson, 1990; Mitchell, 2002). Discourses, as 
is defined by Escobar, are the politics of truth (Escobar, 1988); discourse analysis, 
therefore, involves a wide array of methodologies to determine the construction and 
interpretation of language and meaning (Ferguson, 1990). Critical discourse analysis 
includes examining both the structures of language as well as social and political context 
through which that language is invoked (Campbell, 2009). A host of renowned critical 
studies effectively demonstrate how power and control are embedded in the discourses of 
development (Escobar, 1988; Fairhead & Leach, 2004; Ferguson, 1990; Luke, 1995; 
Mathews, 2005, 2014; Mitchell, 2002).  For example, (Ferguson, 1990) utilizes 
Foucauldian notions of power and knowledge to examine how development organizations 
“constructed” Lesotho as an object to be worked on in particular ways while masking the 
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inherently political nature of development through technocratic language and expertise 
(Ferguson, 1990).  
Studies such as (Escobar, 1988; Ferguson, 1990) have been central for advancing 
critical development studies. At the same time, to assume high-level discursive formation 
is the only, or even primary, driver of development programming inputs and outcomes, is 
to ignore the agency of the various parties that intake and alter programming across the 
policy-to-development continuum. In this study, following orientations of scholars who 
move past discursive formation as the causal force behind development and policy 
outcomes and incorporate the political, logistical, and operational contexts that regulate 
(and are regulated by) how the climate-conflict discourse threads itself through multiple 
institutions, spaces, and individuals’ perceptions (Carr, 2013; Corbridge, 1998; Escobar, 
1988; McKinnon, 2008; Moore, 1999; Simon, 1997, 2007, 2011; West, 2005).  As is 
evident in this dissertation, discourses shift and change as they are interpreted and 
reinterpreted as they are filtered through perspectives, positionalities, and priorities of 
individuals, teams, and organizations to eventually become observable outcomes (Carr, 
2013; Moore, 1999). Reflecting the work of  Li (1999) this research demonstrates that 
there is no ‘up there’ force that determines a discourse, but instead a series of actors and 
agenda that govern outcomes based on priorities, power, and circumstance.  
 
Geography, Political Ecology and Climate-Conflict  
 
The following section is a slightly modified version of a literature review paper 
on climate-conflict and geographic and political ecological approaches I wrote with Ed 
Carr (Abrahams & Carr, 2017). While I have chosen not to count this paper as one of the 
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three that constitute this dissertation, its content is critical for framing the work of those 
papers. The goal of this paper was to outline state-of-the-art thinking on the topic and the 
methodologies and theoretical perspectives of geographers. As such, it speaks directly to 
the theory and incorporates much of the literature that this dissertation builds upon.  
The intellectual terrain of climate change’s impact on conflict is marked by varied 
disciplinary and institutional interests, methods of gathering and analyzing data, and 
starkly different opinions regarding what the data tells us.2 While the chapter on climate 
and security in the most recent IPCC report makes it clear that, in general, (N. Adger et 
al., 2014) (Adger et al., 2014, p. 758) “human security will be threatened as the climate 
changes” it also argues that (p. 760) “Given the many and complex links between climate 
change and human security, uncertainties in the research on the biophysical dimensions 
of climate change, and the nature of the social science, highly confident statements about 
the influence of climate change on human security are not possible” (Adger et al., 2014). 
In short, The connection between climate change impacts and conflict outcomes is highly 
place and time-specific, and is the product of many different, intersecting factors. It is, 
then, an inherently geographic question, and one to which geography and allied 
disciplines have made substantial contributions in recent years 
In this section, I review the contributions of the literature emerging from 
geography and the closely-allied field of political ecology, including literature heavily 
influenced by lessons from these areas of inquiry, which further the understanding of the 
                                               
2 This section is adapted from a literature review published in Current Climate Change Reports, 
titled ‘Understanding the Connections Between Climate Change and Conflict: Contributions from 
Geography and Political Ecology’. For the purposes of clarity I replace all uses of the plural ‘we’ 




connections between climate change impacts and conflict. I focus on how this literature 
challenges the threat multiplier narrative, which remains prevalent, most evidently in 
policy communities. I begin with a brief situation of the question of climate change 
impacts and conflict in broader geographic questions surrounding the relationship 
between conflict and the environment. I then present the methods used for this review, 
before turning to the literature to assess the methods used, and the broad themes and 
findings which emerge from, or have drawn upon, lessons from the geographic and 
political ecological literatures. I close with a brief discussion of gaps in this literature that 
point to future research directions.  
 
(i) Conflict and the Environment in Geography and Political Ecology 
While geography is an integrative discipline, and therefore challenging to define 
in terms of unique methods, subject areas, or interests, it has been marked since its formal 
inception by strong interests in the relationship between people and the environment, and 
by the particularities of place that shape the human experience. It is not surprising, then, 
that geography has long taken an interest in particular cases of conflict that emerge 
around the human use of and experience with the environment (Adger et al., 2014; 
Barnett, 2001; Peluso, 2008; Peluso & Watts, 2001). This interest is most clearly 
expressed in the subfield of political ecology, which emerged from the fields of hazards 
and risk, integrating political economy and the environment perhaps most clearly in terms 
of the structural causes of famine and other disasters (Watts, 1983; Watts & Bohle, 
1993), the conflict emerging around conservation efforts (Brockington, 2002; Goldman, 
2011; King, 2010; Ramutsindela, 2007; Schroeder, 1999), and the challenges that emerge 
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around agrarian change (Bassett, 1998; Carr, 2011; Peters & Kambewa, 2007).  
Political ecology is not the exclusive province of geography, as it emerged across 
a range of fields (including anthropology and rural sociology). However, in whatever 
disciplinary context it might be enacted, contemporary political ecological research draws 
heavily on geographic framings of scale and political economy, thus drawing the two 
fields into what might be represented as a heavily-overlapping Venn diagram. It is 
marked by a broad consideration of the ways in which various processes at different 
scales plays out in particular nature-society relationships, and emerged from a cultural 
ecological fascination with the ways people, communities, and societies adapt to their 
environments (Watts, 2015). From this geographically-informed lens, climate change and 
its impacts on the environment is a natural fit for political ecology. It links global 
processes of change to impacts on the environment and people in particular places.  
For this review, I focus on the literature comprised of place-based and critical 
policy studies that speak to our understandings of the connection between climate change 
and conflict. This literature is not all explicitly political ecological or even geographic, 
but it draws heavily from the lessons of these bodies of thought – whether such influence 
is overtly acknowledged or not. More specifically, I examine how these studies are used 
to critique and further understand the discourses and contextualized realities of the 
climate-conflict nexus.  
 
(ii) Methodology for the Review  
This review focuses on literature published after the most recent IPCC 
Assessment Report, the first to have a chapter dedicated to human security that reviewed 
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current thought on the intersections between climate and conflict and climate and security 
(Adger et al., 2014). I used Google Scholar to identify literature exploring these 
connections as it provided the widest coverage of the social sciences and because some 
significant publications (or citations to important publications) are found in the gray 
literature, both of which are better covered in Google Scholar when compared with other 
scholarly databases (e.g., Web of Science). The gray literature, which is not necessarily 
peer-reviewed, has played an important role in shaping the discourses of climate-conflict. 
Further, because it is used in advocacy and policy making, it was important to integrate 
this work into the literature review to more fully demonstrate how the discourses of 
climate-conflict developed.  
Table 1.1 shows the search terms and total results. In some cases, we excluded 
terms that were irrelevant to the search but made the results difficult to navigate.3 Articles 
were then examined for their relevance to the question of how the geographic and 
political ecological literature approaches the connection between climate and conflict. All 
relevant publications were then organized by theme.  
There are references to articles before the period defined above. That is for the 
following reasons 1) in some cases the work we were reviewing cited these articles; 2) 
the articles are grounding, foundational, or otherwise central to the points we make in this 
review; 3) I felt it important to demonstrate how understandings of a topic have evolved 
over time.  
 
  
                                               
3 For example, “job security” and “food security” when searching for climate change and security 
greatly increased total documents to point of being unnavigable. 
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Table 1.1: Search Terms 
 
Search Terms (title only)  Total Articles 
"climate change" AND security 297 
“climate change” AND conflict 126 
“climate security” OR “climate-security” 96 
“climate conflict” OR “climate-conflict” 91 
conflict AND adaptation AND climate 12 
security AND adaptation AND climate 12 
resilience AND conflict AND climate 8 
“drought AND conflict” 7 
“weather AND conflict” 6 
resilience AND security AND climate 5 
"global warming" AND conflict OR security 4 
resilience AND climate AND climate “peace building” OR 
peacebuilding 
1 
adaptation AND climate AND “peace building” OR peacebuilding  0 
 
(iii) Geographic Approaches to Studying the Climate-Conflict Connection  
As boundary (sub)disciplines or fields of thought, geography and political 
ecology utilize multiple methods to examine the role of climate change in causing, 
perpetuating, or even alleviating conflict. This diversity of methods is a core strength of 
geography as an integrative discipline. Geographical and geographically informed 
examinations of the link between climate  change and conflict have employed a range of 
methodological tools including mapping climate-conflict vulnerability (e.g., Busby, 
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Smith, & Krishnan, 2014; Busby, Smith, White, & Strange, 2013), the remote sensing of 
land use change as it relates to climate-conflict (e.g., Uexkull, Croicu, & Fjelde, 2014), 
quantifying climate-conflict risk in particular places (e.g., Bell & Keys, 2016; Seter, 
2016; Weezel, 2015), qualitative case studies (e.g., Chandra, McNamara, Dargusch, 
Caspe, & Dalabajan, 2017), critical studies examining the narratives and realities of the 
nexus (e.g., Selby & Hoffmann, 2014), and discourse analysis examining how policy 
approaches develop and are understood across spatial and temporal scales (e.g., Hayes & 
Knox-Hayes, 2014). For this study I examine the following: 4 
• Case studies that capture the place-specific interactions of climate change, climate 
variability, and conflict with a wider political economy (e.g., Chandra et al., 2017; 
Gleick, 2014; Milman & Arsano, 2014; Snorek, Renaud, & Kloos, 2014; Tubi & 
Feitelson, 2016; Vivekananda, Schilling, & Smith, 2014). 
• Efforts aimed at the development and testing of conceptual models and spatial and 
temporal aspects of the climate-conflict nexus (e.g., Baalen & Mobjörk, 2016; 
Brzoska & Fröhlich, 2016; Devlin & Hendrix, 2014; Feitelson & Tubi, 2017; 
Namasaka, 2015; Rüttinger et al., 2015).  
• Critical analysis of policy and discourses related to the nexus, including examinations 
the nexus in the context of policy formulation, power dynamics and securitization 
(e.g., Dalby, 2014, 2016; Dunlap & Fairhead, 2014; Hartmann, 2014; Mason, 2014; 
Santelices Spikin & Rojas Hernández, 2016; Jan Selby, 2014). 
• Review studies that amalgamate findings in order to find points of consensus 
                                               
4 While I do not review studies that employ mapping or remote sensing as primary 
methodologies, we do consider that work in the broader context of the review. 
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regarding the connection between climate change and conflict/security and identify 
critical research gaps for the field (e.g., Baalen & Mobjörk, 2016; Bretthauer, 2016; 
Namasaka, 2015; Rüttinger et al., 2015) 
 
1) Case Studies: Developing and Refining Theory    
In the wider climate-conflict field, after large-N quantitative studies, the most 
common way to examine this relationship is through qualitative case studies (Ide, 2017). 
Studies rooted in a particular place and time, or examining a particular organization or 
policy, are important not only for understanding how climate change interacts with 
conflict in specific contexts, but also for grounding, contextualizing, and testing theories 
present in quantitative studies and theoretical arguments. For simplicity, I broadly 
describe this work as case studies. Ide (2017), in his review of different research methods 
used to examine the link between climate change and conflict, provides a typology of 
qualitative research that includes (Ide, 2017):  
 
• tracing how the mechanisms linking climate change or variability to conflict 
interact in a particular place or time (e.g., Feitelson & Tubi, 2017; Gleick, 2014; 
Swain & Jägerskog, 2016).  
• ethnographic studies of communities affected by climate change and conflict 
(e.g., Chandra et al., 2017; Milman & Arsano, 2014; Snorek et al., 2014). 
• research that contextualizes climate change and conflict dynamics into a broader 
political economy (e.g., Asah, 2015; Ide, Schilling, Link, Scheffran, & Ngaruiya, 




These studies employ a range of data collection methods, largely embodied in 
qualitative case studies (i.e., interviews, direct observation, surveys), but also incorporate 
tools from related areas including GISciences, remote sensing, and data collection and 
analysis focus on atmospheric sciences and biophysical processes. Qualitative case 
studies, which ground the intersection of social, political, economic, and biophysical 
processes in particular places, provide the highly granular, contextual data necessary to 
understand the processes through which climate change impacts are – or are not – 
translated into conflict. For example, Chandra et al. (2017) demonstrate how different 
genders experience conflict-related vulnerabilities related to climate variability and 
change in Mindano, Philippines (Chandra et al., 2017). While both women and men 
smallholder farmers face increased vulnerability as a result of climate change and 
conflict, the impacts of extreme climate events had more severe impacts on women, 
including loss of land rights and forced migration (Chandra et al., 2017). Ide et al. (2014) 
exemplify a more mixed methods approach; using both qualitative and quantitative 
methods to map climate-conflict links in Kenya and Uganda (Ide et al., 2014).  Using a 
spatial lens on the question of climate-conflict connections, the authors were able to 
determine where joint effects of climate change and conflict are most likely to occur.  
 
2) Discourses, Policy Analysis, and Securitization 
The geographic approach to discourse analysis is greatly influenced by post-
structuralism and Foucauldian theory (Carr & McCusker, 2009; Dixon, Paul, & Jones, 
1996; Peet, 1998; Pickles, 2001) and largely focuses on how power and policy reflect and 
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refract understandings of place and the relationship between people and the environment. 
Discourse analysis generally rests on the critical analysis of existing documentation and 
literature, but can also employ key informant interviews and direct observation. Much of 
the literature examining the discourses of climate-conflict is a direct response to positivist 
studies purporting a more direct relationship between climate change and conflict (Selby, 
2014).  
With its heavy focus on discourses of nature and society, geography has provided 
tools and lessons that subtly shape a growing literature that not only draws attention to 
the inherent risks of securitizing climate change, but also by employing the lessons of 
previous criticisms of simplistic connections between people and the environment to 
problematize the overly determinative discourses that purport a stronger relationship 
between climate change and conflict than is evident in the data. This includes 
examinations of: 
 
• the climate-conflict nexus that call into question the validity of the connection 
purported in select large-N quantitative studies or instances in which the climate-
conflict nexus was overstated in specific contexts (Dunlap & Fairhead, 2014; 
Hartmann, 2014; Mason, 2014; Selby & Hoffmann, 2014; Selby, 2014) 
• the progression of knowledge and understanding of the nexus as well as the 
evolution of the discourse (Boas & Rothe, 2016; Floyd, 2015; Gemenne, Barnett, 
Adger, & Dabelko, 2014; Ide & Scheffran, 2014; Lewis & Lenton, 2015; 
McDonald, 2013; Okpara, Stringer, & Dougill, 2016) 
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• how different organizations perceive and seek to address the climate-conflict 
nexus (Conca, Thwaites, & Lee, 2016; Hayes & Knox-Hayes, 2014; Scott, 2015) 
as well as how the discourses of climate change translate into policy informed by 
their institutional identity (Floyd, 2015; Hayes & Knox-Hayes, 2014) 
• the climate-conflict nexus as it relates to securitization and/or neoliberalism 
(Asah, 2015; Dunlap & Fairhead, 2014; Floyd, 2015; Hayes & Knox-Hayes, 
2014; Mason, 2014). The securitization literature is largely focused on the risks of 
depoliticizing conflict through narratives that ignore the root causes of conflict 
(Mason, 2014; Selby & Hoffmann, 2014), further enforcing existing power 
structures through environmentally driven governmentality (Mason, 2014; von 
Lucke, 2016), and/or reinforcing states’ disproportionate focus on activities that 
reinforce existing power structures (Boas, 2015). 
 
Below I describe key contributions from the contemporary geographic and political 
ecological literature (including literatures informed by one or both), with particular 
attention to that portion of the literature centered on qualitative case studies. This body of 
work, largely informed by theory and methods typical of political ecology, points to a 
need to expand current perspectives on the connection between climate change and 
conflict beyond a unlinear model tracing climate change to conflict or insecurity.  
 
Geographic contributions to understandings of climate-conflict relationships 
The most common framing of the climate-conflict nexus, particularly within 
policy communities, is that of climate change as a threat multiplier (CNA, 2007, 2014; 
  
 21 
Lewis & Lenton, 2015; Rüttinger et al., 2015; USAID, 2014). This framing suggests that 
climate change won’t cause conflict, but it can exacerbate the risks or worsen the impacts 
of conflict. This discourse was popularized by a 2007 report issued by the Center for 
Naval Analysis (CNA) (CNA, 2007), and has persisted, despite CNA more recently 
reframing climate change as a conflict catalyst that accelerates instability (CNA, 2014). 
The Arab Spring, is a commonly referenced, though contested (Selby, Dahi, 
Fröhlich, & Hulme, 2017), example of the role of climate change as a threat multiplier 
(Fetzek & Mazo, 2014; Gleick, 2014; Kelley et al., 2015). In the instance of the Arab 
Spring, scholars are careful to describe climate change impacts as factors that hastened or 
exacerbated, but did not cause, the uprisings across the Middle East and North Africa, as 
well as in conflict events that followed (Gleick, 2014; Kelley et al., 2015; Sternberg, 
2012; Werrell & Femia, 2013). Similarly, the largely gray literature associated with the 
policy and implementation community reflects the framing of climate change as a threat 
multiplier (Baalen & Mobjörk, 2016; Reiling & Brady, 2015).  
The threat multiplier framing, while helpful in moving away from causal and 
explicitly deterministic arguments to allow space for place- and time-specific 
understandings of the relationship between climate and conflict, is imperfect. When first 
developed, it was predominantly understood in security and defense terms, as the idea 
was put forth primarily for those purposes. Yet as the discourse has evolved, a range of 
other actors are now engaging with the nexus (Boas & Rothe, 2016), including many 
non-security-oriented communities such as development, humanitarian, environmental, 
and diplomatic actors. Many of the findings of the geographic and political ecological 
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literature on climate and conflict nuance, build on, or critique this threat multiplier 
framing.  
 
(iv) Scale and the Understanding of Climate Change and Conflict 
Geographic literature that examines the climate-conflict nexus builds upon a 
broader disciplinary history of conceptual, critical, and applied examinations of scale. 
The temporal and spatial scale at which one examines the relationship between climate 
change and conflict is a critical determinant of how the problem is framed and 
understood, and how efforts to address the link are conceptualized (Adger et al., 2014; 
Devlin & Hendrix, 2014; Ide et al., 2014; Lewis & Lenton, 2015; Salehyan, 2014). 
Varied understandings and different framings of temporal and spatial scale are often cited 
as reasons why the climate-conflict nexus remains so contentious (Adger et al., 2014; 
Bell & Keys, 2016; Buhaug, 2015; Devlin & Hendrix, 2014; Ide et al., 2014; Lewis & 
Lenton, 2015; Salehyan, 2014; Seter, 2016). For instance, the impacts of climate change 
in one place might drive conflict in another. As argued by (Salehyan, 2014, p. 2):  
Aggregate statistics on food and water availability at the national level in a 
country as large as say, India, may mask local-level variation; rainfall statistics for 
India may not accurately reflect water availability in conflict-prone Assam state. 
Yet, if there are reasons to believe that rural people affected by drought or other 
natural disasters will take their protests to the capital, migrate to urban areas, or 
join highly-mobile rebel organizations, then there is no reason to believe that 




The Arab Spring again offers a contextual example of the complications of scale 
in the context of the threat multiplier discourse. Though no scholars argue that the Arab 
Spring was caused by climate change, many argue that it was hastened, or affected by the 
impacts of a changing climate (Beck, 2014; Fetzek & Mazo, 2014; Gleick, 2014; Kelley 
et al., 2015; Sternberg, 2012). One of those arguments is that climate change-linked 
drought in Russia devastated wheat harvests, which generated grain shortages that 
reverberated through an increasingly interconnected global food system, resulting in an 
increase in global wheat prices (Sternberg, 2012). The price of bread increased 
substantially – in some places upwards of 300% - sparking so-called ‘bread riots’ which 
injected significant momentum into the then-nascent Arab Spring (Sternberg, 2012). In 
this case, the distance between the “multiplier” and the conflict outcome highlights the 
challenge of where to adapt to the threat multiplier effects of climate change.  
The geographic literature also suggests that temporal scale is an important 
determinant of how the nexus is understood and potentially acted upon. Climate change 
and climate variability are often conflated in the broader climate change discussion 
(Seter, 2016), and in the climate-conflict literature. the difference is not always made 
explicit. As further explained by Seter (2016, p. 2) (Seter, 2016): 
Climate change says something about changes in mean climate at a location over long 
periods, whereas climate variability describes short-term changes in climate (such as 
standard deviations, the occurrence of extremes, etc.) (IPCC, 2007, pp. 871–872). An 
effect of climate variability (anomalously warm or dry periods) on conflict levels 
cannot automatically be translated into the conclusion that climate change (a warmer 




The temporal scale at which one understands climate-conflict connections can 
implicate climate change, climate variability, and climate shocks, thus influencing 
academic findings as well as policy design and implementation. In examining the 
atmospheric shocks that link climate change to conflict, some onset over years (drought) 
and others can have rapid onset (e.g., floods, cyclones). Treating all shocks as similar 
drivers of conflict without a deep consideration of their different manifestations and 
impacts could obscure important stressor-specific linkages, while enabling problematic 
policies and programs that could themselves trigger conflict (Dabelko et al., 2013; Lewis 
& Lenton, 2015; Rüttinger et al., 2015; Salehyan, 2014; Seter, 2016; Snorek et al., 2014) 
Therefore a careful consideration of how the different timescales of climate change 
impacts affect different scales of conflict is essential for fully understanding the 
mechanisms of climate-conflict generally, as well as in specific contexts (Salehyan, 
2014). This includes differentiating short-term shocks from long-term shifts and 
understanding the nuance of these impacts in the context of particular places.   
Without a robust understanding of the ways in which human responses to the 
short-term expression of climate variability might be linked to human responses to the 
local impacts of longer-term changes in the global climate, studies that use climate 
variability as a proxy for climate change rest on assumptions that are without empirical 
verification. A number of studies offer insight by linking climate change, conflict, and the 
intermediary effects that largely define climate change (T. Benjaminsen et al., 2012). By 
connecting climate variability to the factors that can affect conflict, this subset of 
literature can offer important insights into the mechanics by which climate change may or 
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may not affect conflict, and thus the validity of the assumptions that drive some larger-
scale investigations of the linkages between climate and conflict (e.g., Devlin & Hendrix, 
2014; Raleigh, Choi, & Kniveton, 2015).  
 
(v) Resilience and Vulnerability  
The framing of climate change as a threat multiplier often presents climate change 
outcomes as the product of exposure to environmental changes and/or events, sensitivity 
to those changes/events, and a community’s adaptive capacity (Vivekananda et al., 2014; 
Vivekananda, Schilling, & Smith, 2014a). In that way, the political ecology of climate 
change and conflict closely mirrors the hazard-disaster frameworks for vulnerability 
(Wisner et al., 2004).  That is, climate change and variability, or more accurately the 
rapid and slow onset shocks related to climate change and variability, can exacerbate or 
trigger conflict. This is framed most often as a function of high and direct reliance on 
primary production with limited adaptive capacity in the context of place and time 
(Brzoska & Fröhlich, 2016; Ide & Scheffran, 2014; Raleigh et al., 2015). This viewpoint 
is clearly embodied in a report commissioned by the G7, A New Climate For Peace 
(Rüttinger et al., 2015). The report noted the following seven compounding factors that 
link climate change with conflict: 1) local resource competition; 2) livelihood insecurity 
and migration; 3) extreme weather and disasters; 4) volatile food prices and provision; 5) 
transboundary water management; 6) sea-level rise and coastal degradation; and 7) 
unintended effects of climate policies. Nearly all of these compounding factors assume 
reliance on primary production or limited adaptive capacity. 
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 Both the academic and the gray literature offer resilience as a means of 
broadening the vulnerability lens beyond a focus on primary production to consider a 
wider range of drivers, outcomes, and relationships (Crawford, Dazé, Hammill, Parry, & 
Zamudio, 2015; USAID, 2014; Vivekananda et al., 2014a; Vivekananda, Schilling, & 
Smith, 2014b). While the resilience framework emerged from ecology and socio-
ecological studies, its implementation in the context of climate and conflict clearly takes 
on the lessons of political ecology that stress a need to look beyond proximate 
environmental factors to larger issues of political economy when explaining the rise (or 
lack of a rise) of conflict in particular places. Even some scholars critical of claims about 
the connection between climate change and conflict see a focus on resilience as 
productive. For example, Boas and Rothe (2016) argue that resilience offers a reframing 
of the climate-security nexus in a way that allows for action, adding (p. 628):  
Freed from the alarmist tone of climate conflict storylines, and acknowledging the 
complexity of socio-ecological drivers of insecurity, climate security discourse 
becomes something to which developing and emerging states, actors from the 
development field, and critical academics can again relate. 
 
This wider lens on climate-conflict relationships can be employed to productive 
ends. USAID (2014) provides an example of how peacebuilding and resilience are 
interrelated. One of their partners, Mercy Corps, implemented conflict resolution 
mechanisms among pastoralists in Southern Ethiopia (USAID, 2014). The freedom of 
movement that followed, and the associated access to pasture and water, led to increased 
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adaptive capacity and higher rates of drought resilience when compared with other 
groups.  
Resilience efforts, however, are not free of the challenges that accompany more 
targeted adaptation efforts. As described by Vivekananda and her co-authors 
(Vivekananda et al., 2014b) in their study of community resilience in the context of 
conflict, in all of the study areas resilience-building efforts also drove unintended 
consequences, including negative impacts on the long-term sustainability of food 
security, alterations to labor markets, and conflict centered on the aid efforts themselves. 
Furthermore, resilience-based approaches in the context of climate change-affected 
conflict present a range of practical and conceptual challenges to implementation and 
academic communities. While resilience-centric programming seeks to bolster the ability 
of communities to deal with the sorts of shocks and stressors that can exacerbate, trigger, 
or make communities more vulnerable to conflict, the inherent vagueness of the term can 
push interventions away from a broader political ecological framing of stressors into a 
focus on more immediate needs, thereby limiting the long-term impacts of resilience 
programming. 
 
(vi) Environmental Peacebuilding 
While vulnerability and resilience perspectives introduce nuance into the vague 
framing of the threat multiplier, it is important to acknowledge that this relationship is not 
merely one where climate change drives conflict vulnerability. The increased 
vulnerability to climate shocks as a result of conflict is an important, but oft-ignored 
component of the climate-conflict nexus (Buhaug, 2016; Buhaug, 2015; Dabelko et al., 
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2013; Gemenne et al., 2014; Lewis & Lenton, 2015; USAID, 2014). While there remains 
considerable controversy over the mechanics of the climate-conflict nexus, there is little 
disagreement over the impacts of conflict on vulnerability to climate shocks (U. T. 
Okpara et al., 2016).  Indeed as noted in the IPCC chapter on Human Security, “conflict 
strongly influences vulnerability to climate change impacts” (Adger et al., 2014), p. 758). 
The negative impact of conflict on vulnerability manifests in negative impacts on long-
term investment, infrastructure, and human suffering leading to communities’ with 
limited resilience to climactic shocks (Buhaug, 2016). And while much of this of this link 
is intuitive, a deeper understanding is needed to understand how conflict can exacerbate 
climate change vulnerability and how these joint challenges can best be addressed.  
The concern for conflict-generated vulnerability to climate change raises the issue 
of environmental peacebuilding. Political ecological studies (Krampe 2014; Matthew 
2014) and gray literature (Reiling & Brady, 2015) examining the connections between 
climate change and conflict outcomes demonstrate that while climate change can, in fact, 
negatively affect conflict, it can also be harnessed for peacebuilding activities (Buhaug, 
2016; Gemenne et al., 2014; Link, Scheffran, & Ide, 2016; Matthew, 2014). These studies 
show that resource scarcity will not always drive risk and can, in fact, drive cooperation 
(Crawford et al., 2015; Dinar, Katz, Stefano, & Blankespoor, 2015; Gemenne et al., 
2014; Krampe, 2014; Matthew, 2014). Yet the potential of climate change as a factor in 
peacebuilding has not received much attention when compared with climate change’s 
role as a driver of conflict (Asah, 2015; Buhaug, 2016; Crawford et al., 2015; Egorova & 
Hendrix, n.d.; Gemenne et al., 2014; Krampe, 2014; Link et al., 2016; Richard Matthew, 
2014). This is of particular salience when considering the spatial dynamics of the climate-
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conflict relationship. There is considerable geographical overlap between areas 
conducting ongoing peacebuilding activities and places vulnerable to the effects of 
climate change, including effects on conflict (Busby et al., 2014; Busby et al., 2014). This 
is evident in Asah’s examination of hydropolitics in the Lake Chad Basin (LCB) (Asah, 
2015). The LCB faces overlapping challenges of water scarcity, inter- and intra-state 
conflict, and unequal distribution of water, all of which necessitate interstate cooperation 
and threatens water security. Further, power dynamics also affect these issues, with 
Nigeria having considerably more power to mobilize water use than other countries in the 
basin (Asah, 2015). As a result of this convergence, both peacebuilding and adaptation to 
the effects of climate change are closely intertwined (Asah, 2015). This nuanced 
understanding of hydropolitics is requisite for preventing conflict, aiding in sustainable 
water management, and facilitating cooperation and peacebuilding in the LCB (Asah, 
2015).   
As noted by (Buhaug, 2016, p. 336) “robust scientific evidence indicates that 
peacebuilding is the most effective climate resilience strategy in war-torn regions. 
Without peace and stable, well-functioning political institutions it is hard to see how 
societies can address existing and future security challenges affected by climate change.” 
There are, however, inherent challenges to environmental peacebuilding in conflict-prone 
areas. As described by Matthew (2014) in their work on Rwanda and Sierra Leone, while 
it would be beneficial to integrate climate change adaptation into UN peacebuilding 
missions, it will also be seen as an additional cost in a sector that puts a premium on 
quick benefits (Matthew, 2014). Thus, it will be treated as a low priority in the urgent 




(vii) Backdraft: The Conflict Impacts of Climate Change Adaptation 
Further problematizing the idea of a unidirectional threat multiplier at the climate 
conflict nexus is the growing literature demonstrating that there are conflict risks related 
to adaptation efforts (Dabelko et al., 2013; Milman & Arsano, 2014; Reiling & Brady, 
2015; Snorek et al., 2014). This literature argues that such efforts, if not carefully 
considered in the context of conflict, risk triggering conflict, principally through the 
unequal distribution of adaptation benefits (Dabelko et al., 2013; Milman & Arsano, 
2014; Reiling & Brady, 2015; Snorek et al., 2014). Demonstrating the complex spatiality 
of addressing climate-conflict connections, Milman and Arsano (2014), in their study of 
Gambella, Ethiopia, describe the challenges and possibly inherent contradictions in 
adaptation programs which, in aiming to decrease vulnerability for one group, 
simultaneously increase the vulnerability of another group, potentially leading to conflict 
(Milman & Arsano, 2014). Similarly, Snorek et al (2014), using the example of 
agriculturalists and pastoralists in Niger, describes what they deem ‘divergent 
adaptation’, a situation where an adaptation to climate shocks by one group increases the 
vulnerability of another  (Snorek et al., 2014).    
 
Geographically deconstructing the threat multiplier 
 As is evident across multiple review articles, there are some points of consensus 
in the often-contentious climate-conflict literature. While not solely responsible for the 
following insights, the grounding of geography and political ecology has contributed 




• The relationship between climate change and conflict is not causal; it is widely 
acknowledged that climate change interacts with a host of other issues to produce 
conflict (or build peace). 
• While the places most likely to be affected by climate-affected conflict have 
preexisting tensions and conflict and are likely to have limited capacity to cope 
with climatic shifts, focusing heavily on places with a reliance on primary 
production and limited adaptive capacity overly-constrains our understanding of 
conflict outcomes.  
• Conflict increases vulnerability to climate change.  
• Adaptation efforts can trigger conflict. 
 
The geographic and political ecological literature make it clear that more 
productive approaches to understanding the climate-conflict relationship emerge when 
we move beyond linear examinations of climate change’s impact on conflict (Buhaug, 
2015; Gemenne et al., 2014; Ide, Link, Scheffran, & Schilling, 2016). Despite the 
demonstrated multi-directional nature of the relationship between climate change and 
conflict, much of the academic literature and the policy communities active on the issue 
continue to approach this relationship predominantly through the conflict risk lens 
embodied in the threat multiplier framing. While helpful for moving away from causal 
frames evident both in earlier environmental security discourses as well as some 
contemporary climate-security framings, the threat multiplier framing is unidirectional 
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and tells us nothing about the scales, both temporally and spatially, on which climate 
change may interact with conflict.  
I argue that this disconnect exists because current work on the relationship 
between climate and conflict largely ignores the question of how to address this 
relationship in a productive manner. As argued by Vivekananda, Schilling, & Smith 
(2014, p. 497) while highlighting the limitations of large-N studies, “The focus of the 
quantitative literature on identifying correlations and arguing causality between climate 
change and conflict has been of limited value for the peacebuilding community as it 
provides no answer to the question of how climatic changes and conflict might be 
related” (Vivekananda et al., 2014a). This, I argue, is where the qualitative, highly 
granular spatial and temporal framings that have been the hallmark of geographic and 
political ecological work on the climate-conflict nexus can move the literature and 
practice forward. This type of scholarship provides explanations for the patterns of 
climate change and conflict identified in the broader literature, and offers detailed 
framings of particular conflict events that point to sites for productive intervention 
through development, adaptation, or conflict mitigation programming. However, for 
these qualitative, granular findings to have wide impact and import, they will need to 
explore productive connections between case-based work and larger datasets that allow 
for their detailed findings to inform work in a wider set of contexts. Likewise, moving 
beyond framings solely rooted in vulnerability, most notably climate change as a threat 
multiplier, and a direct engagement with climate change as a factor in peacebuilding, 
conflict as a factor in climate change vulnerability, and the potential risks of adaptation 
efforts will lead to more effective policy that seeks to address the relationships between 
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climate change and conflict.  
 
Understanding Mercy Corps 
 
The extent to which an NGO’s mission drives programming is variable and 
difficult to gauge. Nonetheless, organizational self-identification is an important starting 
point to understanding how development discourses, in this case those focused on linking 
climate change and conflict, get incorporated into organizational strategy.  Mercy Corps’ 
official mission is “To alleviate suffering, poverty and oppression by helping people 
build secure, productive and just communities” (Mercy Corps, 2018, p. 1). As further 
described in their most recent audit, (KPMG, 2017, p. 7) 
Mercy Corps is a global organization, 5000 strong, powered by the belief that a 
better world is possible. Mercy Corps helps people survive and get back on their 
feet when natural disaster strikes, economies collapse or conflict erupts. Where 
there are chronic threats to peace and progress, Mercy Corps partners with 
communities to overcome obstacles and thrive… Mercy Corps employees live 
and work in more than 40 countries facing the world’s toughest challenges. For 
more than three decades, Mercy Corps has worked alongside more than 170 
million extraordinary people to strengthen their communities from within. In 
everything we do, Mercy Corps looks for moments of transition to connect people 




Though this research expands beyond Mercy Corps, I treat them, and more 
specifically the two programs they are implementing in Karamoja, Uganda (BRACED 
and PEACE III), as the research site. While Mercy Corps and their work does not fully 
represent  all development organizations, they offer insight into the typical processes of 
development that speak to the research question and sub-questions at the heart of this 
project: they raise budgets, implement programming, work with partners, mobilize 
communities, deliver services, report to donors, and monitor and evaluate their projects. 
Therefore, Mercy Corps and those two projects provide a lens on the challenges, 
opportunities, and day-to-day realities of implementing climate-conflict-related 
development programming. My time with Mercy Corps does not allow me to speak to all 
of the intricacies of an organization vast in size and scope, as my observations of 
differing views and (at times) conflicting interests and beliefs within the organization 
demonstrate that it is far from a monolith. However, the research design, which included 
time at multiple types of offices, provided critical insight into how development efforts – 
and conceptualizations of development – differ across the organization.  
 
Mercy Corps Financial Information  
With more than 5000 employees and nearly $400 million in operating expenses, 
Mercy Corps has a large, and rapidly growing presence amongst development 
implementers. By their own accounts, employees see themselves as part of an innovative 
organization – which they see as unique in development. For example, when describing 
the potential challenges of addressing large scale environmental destruction, a senior 
member of Mercy Corps noted that even if the organization was taking a risk, it ought to 
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target high-risk, high-reward efforts because if Mercy Corps was not, nobody else was, 
insinuating that they were more flexible, innovative, and entrepreneurial than most large 
development organizations. 
In my discussions with Mercy Corps employees, many noted their need to re-
imagine themselves from a mid-sized ‘scrappy’ organization to an influential 
organization within the development and humanitarian sectors. This was a shift that they 
sought to capitalize and build on. To that end, there was a broader sense that Mercy 
Corps’ rapid growth and innovative approach has given them an opportunity to steer 
development trends in a direction that had not previously been possible. For example, in a 
conversation between Mercy Corps’ Environment, Energy, and Climate (EEC) Technical 
Support Unit (TSU) team and senior leadership, there was widespread agreement that use 
of the organizations’ Strategic Resilience Assessment (STRESS) (a tool to measure 
resilience capacity) was shifting not only efforts within Mercy Corps, but also other 
organizations’ efforts in certain geographies. As such, they viewed their role to include 
both implementing on behalf of donors and influencing donors to shift how and where 
they fund and design programming. 
As is demonstrated in Figure 1.1, Mercy Corps has seen a rapid increase in 
funding and expenditures over the span of the past decade.  According to their most 
recent financial disclosure, for the fiscal year July 1, 2016 – June 30, 2017 (FY 16-17), 
the agency had $392.4 million in programmatic expenses (Audit, Annual Reports). In 
2006, Mercy Corps had total operating expenses of $215.3 million. This growth can be 
attributed to multiple factors. Based on trends evident in financial data (see Figure 1.2), 
descriptions in annual reports, and discussions with Mercy Corps staff, their growth is 
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most directly attributable to increasing funding for ongoing refugee crises, steadily 
increasing capacity and funding for long-term development and resiliency efforts (largely 
focused on fragile places), and an increasing visibility as a major development 
implementer with expertise in complex crisis. As described to me by a senior EEC team 
member as a means of contextualizing how the agency has changed, this increase in 
funding, size, and presence means that they now need to be part of any humanitarian 




Figure 1.1: Mercy Corps Growth in millions (data source: financial Audits 2007-2017) 
 
Mercy Corps funds come from a mix of public and private support; for FY 16-17 
they received $287.7 million from Government support and $139.3 million from private 
support (i.e., fundraising). As is seen in Figure 1.1, this composition of funding has 
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roughly equal amounts of public and private support.5 This shift in orientation is notable 
as it will likely results in them being more attentive and responsive to donors’ priorities 
due to 1) the importance of speaking to donor priorities and initiatives; and 2) the higher 




Figure 1.2: Composition of Funding Sources (in millions) 
 
Evident in Figure 1.3 is that while funding for ‘health’, ‘civil society and 
education’ and ‘humanitarian assistance – recovery’ has stayed relatively steady over 
time, the increase in funding for ‘livelihood and economic development’ as well as 
‘humanitarian assistance – relief’ accounts for the increase in Mercy Corps funding. The 
amount of funding for ‘humanitarian assistance – relief’ spikes and dips dramatically in 
                                               
5 This chart does include what is referred to as ‘other’ in the annual reports; all data are from 
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response to worldwide events. Based on discussions with Mercy Corps staff, it is likely 
that the sharp spike in funding for humanitarian assistance – relief, beginning in 2013, 
can be explained by their response to a series of events including drought in the Horn of 
Africa, typhoon Haiyan which struck the Philippines, and the Syrian Civil War (Mercy 
Corps, 2013). The steady increases in funding for livelihood and economic development 
is largely due to the organization’s increased focus on resilience and longer-term 
development efforts. As the discourses of development have shifted increasingly towards 
achieving ‘resilience’ which speaks to addressing vulnerabilities and fragility (see, for 
example, USAID 2014), Mercy Corps has leveraged its capacity in places experiencing 
complex crisis to implement longer-term development projects (e.g., BRACED in 




Figure 1.3: Mercy Corps Expenditures (in millions), data source: Mercy Corps Annual 
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Despite Mercy Corps’ efforts in longer-term development, resilience, and disaster risk 
reduction, organizational discourses continue to stress its capacity in difficult-to-access 
places and complex crises. Within that framing, they position themselves as an 
organization with unique capacities and capabilities to address conflict (Relief Web, 
2018).6 Indeed, references to “saving and improving lives in the world’s toughest places” 
was often displayed in stickers and posters throughout offices (see Figure 1.4). However, 
as is clear in spending breakdowns (see Figure 1.3), the organizational mandate is not 
limited to immediate emergency response and includes longer-term development 
initiatives (often in places experiencing complex crisis. Funds earmarked as humanitarian 
assistance and relief accounted for slightly less than half of overall organizational 
spending for FY 16-17; longer-term development work can be further broken down into 
livelihood/economic development (31.7% – $124.3 million), civil society and education 
(12.8% – $50.2 million), and health (8% – $31.3 million). 
The framing of Mercy Corps as an organization built for complex crisis is critical to 
understanding its efforts to integrate environmental and ecosystem-centric considerations 
into its programming. As I demonstrate across the different stages of this research, 
integrating longer-term environmental priorities into acute crisis response is inherently 
complex (Abrahams, 2014; Henley-Shephard et al., 2017). That challenge is not limited 
to the implementation site. It can be experienced at the organizational level as well. 
                                               
6 For example, as noted to me by multiple team members, the CEO of the organization has been 
increasingly drawing attention to conflict as being the defining challenge for humanitarian organizations in 
the 21st century. As the CEO, Neal Keny-Guyer describes in (Relief Web, 2018). “The big force that’s 
laying the foundation for many of the crises we see today is conflict. As the World Bank has said, conflict 
is the number one driver of extreme poverty in the world.” 
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Despite these challenges, Mercy Corps is increasingly considering – and seeking to 
address – environmental challenges in the context of their programs. Such efforts, which 
fall within the purview of the EEC TSU, are a central component of the research because 
they illuminate the institutional opportunities and challenges that emerge around 








Understanding Organizational Strategy, Approaches, and Operations 
 Mercy Corps’ strategy is outlined in its ‘Compass’ document, which outlines 
core strategies (Mercy Corps, 2018), as listed on p.1, the three core strategies that guide 
their work are:  
• We empower people to find opportunity during times of crisis  
• We catalyze locally-owned solutions  
• We seek breakthrough innovations that transform lives  
 
Their guiding principles (Mercy Corps, 2018, p. 3), listed below, further reinforce 
the scope of the organization, as does their Vision for Change (see Figure 1.5), which 
highlights their organizational self-identification as an innovative, market-oriented 
organization with capacities both working with both local communities and with local 
and central governments. The circle stresses that the ‘three Is’ (as they are referred to 
internally) are all interrelated and interdependent. The central triangle speaks to a key 
organizational mantra, and the white space speaks to the needed stakeholders.         
• We tackle complex challenges by taking an integrated, adaptive, multi-sector 
approach, understanding that there are no easy or fast fixes.   
• We work in partnerships to create sustainable change at scale, knowing no single 
group can solve the world’s toughest challenges alone.   
• We believe in evidence and learning. We use data to manage our programs more 
effectively, understand the impact of our work and influence others.  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• We use a gender lens. Understanding the role of gender – especially making the 
right Investments in girls and women – is critical to building strength from within.  
  
 
Figure 1.5: Mercy Corps vision for change (source: Mercy Corps Compass, p.1. 
Format adjusted slightly) 
 
Unsurprisingly, the extent to which Mercy Corps adheres to these strategies and 
principles varies by office and program. This is, to an extent, intentional or at least 
understood by Mercy Corps leadership. For example, posters marking the wall of the 
Portland office note “Our strategy is our compass, not our roadmap.” Organizational 
strategy, which is largely conceived by senior management with input from country 
offices and technical support units (TSUs), faces myriad hurdles as programs transition 
from their conceptual origins to specific interventions in the context of a particular place 
and time. As was evident in this research, Mercy Corps, across all offices, is acutely 
aware of the challenges of bridging priorities and conceptualizations across such broad 




Mercy Corps’ priorities and objectives, which have expanded with the growth of 
the organization, cross sectoral divides, work across multiple time frames, and require 
addressing communities’ micro-level needs and concerns while simultaneously making 
such programming scalable to much larger populations.7 This breadth speaks to a core 
challenge in addressing climate change and conflict: climate-conflict responses require an 
inter-disciplinary effort, but integrating environmental management and conservation into 
efforts to address complex crisis often face pushback as these efforts move towards on-
the-ground priorities (this topic is addressed in chapter 5; see also (Abrahams, 2014; 
Henley-Shephard et al., 2017).  This challenge was at the heart of the EEC TSU’s efforts 
to prioritize ecosystem-scale and natural resource management within Mercy Corps.  
 
Origin of Mercy Corps Partnership  
I was introduced to Mercy Corps through a contact in my network. The initial 
person that I spoke with, a former EEC employee and program director at the time, did 
not end up being engaged with the research (he had already made plans to leave the 
organization prior to our call, but was a Mercy Corp employee when we spoke). He did, 
however, introduce me to the head of the EEC, who took interest in the research. A series 
of meetings and conference calls took place with the current director and deputy director 
of the EEC team to identify potential projects and locations, to refine the work plan, and 
adjust expectations. This agreement with the EEC team (and therefore Mercy Corps) was 
key not only for the research design, but also for convincing USAID (who funded this 
                                               
7 This is not, however, an issue unique to Mercy Corps. Other humanitarian agencies describe the 
increasing breadth of their program. One theory is that the emerging dominance of ‘resilience’ 
centric paradigms has led to a broadening of operational agendas.  
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research) of the project’s viability. My informal agreement with the EEC team was that I 
would be allowed to examine particular Mercy Corps efforts addressing the connection 
between climate change and conflict, in return for which, I offered to provide input in the 
field when it would be useful (which I did on occasion),8 provide learning documents 
regarding this research, and share the findings with them. The latter was done via a series 
of presentations across multiple offices and doubled as a chance to member check the 
research.  
Because I had already been awarded the Ceny Walker grant by the Walker 
Institute for International Affairs at the University of South Carolina, a competitive 
fellowship for graduate students to facilitate international fieldwork, I was able to start 
the research with Mercy Corps almost immediately after agreeing to the partnership, 
despite not yet obtaining the USAID contract. Initially the EEC team and I identified 
BRACED as the project on which the study would focus, and we planned to compare and 
contrast BRACED efforts in Wajir, Kenya and Karamoja, Uganda. The plan, which was 
largely put in place through the EEC team, was that I would spend time working very 
closely with the BRACED program director based in Nairobi and go on field visits with 
her and her team.9 
While in Kenya for the initial field visit, a number of factors became clear that 
altered the study plan. First, focusing on two implementation sites (Wajir and Karamoja) 
resulted in significant logistical complications that threatened the viability of the project 
                                               
8 For example, I helped develop/reviewed climate change-related program documents, assisted in 
setting up events, offered insight onto environmental processes. Generally speaking, however, I 
offered only limited input to the field teams. 
9 The program director left the organization not long after I arrived (the Friday before I arrived on 
a Monday) I later met with the former BRACED director, who was preparing to leave the 
country. As such, during this time, I shadowed the BRACED program manager.  
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such that the benefits of comparing the two did not appear to justify the costs or 
complications. Second, BRACED was not addressing the connection between climate 
change and conflict as directly as I anticipated (or as was suggested in the grant 
documents). Third, other programs had a more explicit climate-conflict component – 
PEACE III being the most apparent. It was after this first visit, when I visited Wajir and 
Karamoja, that I refined the research to focus on BRACED and PEACE III in Karamoja.  
Because EEC brokered the field visit with country directors and program 
managers, there was very little pushback from these teams regarding my presence. 
Though some program members were more guarded or had more protocols for me than 
others regarding what meetings I would and would not be able to attend, there were only 
very few instances where I was unable to join the teams in their activities. 10  This access 
allowed me to develop a deeper understanding of what it means to be a development 
organization operating across geographies and trying to address the connections between 
climate change and conflict in its programming.  
 
Description and Role of Different Teams  
Mercy Corps’ approach to climate-conflict is greatly shaped by its structure. For 
the purpose of this research, I break the organization into three categories: administrative; 
country and program teams; and technical support units (TSUs). Their different 
functions, which take place across multiple geographies, highlight the myriad forms 
                                               
10 There was no consistency in what settings I was permitted to join. Some examples include: I 
was unable to sit in on an all-TSU meeting while I was in Portland, attend meetings with donors 
and BRACED leadership, and once a PEACE III partner that reported directly to USAID asked I 
not be part of calls. In all instances in which I was unable to attend an activity, I would be briefed 
by someone who was in attendance. Conversely, I was able to attend all-staff meetings and 
trainings, manager’s meetings, annual planning, etc.  
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development takes within an organization. All of these functions, no matter how 
geographically or functionally removed they are from implementation, affect 
development outcomes.  
 
 Administrative parts of the organization consist of individuals and teams 
performing a range of ‘back-office’ functions for the agency. This includes fundraising, 
accounting, legal, logistics support, drivers, administrative assistants, financial planners, 
marketing, communications, and other similar functions. Their responsibilities include, 
for example, obtaining and distributing program funds (both for salaries and for 
programmatic purposes), ensuring security and financial protocols are followed, ensuring 
hiring and firing procedures follow all rules and regulations (both internally and based on 
in-country law), getting teams to and from the field, and organizing  travel. 
The administrative functions are required for both programming and institutional 
operations, yet they are often a source of frustration for programmatic staff. In field 
offices, considerable portions of the weekly Monday morning staff meetings were spent 
negotiating and navigating the at-times divergent needs of the field teams and the 
administrative teams, which negotiations were often contentious. Those dynamics reflect 
fact that development outcomes are not constrained solely by field-related factors (Carr, 
2011). For example, if the accounting team, in following the rules of the organization and 
of the funder, does not authorize funding to pay the travel costs of community members, 





 Program and Country Teams consist of individuals working directly on 
programmatic activities. The majority of these individuals and teams are based in the 
field offices, though heads of programs and senior programmatic staff tend to be in 
country offices. Those are the individuals and teams who worked directly with 
communities and partners to implement programs I with whom I interacted most closely. 
These roles vary based on the type of programming being implemented. Within Mercy 
Corps, and within the two programs studied in this research, much of this work was akin 
to community organizing. Teams would galvanize support for particular projects from 
communities receiving programming, both soliciting community input and/or directly 
presenting potential project ideas. For BRACED this was largely done through resilience 
action planning (a formalized process to understand vulnerabilities and capacities at a 
parish level). For PEACE III teams operating on the ground, their role more explicitly 
involved promoting dialogue, rather than directly implementing projects that required 
community support. These teams are also responsible for many of the initial stages of 
reporting required by donors, providing documentation and initial metrics to senior 
programmatic staff and M&E officers in Mercy Corps.  
 
 Technical Support Units (TSUs) – consists of individuals and teams with technical 
expertise on programmatic issues, but who do not directly implement programming or 
manage specific programs. In many ways they function as an internal consulting team to 
the organization. At the time I conducted my research, Mercy Corps had 11 TSUs. I 
worked most closely with the Environment, Energy, & Climate (EEC) TSU. The other 
TSUs that I engaged with include Governance and Partnerships; Peace and Conflict; 
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Youth, Gender and Girls; Market Systems and Development; Food Security; and 
Agriculture. Mercy Corps also has a dedicated Research and Learning team, which was 
involved in aspects of this research. Understanding the EEC TSU’s experiences as they 
tried to integrate environmental and resource management priorities in Mercy Corps’ 
projects is a central component of my analysis. Their experiences reflect that despite 
widespread organizational interest in addressing climate-conflict, the technical and 
political hurdles unique to the issue complicate their efforts. This, then, serves as a 
microcosm for wider development efforts seeking address the link between climate 
change and conflict. I also interacted closely with the Peace and Conflict TSU which, 
increasingly, is focused on the role of resource management and climate change in the 
context of climate change and peacebuilding.   
 
Mercy Corps Offices 
 
The goal of this study is to trace the processes by which the relationship between 
climate change and conflict shifts from discursive formation to become policy, 
programming, and ultimately an on-the-ground intervention. Therefore, a critical 
consideration for the research design was to understand how climate-conflict discourses 
shift and change across offices (i.e., places of implementation), and how that was 
reflected in, and affects, development programming. While this research focuses on work 
designed for, and ultimately implemented in, Karamoja, the geographies of development 
extend far beyond the implementation site. As such, my fieldwork extended beyond 
Karamoja to Mercy Corps offices in Kampala, Nairobi, Washington, D.C., and the 
organizational headquarters in Portland, Oregon.   
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Like Mercy Corps, BRACED and PEACE III are best conceptualized as multi-
sited spaces including, but not limited to the physical projects through which 
communities encounter programming, the multiple office spaces (including country, 
regional, satellite, and partners’ offices), the conference rooms and hotels that hosted 
learning events and reflection meetings, and even the ubiquitous land cruisers that span 




Figure 1.6: Development Spaces. The Land Cruiser, inside and out. 
 
Below I describe the different offices, note how long I spent in each one, and 
outline the functions as they relate to PEACE III and/or BRACED. Exploring these 
spaces helped me to better understand the different perspectives and pressures that can 
shape programming decisions. More specifically, by spending time across these different 
sites of program implementation, I was able to better comprehend the different contexts 
in which discourses linking climate change and conflict shift across time and space, and 
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thus how geographic differences and office priorities, positionalities, and unique 
pressures can alter program trajectories. These experiences demonstrate that 
organizations and organizational culture are far from monolithic (Simon, 1997, 2007). 
Indeed, even within teams, perspectives on programming often varied widely.  
 
Moroto, Uganda 
The plurality of my time, roughly six months, was spent in the Moroto field 
office. The Moroto office was a converted house that sits at the base of a small mountain 
in the Mount Moroto mountain range. The office was walled, guarded 24 hours/day by 
unarmed guards, and housed anywhere from 20 – 50 employees (the amount differed 
depending on the day). The office had solar panels and a large battery, and therefore had 
electricity nearly all the time, a luxury in Karamoja reserved mostly for development 
organizations. There was internet access, though it was very slow – considerably slower 
than a connection available on mobile phone. The office was originally set up as part of 
PEACE III, but during my fieldwork it housed a number of other large programs 
including Global Health and Governance (GHG), BRACED, and Girls Improving 
Resilience with Livestock (GIRL). As a result, space in the office was limited.11 Mercy 
Corps’ PEACE III activities and Mercy Corps Uganda’s BRACED activities were largely 
based in this office. 
Behind the office was a small garden, immature fruit trees, and a pit for burning 
trash. On occasion pastoralists would wander by with herds of goat and/or cattle. In the 
                                               
11 As of my final visit to this office, there were discussions that Mercy Corps was to take over the 
recently abandoned office of another agency, ACDI Voca, who had recently not been awarded the 
next iteration of GHG. It is of note, local governance officials tended to press NGOs to build new 
structures rather than take over or modify existing offices or houses.  
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dry season these pastoralists would burn the grass behind the office in preparation for the 
rainy season.12 Chickens, lizards, and songbirds were regular, if unruly, residents of the 
outdoor space, and would occasionally wander indoors to surprisingly little fanfare. 
Large crows would often hop on the office’s tin roof creating a cacophony of scraping 
claws and shrieking caws, which echoed loudly across the office. Snakes and scorpions, 
though less frequent visitors, were occasionally found on the compound as well.  
The office was adorned with posters outlining Mercy Corps rules, regulations, and 
organizational ethos; notice boards; weekly movement plans and donor-funded whistle-
blower hotlines to report fraud and corruption. Though there were patterns to where 
people sat, desks were not assigned, and on more crowded days there were often two 
people to a desk. An outdoor structure, called a tukul doubled as a meeting place and a 
spillover place where desk-less people could do their work. Depending on the weather – 
wind being the largest determinant, heat a distant second – this could be a very desirable 
or very undesirable place to work. For purposes of observation, I often sat here.   
Inside, depending on how one chooses to count, there were six rooms of varying 
sizes and each room held a number of desks roughly proportionate to its size. One of 
those rooms had been recently transitioned from a guest room to another office to address 
the overflow of employees.13 Who was in each room broke down largely by program, 
with the exception of one room mostly housing senior programmatic staff across teams: 
this was occasionally referred to as “The Manager’s Room.” There was also a kitchen 
                                               
12 Pastoralists in the area believe that this practices increases the nutrient density of the grass. 
13 The guest room was predominantly used to house one of the senior member of PEACE III 
when he came from Nairobi, but due to space shortages and his limited time in the office, they 
opted to transition it to an office.  
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which, like offices everywhere, served as a congregating point for tea, [instant] coffee, 
and chats. The office also had an outhouse and an internal toilet – the latter was 




Figure 1.7: Clockwise from top to bottom: Moroto Field Office, a Resident Chicken, and 
the Tukul  
The office technically operated from 8:00am – 5:00pm, Monday to Friday, and 
field teams tended to depart around 9:00am returning at varied times. On weekends the 
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office was accessible and usually 5-10 people could be found working there. Some would 
also come for electricity and Internet, which most employees did not have at their homes.  
Transport was largely in Mercy Corps branded vehicles, but for certain types of 
travel (generally defined by the amount of people going and the availability of cars) 
motor bikes (known locally in Uganda as Bodas (short for Boda Bodas)) were the 




Figure 1.8 Means of Transport, Land Cruisers and Bodas 
 
  Field offices, generally, were responsible for directly implementing the 
programming or working closely with partners (usually, though not entirely, local 
Community Based Organizations (CBOs)). The personnel in these offices were also 
responsible for the production of paperwork that ultimately filters back through regional 
offices, in some cases through domestic offices, and ultimately back to the donors in the 
form of monthly, quarterly, and annual reports. This includes, for example, data on total 
‘beneficiaries’ served, rationales for activity, expense reports, and purchase orders. In all 
of these ways, Moroto was a very typical field office. The working language in the office 
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was English. Occasionally conversations would happen in Karamajong, but many staff – 
including Ugandan staff – did not speak the language. Unlike other field offices 
(Kaabong and Kotido, for example), there were living quarters for employees at this 




Mercy Corps headquarters are in Portland Oregon. I twice visited this office, each 
visit lasting one week. The building housed the full range of functions required by a 
modern development and humanitarian NGO, including fundraising, accounting, 
management, program leadership, technology support, and monitoring and evaluation 
staff. This office also housed the majority of senior staff that develop organizational 
strategy, pursue new initiatives, and craft the public face of an increasingly visible 
organization. Critically for my research, this office was central in framing and defining 
how, as an organization, Mercy Corps approaches and seeks to address the connection 
between climate change and conflict. The office was home to several people who 
provided technical input and interact closely with PEACE III and BRACED14 donors.  
The office was a four-story formerly industrial, LEED-certified building that 
holds roughly 300 employees. The office looked out on the Willamette River near to the 
heart of downtown Portland. On the first floor, a security guard screens visitors to the 
office. Also on the first floor was the Mercy Corps Action Center, a place for Mercy 
Corps to showcase their work and an area that doubles as an event space . The workspace 
                                               




was filled with conference rooms named after rivers in areas they work, high-resolution 
photos of program recipients, large tables filled with awards and framed photos of senior 
Mercy Corps staff with dignitaries and celebrities (e.g., the CEO with John Kerry) (see 
Figure 1.10), and a place to leave or take small amounts of money from the places they 
operate to help facilitate employees having local currency on hand when arriving on trips 




Figure 1.9: Mercy Corps Portland, External View 
 
                                               
15 A note about the term ‘the field’. While not a contested term, exactly, it is flexible in its 
meaning. Based on usage within Mercy Corps is, in essence, one step closer to the communities 
Mercy Corps works with from wherever one predominantly exists. For example, a trip from 
Kampala to the Moroto field office would be referred to as going to the field. A trip from Moroto 
to a community site, a local government official’s office, or a project would also be referred to as 







Figure 1.10: Mercy Corps Portland, Internal View, Conference Rooms and Waiting Area 
(Left) and Wall of Awards (Right) and Leave-and-Take Currency Jars (Bottom) 
 
The immediate area was described to me as “historically, the grittier part of 
downtown Portland.” When changing office space to accommodate their growth, the 
organization had the option of putting their office in a more established part of town, but 
felt that to do so would be in contrast to their organizational culture. There is a small 
portion of Mercy Corps – Mercy Corps Northwest – that addresses development 
questions in the context of Portland. Their focus is on homelessness, small business 




  Being headquartered in Portland offers a set of benefits and challenges. As 
described by one of the Portland-based employees, being the only major international 
development actor in a place well-known for its quality of life is a key recruitment tool. 
All those I spoke with described loving Portland and the surrounding area – many 
compared it favorably to their experiences living in Washington, DC. Some noted being 
congratulated for moving to Portland by fellow Portlanders. It was also noted recruitment 
still faces a challenge in that Washington, DC, was the more obvious landing point for 
US-based development workers and holds a much larger pool of candidates due to the 
greater opportunities for internationally-focused work. 
 
Kampala, Uganda 
Mercy Corps’ country office in Uganda was on the 4th floor of a building shared 
with multiple western-based development organizations, including a USAID monitoring 
and evaluation office, Tufts University’s Feinstein International Center, other NGOs, and 
a number of businesses. Entrance to the building required going through a metal detector, 
but security protocols were not particularly stringent. In total I spent two months at this 
office. The office is an open plan with a few meeting rooms and was divided largely into 
programmatic staff and administrative staff. The Kampala office housed the country 
director and currently the East Africa regional director.16 This office spends considerable 
time coordinating activity with donors, and the ‘back office’ functions of a major 
international NGO (e.g., logistics, accounting, human resources). This office housed 
                                               
16 During my first trip the East Africa regional director was based in Nairobi – this changed after 
a shuffling of positions in 2017 
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senior programmatic staff working in Uganda (e.g., the Program Director for PEACE III, 
BRACED),17 and the Deputy Director in charge of Programming. In both this office and 
the Nairobi office, the back-office functions are largely separated from the programmatic 




Figure 1.11: Mercy Corps Kampala 
 
Employees in the field offices occasionally referred to country offices as 
‘paperwork’ offices or ‘HQ’ – both terms used pejoratively. Yet they offer multiple 
personal and professional benefits and therefore are desirable places to work. For 
example, many Moroto-based staff described a desire to work in Kampala so they could 
pursue educational opportunities. Some PEACE III and BRACED staff currently take the 
                                               
17 There were, technically, two program directors for BRACED. The lead is based in Nairobi, but 
the program director for Uganda-focused BRACED activity is in Kampala. 
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overnight bus to Kampala to pursue advanced studies on the weekend.18 Additionally, 
pay was perceived to be higher in the Kampala office when compared to the field 
offices.19 Finally, especially for the younger staff, Kampala was considered more socially 
desirable. Despite this, field staff tended to prefer the day-to-day work that happened in 
the field office, which focused on working directly with the community, when compared 
with the jobs based in Kampala, which focused more on coordination and reporting.  
 
Nairobi, Kenya 
The Nairobi office, which is the Kenya country office, is a central hub for Mercy 
Corps work in the East Africa region and, naturally, Kenya-focused projects. I use the 
term ‘Kenya-focused’ as some programs, most notably PEACE III, centered on Kenya, 
but had operations that crossed into other countries. I spent approximately two months in 
this office. Mercy Corps occupied a floor in a building within ABC Place, a shopping 
center and office plaza with grocery stores, pharmacies, and restaurants, as well as many 
NGO and business offices. The shopping center required security checks to enter and, on 
occasion, police armed with rifles would stand guard from the rooftops. The office 
contained a handful of offices for senior staff, multiple meeting rooms, but was mostly an 
open plan with many cubicles. 
The primary function of this office is the management of programs, coordination 
with donors and other partners, reporting to donors and headquarters on program updates, 
                                               
18 The overnight bus runs daily (there are a few companies that run this bus back and forth from 
Kampala), from both locations. Outside of the overnight bus, there are limited options available 
to individuals to get from Kampala to Moroto.  
19 I lack any data on Kampala salaries and am unable to answer that question definitively. 
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and general administrative function for Kenya-centric programming. Mercy Corps did 
have some livelihoods-focused programming targeting youth in Nairobi, but these were 
secondary functions of this office. All BRACED activities went through this office, 
which housed the Programme Director. PEACE III had, at times, key personnel housed in 
Nairobi, but the majority were either in Moroto or Kampala. PACT, the primary grant 
recipient for PEACE III (Mercy Corps was technically a sub-contractor on this project), 




Mercy Corps occupied roughly 1/3 of the 6th floor of a large building in 
downtown Washington, DC, and was currently in the process of expanding. Mercy Corps 
shared the floor with CISCO and a fitness center. I visited this office four times, each 
only for a day.  Like the Portland office, this office was dotted with photos and awards 
related to their work. This office was initially developed predominantly as an auxiliary 
office to the Portland headquarters to focus on policy/advocacy and fundraising. In recent 
years, however, it has expanded rapidly. This office housed multiple functions, and many 
key personnel from the TSUs and the Research and Learning Team of Mercy Corps, 
including the head of Research and Learning, the head of the Environmental TSU, and 
the lead on all TSUs. Though I only list the total days formally conducting research with 
Mercy Corps on these days, multiple meetings coordinating the research took place here.  
My time here focused largely on coordinating activities, updating and catching up with 





Just across the Ugandan border, Mercy Corps’ Lodwar office existed as a satellite 
office for programs based out both Mercy Corps Kenya and Mercy Corps Uganda. I had 
two roughly week long visits in Lodwar. The Lodwar office is part of a group of offices, 
including those of other development agencies. Like the other offices, it was gated and 
guarded. It has three rooms and the number of employees in the office was variable, 
ranging from five to fifteen on the days I was there. For the purposes of the programs I 
was working with, Lodwar was largely used for coordinating Kenya-related activities for 
PEACE III. Lodwar is well known for its remarkable heat, it reaches well over 40 °C 
(104.0° F) in the hotter times of the year; on one of my visits it reached 42 °C (107.6° F). 
 
Kaabong, Uganda 
Kaabong is a field office akin to Moroto. Though the core programs I studied 
were based out of Moroto, activity for PEACE III took place in areas near this office. I 
had two roughly week-long visits to Kaabong. The majority of activity in this office 
centered on a different program, Global Health and Governance (GHG), a USAID-
funded program comparable to BRACED, but there were PEACE III partners in 
Kaabong.20 The office, which was also converted from a house, had multiple structures, 
                                               
20 BRACED and GHG had enough overlap that the decision was made to keep programming 
geographically separate. PEACE III for certain types of programming, worked with GHG in the 




including housing for employees, a tukul, and multiple single unit sleeping units for 
visiting Mercy Corps staff.   
 
Wajir, Kenya  
The Wajir office focused largely on BRACED and other programs designed for 
the specific context of the region. I spent one week in Wajir. Due to the proximity to 
Somalia, and recent incidents in the area, this office is heavily guarded and more fortified 
than other offices. Movement is also more restricted in Wajir due to security concerns. 
The office was, like others, a converted house with multiple desks in an open layout. A 
large conference table doubles as an auxiliary work space and a central meeting point.  
My time in this office was largely observing BRACED activities in the area.  
 
Kotido, Uganda 
Kotido was also a field office akin to Moroto. I made sporadic visits to this office 
totaling five days. Though no formal activity for PEACE III or BRACED took place out 
of this office, it was the main office for GHG. The Kotido office was also a modified 
house. Like Kaabong, Kotido was able to house multiple full-time employees and guests. 
My time in this office was predominantly as a stop to and from Moroto and Kampala on 




Eldoret, Kenya  
This was once a major office, but due to the limited activity in the area, only a 
few people were working in this office. I stopped here once, along with a PEACE III 




BRACED and PEACE III, the two programs of study, offer a corollary. BRACED 
is a climate change-centric program that exists in the backdrop of conflict/post-conflict 
dynamics. PEACE III is a conflict mitigation and peacebuilding program that is seeking 
to integrate climate change into the core goals of the program, such as peacebuilding. 
Comparing program dynamics offered a unique vantage point into the challenges and 
opportunities regarding the translation of discourses of climate change and its impact on 
conflict into programming.  
 
Table 1.2: BRACED and PEACE III Comparison 
 
 PEACE III BRACED 
Goals PEACE III is focused on 
cross-border conflict 
mitigation and peacebuilding. 
BRACED is focused on 
developing resilience to 
shocks and stressors 
Financial Information  The total budget for PEACE 
III is $20.3 million. Of which 
4.6 million pounds over three 
years ($6.2 million) 
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Mercy Corps was responsible 
for $3 million.  
Geographic Scope The wider program 
encompasses border areas of 
Kenya-Somalia; Kenya-
Ethiopia; Kenya-Ethiopia-
South Sudan; Kenya-Uganda; 
Kenya-Uganda-South Sudan; 
Uganda-South Sudan (see 
Figure 1.16 for a map). This 
research, however, focuses on 
Kenya-Uganda.  
The program is being 
implemented in Wajir, Kenya 
and Karamoja, Uganda. 
Though I spent time in Wajir 
during the initial research 
stage, the focus of this work 
is within Uganda. Within 
Karamoja, Braced focuses on 
Moroto, Napak, and 
Nakapiripirit. 
Donor  USAID DfID 
Climate-Conflict focus PEACE III has a direct focus 
on addressing climate-conflict 
in their programming. This is 
a broad mandate.  
BRACED aims to mitigate 
the impact of conflict on 
climate change vulnerability 
and address future conflict 






Mercy Corps is implementing a portion of BRACED. BRACED is, collectively, a 
£110 million comprised of 15 projects across 13 countries (BRACED, 2016).21 It is 
considered a high risk, high return program that seeks to address climate change 
vulnerability in volatile places (BRACED, 2016, p. 1). The goal of the overall program, 
as is articulated in program documents, is to “reach some of the people most vulnerable 
to disasters in the world, who have received the least support and investment in disaster 
resilience to date, with measures that will be sustained beyond the lifetime of the 
programme.”  BRACED has three strategic output areas that aim to increase resilience 
over both the long term and the short term (BRACED, 2016) 
• Output 1: Strengthened technical and adaptive capacity of formal and informal 
governance of structures in natural resource management, climate change 
adaptation, disaster risk reduction, and economic development with improved 
coordination between local, national and regional levels.  
• Output 2: Improved economic opportunities for women, men and youth in rural, 
peri-urban and urban areas natural resource management and climate smart 
investment.  
• Output 3: Reduced inequality and increase empowerment of women, men, girls 
and boys 
 
                                               
21 The program technically ended in December 2017, however, Mercy Corps has been awarded 
the second iteration of BRACED. My work focused entirely on Mercy Corps’ work on the first 
iteration of BRACED.   
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Mercy Corps received £4.6 million pounds for their component of BRACED. As 
described in the grant agreement, BRACED programming focuses both on addressing 
short-term instability and vulnerability and igniting transformational shifts in the 
resilience of people in the area: 
The aim of PROGRESS [BRACED]22 is to build absorptive, adaptive and 
transformative capacities of household and communities to be more resilient in 
the face of increasing climate risks, referred to as shocks and stresses. In both 
north-eastern Kenya and northern Uganda, these shocks and stresses include 
drought, increased aridity, flooding and flash floods, soil erosion, slashing and 
burning and massive deforestation. All of these contribute to environmental 
degradation which reduces the local resource-base for viable livelihoods. 
 
Mercy Corps’ BRACED team and its associated focus and programming is 
broken down into the five teams: Governance, Natural Resource Management (NRM), 
Lands, Markets, and Gender. Though there is some overlap in these teams, they have 
different foci that align closely with their team names. During my time with the 
organization, there were some all-hands-on-deck efforts, such as forming resilience 
action committees (described below) and in the distribution of ‘scratch cards’, which 
were essentially coupons that provided discounts on agricultural inputs such as seeds and 
fertilizer for BRACED recipients.  Though I spent time with all of these teams, my focus 
was largely on the NRM, Lands, and, to a lesser extent, Governance teams.  
  
                                               
22 At the time of writing the grant application the portion of BRACED being handled by Mercy 




Mercy Corps is implementing BRACED in two distinct locations: Karamoja, 
Uganda and Wajir, Kenya. The decision to host the work in two such disparate locales 
was strategic: while culturally unique, both places have livelihood systems with deep 
roots in pastoralism and were facing many of the same climactic stresses. Likewise, both 
areas have experienced considerable conflict in recent years, but of varied type and 
intensity. This combination would allow for overlap in program design and effective 
learning outputs. In the initial program documents there was considerable overlap in the 
types of programs that would be rolled out in the two sites. The decision to focus on these 
two geographies, however, was later described to me as regrettable due to the 




Figure 1.12: BRACED Geographies (credit: Kevin Remington) 
                                               
23 It is of note that there were changes in personnel within BRACED from program design and 
the early program implementation to more advanced stages of the grant. For the scope of this 
research it is important to acknowledge that 1) many of those implementing the project did not 
agree with the initial design of the program. 2) This shift, in many ways, resulted in a 
fundamental reconfiguration of the program that centered much more on governance and 




After a strategic restructuring of the program, Mercy Corps made the decision to 
focus their work on three particular districts in Karamoja rather than the entire region 
(Moroto, Nakapiripirit, and Napak). Mercy Corps and BRACED personnel had two 
reasons for focusing the work on select geographies within Karamoja. First, the sheer size 
of Karamoja and the finite resources of the grant, most critically, transport, made 
covering the entire area impractical. Karamoja is 27,000 square km in size, and the 
project only had a few Land Cruisers at its disposal to move staff and equipment.  
Therefore, a spread-out strategy was unmanageable. Second, another program, GHG, 
conducts very similar programming in the northern part of district. Stretching out 
BRACED operations and resources did not make sense when another program was doing 
comparable work from a more strategic location for the northern districts. Third, in their 
decision to focus on community mobilization and resilience action committees (RACs, 
described below) there was a desire to limit the scope of not just where, but also with 
whom, they work. All of these factors highlight a challenge faced by all development 
organizations: balancing what is achievable and measurable with ideas and goals that 
might have greater impact for a wider community. In the table below, I describe some 







Figure 1.13: The Districts in Karamoja Where BRACED is operating (red) (credit: Kevin 
Remington) 
 









RACs underpinned all BRACED work. RACS were to mobilize the 
community, form committees representing BRACED issue areas 
(e.g. land, NRM, gender) and elect representatives that steer the 






Following the mobilization of the RACS, teams developed RAPS. 
These were one- to two-day processes following a defined protocol. 
The goal of RAPs was to identify community-identified hazards 
and resources with the ultimate goal of bolstering resilience.  
Governance 
training  
The governance team mobilized communities to train groups on 
advocacy, organizing, and their legal protections.  
Permagardens Permagardens and training on permaculture techniques was a 
passion of one the original program directors. Due to the climate of 
Karamoja (and for that matter, Wajir), agricultural techniques that 
conserved water were seen as central for resilience.   
Safe spaces A gender-centric program where girls were given space and time to 




Similar to permagardens in promoting very localized agriculture, 
sack and community gardens were designed to grow food in small 
spaces or in  canvas sacks.  
Scratch Cards  In partnership with an agricultural dealer, these cards allowed 
Karamoja residents receiving BRACED programming discounted 




The lands component of BRACED worked to identify key 






Mercy Corps organized trainings for the land rights committees and 
other community members on the different land systems in Uganda, 





A partnership with governance officials to ensure their budgeting 
process considered the unique vulnerabilities of women and girls.  
 
BRACED, Climate Change, and Conflict  
 In grant documents, Karamoja was positioned as an insecure place somewhere 
between a conflict and post-conflict setting. For example, as described in the grant 
narrative (Mercy Corps, 2014, p. 38) 
The overall security rating for both Wajir and Karamoja is “High” with some 
locations considered “Extreme,” reflecting a high likelihood of threats related to 
operational risks, terrorism, and political/social instability. Threats of criminality 
(assaults, car-jacking, kidnapping) are high in many remote locations. Clan 
rivalries and skirmishes, the Somali conflict (Wajir), and cattle rustling conflict 
(Karamoja) are sources of continuing violence in the region. Both regions are 
deeply traditional and likewise, both have an extremely high saturation of 
weaponry. Most areas in Karamoja and Wajir are extremely remote with limited 
response and medical facilities.24 
                                               
24 On the ground, the challenges of cattle rustling and of small arms was not as acute as suggested 
here.   
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 The effects of conflict and the challenges of the shifting economic and physical 
landscapes of Karamoja were often described by BRACED staff as a challenge for 
resilience, both in the sense that it heightened vulnerabilities to contemporary challenge 
(e.g., food security) and underscored its importance.  Yet, for the communities, conflict 
was often framed as a past concern. During RAPs, BRACED staff would explicitly ask 
community members about their concerns about conflict and security. This was done in 
the context of identifying wider vulnerabilities. Using a ranking system, community 
members were asked to identify what they deemed to be the biggest challenge in their 
community. Each community member voted, receiving six rocks; each member then put 
three rocks on the most pressing concern, two rocks on the second most pressing, and one 








 Most community members did not list conflict as a major concern. For example, 
only 11 of 36 member communities listed conflict and security amongst their top six 
concerns (the number used in the resilience assessment process). They did, however, note 
that while concerns ‘of the gun’ had decreased, other forms of insecurity – most notably, 
food security – and other more localized forms of conflict (theft, household violence, and 
resource conflict) were a contemporary challenge. 
As such, the ways in which BRACED addressed climate-conflict connections was 
in the context of pressures that might contribute to conflict and in guiding populations 
towards more resilient livelihoods and increased food security. This was seen as a direct 
response to the reduction in food security resulting from years of conflict and a 
disarmament campaign that led to a widespread loss of cattle and decreased food security. 
BRACED was not, however, explicitly focused on alleviating conflict in their program.  
 
PEACE III Background  
PEACE III is a conflict mitigation and peacebuilding program that operates in 
multiple countries. It builds on two previous iterations, PEACE and PEACE II and 
though it has a broad geographical remit, it is centered in Kenya (see Figure 1.14).  As 
described in the 2015-2016 annual report (PACT & Mercy, 2016). 
PEACE III is a five year, USAID funded regional conflict transformation program 
awarded to Pact in partnership with Mercy Corps in April, 2014. The program 
seeks to contribute to stability in the Horn of Africa region, by strengthening the 
horizontal and vertical linkages within & between local, national, and regional 





Figure 1.15: PEACE III Model of Change 
 
Mercy Corps is a subcontractor to PACT, a US-Based NGO, on PEACE III and 
predominantly focuses on Zones 5-8 (see Figure 1.16).25 Because PACT is the primary 
contractor they technically have considerable influence over Mercy Corps’ activities 
under this project. However, because PACT and Mercy Corps divided the work and 
operated in different geographies, Mercy Corps had relative autonomy over day-to-day 
decisions. As a result of the vast area and the associated operational challenges it poses, 
Mercy Corps relies heavily on partnerships with local CBOs and NGOs. When PEACE 
III was awarded, Mercy Corps and PACT were informed that the funding came in part 
from USAID’s climate change funds. As a result, a requirement for the implementation 
of PEACE III was to integrate climate change, specifically efforts that address climate-
conflict links into programming; the specifics of this mandate were left broad.  
                                               




Figure 1.16: PEACE III Geographies, Mercy Corps is operating primarily in Zones 6, 7, 
8 and manages activity in Zone 5. 
 
Peace III Geographies 
Following are descriptions of the program geographies taken from (PACT & 
Mercy, 2016). The geographies vary considerably but speak to some of the barriers and 
opportunities described in chapter 5. For example, Zones 7 and 8 are stable and relatively 
accessible and therefore are far easier places to operate when compared to Zone 5, which 
during my time with the program, often was inaccessible due to safety concerns and 
Ethiopian governmental restrictions. While the geographies vary widely, so do the issues 
PEACE III is seeking to address. For example, the challenges and conflict across the 
Kenya-Somalia borders differ from those of Uganda-Kenya and Ethiopia-Kenya-Uganda. 
Though there is communication and lesson-sharing between the different teams, the 
programming differs considerably depending on the zone. My work centers on Mercy 
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Corps activities focused on Zones 6, 7, and 8 (predominantly zones 7 and 8). These 
activities were all based out of the Moroto office.  
 
Table 1.4: PEACE III geographies related to operations in and around Karamoja  
 






This zone that covers a triangular border area between Uganda/Kenya 
and South Sudan. Increased arms inflow into Uganda and Kenya from 
South Sudan is a contributing factor to several	attacks in this zone 
around Kaabong and Turkana. In South Sudan, tension has been high 
due to ongoing crisis which climaxed in July this year when fighting 
erupted between the two warring parties. However, there are some 
examples of success: the resource sharing agreement signed between 
Turkana of Kenya and Dodoth of Loyolo-Kaabong has led to peaceful 
coexistence. PEACE III also facilitated opening of Pire Market at the 
border between Uganda and South Sudan and Nadapal along the 
Kenya-South Sudan border.  
 




Zones 7 and 8 have largely remained peaceful and security conditions 
improved. The two zones are occupied by Turkana from Kenya; 
Matheniko and Tepeth of Moroto, Uganda; Pokot of Amudat, Uganda 









governments, other peace actors like youth groups, coordination 
between partners, and increased cross border trade have generated a 
peace trend that needs to be consolidated. There still remain some 
incidences of livestock theft and conflict over water and pasture but 
most of these conflicts are localized and low scale. Emerging trends 
include the increasing demand for donkey skins following 
establishment of a Chinese tanning factory in Lodwar leading to 
accelerated theft of donkeys 
 
PEACE III Example Programming  
The focus of PEACE III is predominantly on dialogue, reconciliation, and 
enhancing the ability of governments to respond to conflict and conflict risk. This has, at 
times, made the integration of climate change into the program an awkward fit. As 
described by a senior member of the Mercy Corps team, ‘we don’t do environment 
programming, but we’re dealing with environmental issues.’  Put differently, the core 
capacities of the program and the personnel do not align with what are deemed to be 
environmental goals. Table 1.5 contains a descriptions of typical activities (PACT & 





Table 1.5: PEACE III Programming Examples 
 
Programming Descriptions 
Trauma Healing  Addressing past violence and grievances between groups and fostering 
spaces to deal with trauma. 
Peace Dividends Projects or activities that celebrate, reward, and reinforce lasting peace 
between communities (e.g., the construction of a watering dam or 
sponsored bull slaughter celebration). 
Peace Rallies A means to disseminate and celebrate peace resolutions following 
peace dialogues  
Dialogues A core of the program: dialogues are used to promote promoting 
reconciliation among conflicting communities – these processes are 
often referred to as “ strengthening horizontal linkages between actors.” 
These are often supported by PEACE III but can be initiated by the 
program or by local governments.  
Supporting youth The program carries out a range of activities specifically targeting 
young people to enhance leadership abilities and create change 
Capacity building 
of local peace 
actors  
Building peacebuilding and conflict mitigation capacity, predominantly 
through training, for program teams, local CBOs, and local governance 
actors is core to the program. PEACE III also works to foster 
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relationships with local, national, and regional governments as a means 
to support ‘vertical linkages’. 
Intergovernmental 
collaboration 
across border  
Supporting and encouraging information sharing, learning, and joint 




Setting up channels and incentives for collaborations and connections 
across different boundaries and borders, and brokering peace 
agreements 
 
PEACE III, Climate Change, and Conflict 
 As noted previously, PEACE III was tasked with addressing climate change as a 
condition of its funding. This was not an initial part of the program design and was a 
significant shift for the program. Indeed, in the grant application the term ‘climate 
change’ is noted once (PACT & Mercy Corps, 2013), however in the 2015-2016 annual 
report, ‘climate change’ is listed 25 times (PACT & Mercy, 2016). In other words, within 
the geographies of Peace III, in particular in Zones 5-8, concerns for the connection 
between climate and conflict have gone from nearly non-existent to an important framing 
of the project. As described in their annual report to USAID (PACT & Mercy, 2016):  
Contextually the program has been shifting more towards countering violent 
extremism (CVE) programming in the Somali Cluster, and climate change 
integration programming in the Karamoja cluster... In the Karamoja cluster the 
program’s approach to Climate Change, NRM and Conflict is premised in the 
idea that improvements in peace and security, contribute to communities’ abilities 
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to cope with stress and shocks. 
 
The manifestation of climate change as a factor in conflict was raised both 
abstractly (i.e., how does climate change affect the program) and in the context of 
specific geographies and initiatives by personnel, in reporting and planning documents, 
and by program partners. Yet the struggle to conceptualize climate change in the context 
of programming was a consistent frustration for the PEACE III team. As a result, 
considerable effort was spent on trying to understand climate-conflict. For example, 
PEACE III worked with the research firm International Business & Technical 
Consultants (IBTCI) to develop an understanding of how climate change affects conflict 
in the region. They also hired a local consulting firm to develop a user guide on climate-
conflict and train constituents in the topic. Yet, by most internal accounts, this work 




In this section I describe the research methods that I draw upon for this work. 
These descriptions focus on research done in the context of Mercy Corps and the two 
programs of study rather than the research focused on governmental approaches to 
climate-conflict (chapter 2). In each paper I describe the specific methods used to answer 
the research questions at hand. The goal of outlining the methodology here is to draw 
together the overall methodological approach which I used to trace the discursive 
formation around climate change and conflict through to program implementation.  
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I follow methodologies typical of institutional ethnography, namely a focus on 
participant observation, textual analysis, and interviews (Billo & Mountz, 2016). 
Originally coined by Dorothy Smith, a sociologist, institutional ethnography has its roots 
in feminist and Marxist scholarship (Billo & Mountz, 2016; Devault, 2006; Smith, 1987; 
Smith, 2006). The nature-society and science and technology studies literatures, both 
within and beyond geography, have utilized institutional ethnography topics ranging from 
the testing of nuclear weapons by American nuclear scientists at Lawrence Livermore 
National Laboratory (Gusterson, 1996) to how indigenous community associations 
construct discourses that connect with transition networks in the Ecuadorian Amazon 
(Perreault, 2003a, 2003b). 
This dissertation fits within the institutional ethnography literature focused on the 
intersection of development, the natural environment, and the production and impact of 
discourse (Bebbington et al., 2004; Essex, 2013; Goldman, 2001a, 2001b, 2007; King, 
2009; Moore, 1999; Thomas Perreault, 2003a, 2003b; Welker, 2014). This body of work 
explicitly moves beyond the discourses evident in programmatic documents and seeks to 
understand the inner working of organizations, and how teams and individuals interact 
with external stakeholders – what (Welker, 2014) refers to as “the messy back stage”.  As 
described by (Bebbington et al., 2004 p.35) in relation to the Ferguson’s and Ecobar’s 
seminal texts on the discourses of development (Escobar, 1988; Ferguson, 1990), “while 
such analyses may reflect how the texts of development institutions can be and are read 
from the outside, they say little about the actors, dynamics, and political processes 
underlying the production of such texts.” That is, there is no ‘up there’ Discourse that 
defines Development (Hart, 2004; Li, 1999; Moore, 1999; Simon, 2011) Rather 
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discourses, are produced, reproduced, and negotiated  in the processes of development 
practice (Gardner & Lewis, 2000; LI, 2005). As further described by (Bebbington et al., 
2004, p. 38): 
The World Bank might be viewed as a battlefield of knowledge with different arenas 
in which the contests are waged: internally among its staff (the battlefield we focus on 
here); externally with non-Bank actors and those encountered in the course of 
implementing projects; and – more intriguingly – cross-border battles in which 
different sub-communities within the Bank are linked to different communities 
outside the Bank, and where the battles engage larger communities whose 
memberships transcend institutional boundaries 
 
The same can be said of not just Mercy Corps, but the programs of study – 
PEACE III, BRACED – and each of the offices previously described. There were 
constant negotiations based on priorities, positionalities, and prerogatives. Central to my 
approach, and institutional ethnography more generally, is to triangulate understandings 
of these processes within and across the institution(s) of study utilizing mixed methods 
rooted in understand how the quotidian influences larger processes.  
 
Direct observation  
Direct observation consisted of a range of activities including attending training 
and learning events, attending coordination and planning meetings, going to field sites, 
participating in resilience assessments, attending meetings with local governance 
officials, attending briefings, attending coordination meetings with other NGOs, and 
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sitting on annual planning and annual review meetings. Essentially, I was able to observe 
the day-to-day activities of development programming from the perspective of a wide 
range of actors. 
To capture these observations, I took detailed notes. While I did do some formal 
interviews, some of the richest data came from interview-like informal conversations 
grounded in the context of what I was observing. This middle ground proved to be a very 
fruitful source of data as I was able to ask questions based on the immediate context. Due 
to their informality and unplanned character, I do not characterize any of these 
conversations as interviews. Some examples of these types of conversations include:  
• After getting a flat tire in an area that had, until recently, been considered 
extremely dangerous, I had a long conversation about the intricacies of 
navigating Karamoja’s landscape before and during the disarmament. 
• After a planning meeting, upon asking for clarification of a joke, I had a 
detailed conversation with a Mercy Corps employee about the time he had 
been ambushed and shot while in the field26 and how that affects his approach 
to peace building. 
• Over lunch one of the Mercy Corps employees, a former ‘warrior’27, 
explained in detail his experiences as a pastoralist and the shifting role of 
guns, land, and tradition in Karamoja.  
                                               
26 A note about the term ‘the field’. While not a contested term, exactly, it is flexible in its 
meaning. Based on usage within Mercy Corps is, in essence, one step closer to the communities 
Mercy Corps works with from wherever one predominantly exists. For example, a trip from 
Kampala to the Moroto field office would be referred to as going to the field. A trip from Moroto 
to a community site, a local government official’s office, or a project would also be referred to as 
going to the field.  
27 Warrior being a catch-all term for an armed pastoralist who took part in cattle raids 
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• Over tea, an employee confided in me about a problematic boss, helping shed 
light on the internal politics that can complicate development.  
• Over beers, an employee of separate NGO explained to me challenges she had 
recently been having with other NGOs, including Mercy Corps, relating to 
learning events and ‘per diem’ culture.  
 
To the extent that I was able to blend in, I tried.28 I relied on hand-written rather than 
typed notes to further avoid calling attention to my presence. All notes were then typed 
up in detail – and with reflections – at the end of each day. This practice with my field 
notes was critical for description not just of the conversations, but the settings, 
interactions, and insights from the day (Emerson, Fretz, & Shaw, 2011). 
 
Survey  
In order to better understand the Karamoja context, I conducted a survey focused 
on government officials in the region (n=103). The survey is included in the appendix.  
When developing the survey I worked with multiple Mercy Corps employees to ensure 
the questions were both understandable and applicable in the context of Karamoja. I also 
tested the survey before formally implementing it, giving it to three employees of Mercy 
Corps who role-played different governmental positions. The survey was designed to be 
either administered orally or given directly to respondents to fill out manually. It was also 
                                               
28 The Mercy Corps team largely got used to me sitting quietly and taking notes (as was 
commented to me on my final day in Moroto during a send-off by the entire office).  
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designed and tested to be completed in under 30 minutes out of respect for the officials’ 
time and to ensure all questions were answered with officials’ complete attention. 
The survey focuses on the perspectives of local governance officials, primarily 
Local Council 1s (LC1s)29, on 1) climate and environmental change; 2) conflict and 
security; and 3) NGO activity. Because the majority of the population in Karamoja is 
illiterate, the survey was most frequently administered orally in Karamajong by a 
Karamajong woman who at the time was working part time for PEACE III (she is now a 
full-time employee). This arrangement, which had the approval of senior Mercy Corps 
officials, was critical for the data collection: it allowed her easy access to places of data 
collection and the government officials themselves, offered her entry points to the 
respondents, and allowed opportunities to conduct multiple surveys when, for example, 
PEACE III would host trainings, learning events, or community mobilizations.  Some 
surveys were also filled out by hand by respondents attending PEACE III events. 
The focus on local government officials was purposeful. My experiences 
suggested that this population is aware of both the issues facing individuals in their 
community and the more macro effects of policy and development. Moreover, because 
the majority of the sample live in their respective communities, they could speak to the 
day-to-day existential challenges facing their areas and how climate change, conflict, and 
development relate to those challenges. This allowed considerable insight into the 
shifting conflict, economic, and physical landscapes in the region. Furthermore, their 
roles required interaction with my primary research topic: the development apparatus that 
                                               
29 LC1 stands for Local Council 1. It is the most localized elected representative within the 
Uganda system. They represent villages and report to an LC3 (who represents the sub-county) 
who in turn reports to an LC5 (who represents the district). The LC1 can be conceptualized as a 
combined village mayor and representative. 
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exists in the region. Their perspective on development and economic change in the area 
was deeply insightful.  
I took multiple steps in the implementation of the survey to ensure conflicts of 
interest were minimized and that government officials did not simply reflect development 
discourses in order to ingratiate themselves to PEACE III. These included 1) designing 
the survey such that questions about climate change and conflict were kept separate; 2) 
working with my research assistant on how precisely to ask questions such that she would 
not influence response; 3) building quantitative questions with space/probes for 
qualitative explanations, which allowed topics to be broached non-normatively; 4) 
considering how the questions about NGOs offered insight into how each respondent 
viewed development efforts, this offered clarity into how development discourses 
individuals’ responses; 5) ensuring that prior to each survey my research assistant 
explained to respondents that this work was not for Mercy Corps and instead it was for 
academic research, which the respondents understood. She also explained that their 
responses would be kept strictly confidential; 6) targeting lower-level government 
officials who were less likely to interact with development agencies.  
Additionally, having someone who could ask questions in Karamojong and speak 
to shared experiences in the region proved critical to the richness of the data. Based on 
the respondents’ candor, including frank criticism of development efforts in the region 
and of Mercy Corps, I do not think this connection with Mercy Corps had a significant 
influence on the responses. Having support from Mercy Corps, however, made 





Gray literature utilized in this research includes internal documents from the two 
programs, such as quarterly and annual reports, the initial grant documents, internal 
memos, and documents from partners. Many of these were provided to me directly by 
Mercy Corps. I was also given access to Mercy Corps intranet for defined periods of time 
when I was able to download these reports and other Mercy Corps material. These 
documents provided direct insight into how the organization approached the relationship 
between climate change and conflict, and development more generally. It also allowed 
me to gain better insight into Mercy Corps strategy (e.g., via the Compass document) and 
organizational structure. I restricted my downloads to documents that spoke directly to 
the research. I also collected artefacts such as handouts at meetings, attendance lists, and 
program activity summaries used in reporting. Finally, I utilized reports, briefs, and 
policy documents available on the internet that are related to the research topic. 
 
Interviews 
Interviews varied greatly throughout the research, both in terms of approach and 
content. Though semi-structured interviews with policy officials were at the heart of the 
first stage of research, they did not play as important as a role for the research with Mercy 
Corps. The informal conversations described above proved to be a far more fruitful tool 
when compared with the results of formal interviews during these research stages. When 
conducting interviews with Mercy Corps staff and partners, often they would repeat 
broad development discourses and organizational talking points. This data, therefore, was 
less useful than the observational data. As such, for the majority of data collection 
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focused on Mercy Corps, I used interviews primarily to answer very specific questions 
and patch knowledge gaps. For example, interviews were effective for learning about 
NGO interaction with the government in the region, how individuals gauged the success 
of programming, and questions about specific job functions.  In total I conducted 39 
interviews, 29 in the course of learning about the contemporary discourses of climate 
change and conflict in the policy community  and 10 interviews for the research focused 
on BRACED, PEACE III and Mercy Corps. 
 
Member Checking the Research  
 To enhance the validity of the findings (J. Maxwell, 2012, Chapter 6), I presented 
my preliminary findings, over multiple stages, to key stakeholders within Mercy Corps 
offices (see Table 1.6). In all cases, I presented the work and then facilitated a discussion. 
I also explicitly pushed for areas of disagreement or issues that need to be further 
explained. Generally, there was only limited disagreement with the research findings. For 
example, I received some pushback on topics balancing the scale of the challenges with 
the scope of Mercy Corps, a subject I discuss in chapter 4.  Such pushback, however, 
always led to nuanced conversations between people in the room that clarified my 
interpretations and generally resolved our differences. In addition to vetting the findings, 
this process also helped clarify the differences in Mercy Corps perceptions of climate-





Table 1.6: Member Checking Dates and Descriptions 
 
Location  Dates Audience Description 
Moroto – Peace III October 30, 
2017 
This focused on Moroto-based staff 
working directly on program 
implementation of PEACE III; 
predominantly Program Officers 
Moroto – BRACED October 30, 
2017 
This focused on Moroto-based staff 
working directly on program 
implementation of BRACED; 
predominantly Program Officers and 
Program Managers 
Kampala – Uganda 
Leadership 
November 3,  
2017 
This focused on Country leadership and 
included the Country Head, Director of 
Uganda Programming, the Program 
Director of PEACE III and other 
programmatic leadership 
Portland – TSU directors January 16, 
2018 
An interactive discussion whereby I 
walked through the findings with the 
Deputy Director of the EEC  




Senior officials within the organization 
including the head of programming, 
regional leads, the Director of Peace and 
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Conflict, and other senior members of the 
TSU had a roundtable discussion about the 
work 




This talk was open to the entire Portland 
office and was streamed online; it is still 
available for the organization to watch.  
Washington DC, 
Organizational Leadership 
January 22,  
2018 
Senior officials within the organization 
including the Director of the EEC TSU, 
VP of Technical Leadership, Policy and 
Advocacy leaderships, and other senior 
members of the TSU  
 
Analysis 
The qualitative data was entered into qualitative software (MAXQDA), coded for 
specific themes, and then analyzed across these themes. The codes were developed 
deductively during an initial review of the data, then refined to create a simpler schema 
(Emerson et al., 2011). This process was done twice. The coding structure was then 
utilized to review specific combinations of topic whereby I created a more granular set of 
codes. From there key patterns were identified and examined based on specific criteria.  
In total there are 20 primary codes, each with a range of 1-17 sub-codes. The data were 
coded for descriptive factors (e.g., location and program), local variable (e.g., hazards 
and conflict patterns), relationship dynamics (e.g., central government interactions with 
implementing agencies), and a host of themes that relate closely to the papers in this 
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dissertation (e.g., pressures on the landscape, barriers to implementation, scale, and 
Mercy Corps processes).  
For the survey data, my research assistant and I went through each survey one-by-
one with her reading responses so that I could input each answer into Microsoft Excel. We 
then double checked the data to make sure it was all inputted correctly by going through 
each document a second time. The data for the survey was organized in multiple ways: 1) 
biophysical impacts of climate change 2) listed socioeconomic impacts of climate change 
3) current climate change adaptation; 4) listed long-term concerns about climate change 
5) interactions with NGOs. Qualitatively the data were reviewed and analyzed for 
patterns that align with the coding structure used in analyzing interview and observation 
data. I also created Boolean columns for some columns to allow for quantitative analysis 
for specific categories (e.g., the specific biophysical and socioeconomic impacts of 
climate change, recent security challenges, and adaptation efforts). In these instances, 
listed answers were given a yes/no code. Descriptive statistics were then used to identify 
patterns within the quantitative data. Then specific tests were conducted to examine 
correlation and relationships across different variables. This process principally informs 
the Chapter 3 which focuses on Karamoja. 
 
Positionality and Mercy Corps  
 
Mercy Corps was an object of study, but they were also my host. And, 
collectively, they were generous and gracious hosts. I used their Internet, bathrooms, and 
electricity. I rode in their cars to and from the field, drank their water, and was always 
invited to office-wide lunches. The Kenya Country Director picked me up on my first day 
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of field work, I joined team dinners in Portland, and enjoyed day-long goat roasts awash 
with local brew in Karamoja alongside Mercy Corps employees. Their logistics team 
helped facilitate travel, employees described to me their frustrations about their work, and 
I was privy to office gossip. On occasion, I provided minor input or answered technical 
questions related to programming and strategy. However, the staff all understood my 
positionality as a researcher. And I never concealed my intention to understand climate-
conflict processes through Mercy Corps programming.  
As an outsider, I was seen by many as both a sympathetic ear and potentially an 
important voice. Therefore, Mercy Corps staff often shared concerns and frustrations 
with me, unsolicited. For example, the drivers would often describe to me the 
(compelling) reasons Mercy Corps ought to budget for better tires. Likewise, others saw 
me as an easy and safe way to vent about other teams, rules and policies, and other 
frustrations without risk of consequence. Some staff, who just wanted to be helpful, went 
out of their way to show me a document or share an anecdote that they thought could be 
informative. Having these sorts of experiences greatly aided the research. Moreover, 
because I was able to spend considerable time in the Karamoja and attend key meetings 




In this chapter I situated this work within the literature, outlined the geographies 
of this research, described Mercy Corps and the two programs of study (i.e., the research 
sites), and the research methods that link the themes and papers that follow in the 
proceeding sections. In sum, this research centers on understanding how a particular 
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organization, through two particular programs, seeks to address climate-conflict. It is 
clear that the organization is far from monolithic and programming can be steered or 
altered as it traverses the many stages along the policy-to-implementation continuum. 
Program implementation, even when defined by a clear set of programmatic goals, 
introduces complex questions related to geography and inter and intra-organizational 
interests. Mercy Corps, in part because of its size, complexity, and breadth of focus, 
offers a productive vantage point from which to draw insight into the path of discourses 
of climate change and conflict as they travel from policy to implementation. In the next 
section of this dissertation, I present three core papers that demonstrate how climate-
conflict discourses affect policy making, how climate-conflict interactions took place in 
Karamoja, and ultimately, what it meant to develop programming targeting climate-
conflict overlap.  
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CHAPTER II: THE PERCEPTIONS OF AND APPROACHES TO THE 
CONNECTIONS BETWEEN CLIMATE AND SECURITY AMONGST 
THE US-BASED POLICY COMMUNITY30 
 
                                               





While there has been considerable research examining the mechanisms and extent 
to which climate change does – or does not – affect, exacerbate, or trigger conflict (e.g., 
Barnett & Adger, 2007; Buhaug, 2014, 2015; Burke, Hsiang, & Miguel, 2015; Devlin & 
Hendrix, 2014; Gemenne, Barnett, Adger, & Dabelko, 2014; Hsiang et al., 2013; Ide, 
Link, Scheffran, & Schilling, 2016; Kelley et al., 2015; Nordås & Gleditsch, 2015; 
Raleigh, Choi, & Kniveton, 2015; Rüttinger et al., 2015; Salehyan, 2014; Selby, 2014; 
Selby, Dahi, Fröhlich, & Hulme, 2017), there has been far less research conducted on 
how policy institutions approach, understand, and seek to address the connections 
between climate change, conflict, and security (e.g., Floyd, 2015; Hayes & Knox-Hayes, 
2014; McDonald, 2015; Scott, 2015). This gap persists despite institutions’ clear interests 
in the topic. This article, through the study of US institutional actors concerned with 
climate change and security, furthers the understanding of how policy-makers frame the 
question of climate-security linkages and envision the policy implications of those 
linkages.  
The idea that climate change can influence security and/or conflict is no longer 
confined to climate change or security specialists (Floyd, 2008, 2010; Salehyan, 2014; 
Swyngedouw, 2010; Szasz, 2016).  For instance, speeches and statements by high-
ranking political officials including former President Obama, former Secretary of State 
Kerry, former Director of National Intelligence James Clapper, former Secretary of 
Defense Chuck Hagel, former Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter, and current Secretary 
of Defense James Mattis reference climate change as a security risk (Carter, 2016; 
Clapper, 2013; Hagel, 2014b; Obama, 2015b, 2015a; Pecquet, 2014; Revkin, 2017). 
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Additionally, statements by vocal, high-ranking military officials (e.g., CNA, 2007, 
2014), and popular media uptake of well-publicized academic articles on climate-conflict 
linkages (e.g., Hsiang, Burke, & Miguel, 2013; Kelley et al., 2015) have further 
mainstreamed the potential linkages between climate change and conflict (climate-
conflict) and climate change and security (climate-security)31 in the discourses of 
policymaking in the US . This shift is visible in the inclusion of climate change as a 
security concern in a range of policy documents (e.g., Hagel, 2014a, 2014b; Obama, 
2015a) and on-the-record comments by senior officials in the US Government (e.g., 
Kerry, 2015; Obama, 2015b, 2016b). Furthermore, despite broad shifts in the US 
Government’s approaches to climate change following the election of Donald Trump, the 
discourses of climate change and security within its policy institutions have largely gone 
unchanged.  
This article examines US-based policy actors’ and organizations’ approaches to 
climate change and security. The US represents a unique but critical case as it relates to 
the policy uptake of climate-security discourses (Busby, 2008). It has the world’s largest 
military and aid budget, it is the largest per capita emitter of greenhouse gases, and there 
is considerable political tension around the scientific consensus on anthropogenic climate 
change (Dunlap, McCright, & Yarosh, 2016). Thus, while in many ways a product of the 
US’s particular political climate and institutions, US framings of this relationship and 
policies such framings enable will have an outsized impact on climate-security policy and 
practice worldwide (Busby, 2008).  
                                               
31 Climate-security offers a broader framing than climate-conflict to include indirect threats such as food 
and water security that can lead to conflict outcomes  
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 I begin this article with a review of the literature, primarily focusing on climate-
security discourses emerging from the current state of knowledge. I then describe the 
research methods informing this paper before turning to the approaches to climate-
security amongst the US policy community. I close the paper with a discussion of the 
lack of sectoral or organizational consistency in approaches to climate-security within 
this community or even within particular governmental agencies, and demonstrate that 
despite a growing demand for policy addressing the connection between climate and 
security, there are considerable challenges in conceptualizing how to respond to climate 
change as a threat multiplier. 
 
Climate and Security: The State of Knowledge 
 
Climate-security discourses have their roots in and closely parallel those of 
environmental security (Detraz & Betsill, 2009; Floyd, 2008, 2010). Links between the 
environment and security risks are often made to draw political attention to 
environmental issues that are otherwise treated as low political priorities (Trombetta, 
2008). The impact of the environmental security discourse on policy were most evident in 
the mid-1990s. This could be seen most clearly following the publication of Robert 
Kaplan’s article ‘The Coming Anarchy’ in The Atlantic Monthly. That article (and later a 
book of the same title) helped mainstream the environmental security discourse in the US 
and received significant attention in policy circles (Floyd, 2008; R. Kaplan, 1994, 2001; 
Levy, 1995). However, many scholars dismissed the article, and the associated 
discourses, as a variation of environmental determinism that did not acknowledge that 
environmental degradation is a stressor, that rarely, if ever, causes violent conflict (e.g., 
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Gleditsch, 1998; Levy, 1995).   
Policy officials, most prominently senior staff within the Clinton White House, 
were directly influenced by Kaplan and Thomas Homer-Dixon (whom Kaplan cited 
extensively, but selectively) (Levy, 1995). Indeed, Homer-Dixon twice briefed Vice 
President Gore on topics of environmental security (Floyd, 2008), Senior officials began 
to cite environmental change and potential resource conflict as issues of national security 
leading to both sweeping statements and the creation of high-level positions such as the 
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Environmental Security (Dabelko & Simmons, 
1997; Levy, 1995). As described by (Levy, 1995, p. 35) “President Clinton was reported 
to have scribbled marginal notes on his personal copy, and citation of it became 
practically de rigueur for Cabinet members appearing before Congress.” However, the 
discourse of Kaplan’s article, which drew on neo-Malthusian framings of scarcity and 
conflict, did not reflect the complex and contextual realities of how environmental 
change can affect conflict outcomes (Deudney, 1990; Gleditsch, 1998; Matthew, 1995). 
Over time, the lack of alignment between the more alarmist framings of environmental 
security and the complex reality of how environmental change can alter security 
outcomes damaged, or at least watered down, efforts to elevate environmental issues to a 
political concern akin to traditional conceptualizations of security (Conca & Dabelko, 
2002; Floyd, 2008; Gleditsch, 1998; Peluso & Watts, 2001).  
Much like the emergence of the environmental security discourse, those looking 
to advance climate-related policy have leveraged the climate-security discourse to elevate 
climate change beyond routine administration and into high politics by linking it to 
national security concerns (Conca & Dabelko, 2002; Dalby, 2016; O’Lear & Dalby, 
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2016; Oels, 2015; Swyngedouw, 2010; Szasz, 2016). The present-day climate-security 
discourse emerged circa-2007 (Dalby, 2015; Floyd, 2010; Lewis & Lenton, 2015; 
Methmann & Rothe, 2012). At this time, climate change was increasingly being framed 
as a national security concern that could drive instability and conflict by actors in the US 
and beyond (Floyd, 2010; Lewis & Lenton, 2015; Methmann & Rothe, 2012).  This 
framing was, at least in part, driven by the difficulties of getting climate change 
prioritized as a domestic or international political topic (Swyngedouw, 2010; Trombetta, 
2008). At the same time, high-profile reports linking conflict in Darfur to climate change 
(e.g., UNEP, 2007), the first debate by the UN Security Council on climate change as a 
security threat (Scott, 2015; United Nations, 2007), and statements by military officials 
about climate change (CNA 2007) helped shift the once esoteric arguments about climate 
change and conflict firmly into the mainstream (Dalby, 2016; Detraz & Betsill, 2009; 
Floyd, 2010; Lewis & Lenton, 2015; McDonald, 2013; Meierding, 2013; Methmann & 
Rothe, 2012).  
Exemplifying the rapid ascent of this field of study are the fourth and fifth IPCC 
assessment reports (AR4, AR5) released, respectively, in 2007 and 2014 (Gleditsch & 
Nordås, 2014; IPCC, 2014). Gleditsch and Nordås argue that that while AR4 lacked 
systematic research that examined climate-security connections, AR5 paid close attention 
to climate-security debates across multiple chapters (Gleditsch & Nordås, 2014; IPCC, 
2007, 2014; Nordås & Gleditsch, 2007). Over that same period, the climate-security 
discourses have become significantly more nuanced, with the relationship decreasingly 
framed as causal. Gleditsch and Nordås (2014) highlight IPCC WGII chapter 15, ‘Human 
Security’, as exemplary in this regard (Adger et al., 2014; Gleditsch & Nordås, 2014).  
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As with the wider environmental security discourse, the political ramifications of 
overstepping the evidence for the connection between climate change and conflict were 
evident during data collection for this research. For example, multiple scholars have 
challenged the claims that conflict in Darfur was climate-driven, demonstrating that the 
links between climate change and the conflict were overstated, if not outright incorrect 
(Hartmann, 2010; Kevane & Gray, 2008; Selby & Hoffmann, 2014a; Tertrais, 2011). In 
the course of the research represented in this article, research participants, often 
unprompted, noted that past overstatements of the climate-conflict link, including 
regarding Darfur, have negatively impacted the perceived credibility and legitimacy of 
the broader climate-security discussion.  
Though the relationship between climate change, conflict, and security is a 
subject of ongoing academic debate  (Benjaminsen, 2016; Buhaug et al., 2014; Buhaug & 
Nordkvelle, 2014; Burke et al., 2015; Hsiang, Burke, & Miguel, 2014; Kelley et al., 
2015; Nordkvelle, 2014;  Salehyan, 2014; Selby et al., 2017), policy communities have 
largely – though not ubiquitously – accepted the idea that climate change is a security 
concern, most often framing this relationship as a ‘threat multiplier’ (Abrahams & Carr, 
2017). This term was popularized by a 2007 report from the Center for Naval Analysis 
(CNA), a security-focused think tank, entitled ‘National Security and the Threat of 
Climate Change’ (CNA, 2007). The threat multiplier frame suggests that the impacts of 
climate change will not cause conflict, but rather can hasten, exacerbate, or trigger 
conflicts (CNA, 2007). For example, shifting weather patterns might lead to acute 
resource shortages or price shocks, which in turn exacerbate the risk of conflict in a 
particular place. Despite a relatively recent reframing of climate change by CNA as a 
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‘conflict catalyst’ (CNA, 2014), the threat multiplier remains the most common way to 
understand the relationship between climate change and security (Abrahams & Carr, 
2017). Despite the near-ubiquity of this framing, a clear articulation of associated policy 
prescriptions has not followed. This can be attributed, in part, to the vagueness and 
linearity of the threat multiplier discourse, which frames climate change primarily driving 
conflict without accounting for either the potential role of climate change in 
peacebuilding and cooperation or the potential of conflict to lead to climate change 
vulnerability (Abrahams & Carr, 2017).   
There have been multiple efforts to consolidate the different methodological, 
epistemological, and disciplinary perspectives emerging around the connection between 
climate and security. Literature reviews (e.g., Gilmore, 2017; Ide, 2017; Lewis & Lenton, 
2015), as well as the Human Security IPCC chapter in AR5 (Adger et al., 2014), special 
issue journals dedicated to questions of climate-security including Climatic Change 
(2014), Current Climate Change Reports (2017), Geopolitics (2014), Journal of Peace 
Research (2012), and Political Geography (2007, 2014)), and  reviews targeting policy 
makers (e.g., Rüttinger et al., 2015; Stark, 2014) have all helped to organize the wide, and 
at times contradictory, findings in a literature that crosses disciplines, methodological 
orientations, and theoretical positionalities. Collectively, these reviews identify the 
following points of consensus in the literature (Abrahams & Carr, 2017): 
• The relationship between climate change and conflict is not causal; it is widely 
acknowledged that climate change interacts with a host of other issues to produce 
conflict (or build peace).  
• While the places most likely to be affected by climate change-affected conflict 
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have preexisting tensions and are likely to have limited capacity to cope with 
climatic shifts, focusing heavily on places with a reliance on primary production 
and limited adaptive capacity overly- constrains our understanding of conflict 
outcomes.  
• Conflict increases vulnerability to climate change. 
• Adaptation efforts can trigger conflict.  
These points of consensus are very broad and thus leave many important 
questions regarding the integration of climate-security into policy priorities unanswered 
(Lewis & Lenton, 2015; Meierding, 2013). These questions include, but are not limited 
to, the epistemological implications of the spatial and temporal scales at which climate-
security is understood (Gemenne et al., 2014; Lewis & Lenton, 2015; Salehyan, 2014), 
the question of who’s or what’s security is of concern (Barnett, 2001; McDonald, 2013), 
and whether climate change has, in fact, experienced securitization, and what 
securitization might mean for policy-making institutions.(Boas, 2015; Hartmann, 2014; 
Mason, 2014; Oels, 2015; Oels, 2012). 
 Collectively, these questions reveal the fundamental challenges inherent to 
translating the disparate understanding of climate-security connections into actionable 
policy (Boas & Rothe, 2016; Floyd, 2015; Hayes & Knox-Hayes, 2014; Lewis & Lenton, 
2015; Scott, 2015). This article illuminates the ways in which individuals and 
organizations tasked with developing and implementing policy and programming 
understand the connection between climate and security, and use those understandings to 




 Research Methods 
 
The data for this article was gathered through participant observation, document 
analysis, and semi-structured interviews. Data collection was informed by grounded 
theory, whereby with all data sources, the goal was to reach saturation when no new key 
ideas or themes emerged during data collection (Corbin & Strauss, 2008 p. 6). The use of 
multiple methods allowed for findings to be triangulated across multiple sources (Corbin 
& Strauss, 2008), thus deepening and reinforcing saturation.  
I conducted participant observation at conferences and meetings directly 
addressing the connections between climate and security (n=16). During these events I 
took detailed fieldnotes about presentations, panel discussions, and questions and answers 
following the presentations and panels. I identified appropriate events through my 
professional network, information hubs centered on the topic, and through 
recommendations from research participants. I attended these events in person whenever 
possible (n=7), though I also participated in public webinars offered by the Security and 
Sustainability Forum and the Center for Climate and Security. I supplemented participant 
observation with resources available on the Internet. That includes watching additional 
panels and presentations hosted by the Woodrow Wilson Center, the World Affairs 
Council, and the Henry Jackson Foundation.  
My document analysis rests on the examination of documents issued by the U.S. 
Government (USG) and its partners (i.e, organizations funded by or directly informing 
the USG such as the Woodrow Wilson Center, the Center for Climate and Security, and 
Mercy Corps), as well as white papers, blog posts, technical reports, op-eds, and internal 
memos from organizations actively working on climate-security. Documents were 
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identified through Internet searches, cross-checking references in academic and gray 
literature, and suggestions from research participants. They provided insight into the 
‘official’ discourse of organizations, which I then used to compare with individual 
understandings that emerged during observation and interviews. In total, 64 documents 
were incorporated into my analysis. Since this stage of data collection commenced prior 
to interviews and observation, I searched for a broad domain of documents in order to 
identify key themes and questions, which were then considered in interviews and 
analysis.   
I conducted semi-structured interviews with 29 individuals working directly on 
climate-security who either worked for the US Government (n=18) including the 
Department of Defense (DoD), State Department, and the Agency for International 
Development (USAID) or organizations working closely with the US government (n=11) 
(e.g., NGOs working closely with USAID and think tanks whose goal is to influence and 
inform US policy).32 The majority of interviews (n=24) were recorded and transcribed, 
though in select instances research participants asked that I do not record primarily due to 
the sensitivity of the topic and their position in the United States Government (n=5). 
Interview questions focused on participants’ engagement with climate-security, 
perceptions of the validity of the connections between climate change and insecurity, and 
potential policy responses. Interview participants were identified at the conferences and 
events where participant observation took place, through my professional networks, and 
by reaching out to specialists in the field. Sampling was based on a snowball method 
                                               
32 The empirical data collection done for this research was predominantly done prior to the election of 
Donald Trump. All interviews were done with individuals who were part of the Obama administration.  
Many, however, continue to hold roles underneath the Trump administration.   
  
 141 
whereby I asked for references from initial participants to identify later participants. 
Some participants were interviewed twice, allowing me to member check key findings 
(i.e., present preliminary findings to research participants) (Corbin & Strauss, 2008).  
The data I gathered through these methods were entered into qualitative analysis 
support software (MAXQDA) and coded. A total of 107 unique codes were created 
across 11 categories, including sectors, role, participants’ perceptions of climate-security 
connections, perceptions of other sectors, definitions of key terms, and 
challenges/strategies in addressing the connection between climate and security. This 
coding allowed an alignment of core themes based on sector, organization, and role, 
which facilitated an identification of the different ways that research participants 
conceptualize climate-security, their approaches to understanding and addressing the 
issue, and the sorts of policies – if any – they see as central to addressing the link.  
 
Research Participants, Categorizations, and Description of Interview Participants 
The connections between climate and security inherently engage a diverse 
community. The sectors represented by the research participants can be broken into three 
categories: defense, development, and environment. Each is described below, as is the 
total number of individuals interviewed from that category. These categories reflect the 
self-identification of research participants, which coincides as well with the primary 
focus of their organization as well as their individual role within that organization.  
 
Defense – this category consists of individuals working for defense or national security-
oriented organizations, including operational organizations such as the Department of 
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Defense (DoD), organizations focused on intelligence gathering and analysis, security-
focused think tanks, and organizations otherwise focused on US national security (n=15). 
 
Development – this category consists of individuals working for donors such as USAID, 
implementing organizations, development-focused think tanks, and diplomacy-focused 
organizations (i.e., the US State Department). Individuals working for humanitarian 
assistance-focused organizations were also categorized as development actors due to the 
structure of the sample and the individuals’ focus (n=10).  
 
Environmental – this category consists of any individual working for organizations that 
are primarily focused on natural resources or natural resource management. Most present 
in this discussion are international NGOs and multilateral organizations working on 
implementation of programming with environmental goals or on environmental 
advocacy. Despite employing a snowball sampling strategy and starting with an 
individual who was classified as an environmental actor, this was the least represented 
group (n=4). I explain this low number below.  
 
The higher proportion of defense and development-focused actors relative to 
environmental actors does not represent a sampling bias – explicit attempts were made to 
get a broader perspective from those in the environmental sector. Instead, the formulation 
of the sample is largely representative of the community at large, which is more heavily 
represented by defense and development organizations and actors rather than those 
representing more explicit environmental goals and priorities. Nonetheless, to ensure the 
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widest possible engagement, I sought out individuals with an environmental background 
following initial data collection. When asking for references from research participants, I 
made explicit requests for references for individuals working for environmental 
organizations. The vast majority of references remained for individuals focused on either 
the defense or development aspects of the connection between climate and security. As I 
will demonstrate below, however, while those I interviewed worked in particular sectors, 





 The data demonstrate that there are three distinct but overlapping themes that link 
climate-security discourses to questions of policy development. These themes, though not 
mutually exclusive, reflect how policy organizations and actors approach climate-
security:     
1) A challenge of adaptation and resilience: Climate-security connections are 
framed as an issue of risk to be managed through adaptation and/or resiliency 
efforts. The majority of interview participants invoked this theme. 
2) A potent political tool for elevating climate change in the policy world: 
Climate-security connections are a means of motivating people to ‘act on 
climate’; to galvanize those who have been uninterested in the issue of climate 
change or to bring on board those who question the science behind it. This 
theme was prevalent, but less common amongst participants than the first 
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frame. It was, however, very common in official documents, speeches, and 
op-eds. 
3) A topic of limited importance and feasibility: Climate-security connections are 
either insignificant as a conflict driver, irrelevant in development 
programming, or impossible to address for particular sectors. This was the 
least commonly-referenced theme across all forms of data. 
 
It is of note that many participants mobilized multiple themes (n=15) including 
eight defense actors, four development actors, and three environmental actors. Those 
referencing two themes almost entirely linked questions of adaptation and mitigation (i.e., 
themes one and two). This can be explained, in part, by the connections between multiple 
themes seen in the broader discourses of climate and conflict presented in speeches and 
policy documents.  For example, speeches given by President Barack Obama and 
Secretary John Kerry were heavily focused on adaptation challenges as they relate to 
climate-security (Kerry, 2015; Obama, 2015b; also see Figure 2.1). These adaptation 
arguments were then used to highlight the need for mitigation efforts such as pricing 
carbon emissions or garnering support for reaching a global climate accord.  
 
A challenge of adaptation and resilience 
 The most common expression of climate-security in the context of US policy is 
that climate change is a “threat multiplier” such that climate change impacts can increase 
communities’ and places’ vulnerability or exposure to shocks and stressors, which, in 
turn, increases the likelihood and/or impact of conflict, thus decreasing overall security. 
  
 145 
This was expressed consistently in official documents as well as by research participants. 
For example, as described in the 2014 Quaddrenial Defense Review (Hagel, 2014b, p. 8): 
Climate change may exacerbate water scarcity and lead to sharp increases in food 
costs. The pressures caused by climate change will influence resource competition 
while placing additional burdens on economies, societies, and governance 
institutions around the world. These effects are threat multipliers that will 
aggravate stressors abroad such as poverty, environmental degradation, political 
instability, and social tensions – conditions that can enable terrorist activity and 
other forms of violence. 
 
This framing of climate change as a threat multiplier implies that the mitigation of 
climate-related conflict can be achieved by efforts to address shocks and stressors 
through adaptation or resilience-building efforts. Multiple research participants used 
some variation of the terms ‘threat minimizer’ or ‘threat mitigation’ to describe their 
understanding and/or efforts in this arena. For example, as noted by Informant 21, a 
development practitioner who worked for an implementing organization: 
In that we need to look at this connection [between climate change and security] 
within the larger development spectrum, so let's look at vulnerabilities in terms of 
what are the underlying vulnerabilities in development. And then how are these 
multiplied by climate change? Climate change is really seen as a multiplier effect 





The implementation of “threat mitigation” was plagued by difficulties in 
conceptualizing what constitutes policy and programming that address the connection 
between climate and security. This gap was a common theme at conferences and was 
brought up unprompted by many interview participants. For example, when describing 
climate-security topics that needed more research, a majority of interview participants 
consistently noted the need for more granular information about the processes that link 
climate change to insecurity, ways to identify inflection points that would limit the effects 
of climate change on insecurity through policy and programming, and the types of 
adaptation efforts that could address the challenges of climate change as a threat 
multiplier. In short, there remain deep uncertainties regarding how, and where, to adapt 
or build resilience to the joint challenges of climate change and security. Referencing 
these challenges, Informant 20, who worked for USAID, described the challenges of 
funding structures and institutional mandates that can inhibit policy efforts targeting 
climate-security: 
The ways that climate change and conflict issues are interacting in the world are 
so fundamentally interdisciplinary and your entry point could be, for example, 
rule of law to solve the problem. Your entry point could be economic 
development. But that stuff is not called climate adaptation and can’t be attributed 
to the earmark33. Maybe your best entry point is a bunch of paralegals to do X, Y, 
and Z. [Adding in a joking tone] But that is not a climate adaptation intervention, 
so you can’t do it. 
 
                                               
33 In this context earmark is shorthand for the sectoral area from which the money is drawn. Therefore, 
earmarks define for what money can be used for and the type of intervention.  
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A potent political tool for elevating climate change in the policy world     
 The political potency of the threat multiplier discourse is readily apparent in the 
US, where climate change is viewed often in partisan political terms (Dunlap et al., 2016; 
Hornsey et al., 2016; Leiserowitz et al., 2014). Linking climate change to security – in 
particular, national security – potentially shifts the political landscape as it offers a 
message, and messengers, viewed as more appealing to right-leaning political actors who 
may be uninterested in, or unconvinced by, the scientific consensus on anthropogenic 
climate change. Although the political potency framing was less prevalent than the 
adaptation/resiliency framing, multiple research participants framed the connection 
between climate change and national security as a motivator for addressing climate 
change with policy (in particular mitigation-focused initiatives) both nationally and 
internationally.  
 Multiple research participants argued that shifting the messenger on climate 
change – even if the message largely stayed the same – would shift the left-right split 
around climate action in the US. In this argument, having high-ranking military members 
and national security-focused institutions emphasizing the ways in which climate change 
multiplies security threats is a way to bring constituencies who have previously been 
disengaged from or actively against climate action due to their perceived political 
leanings into efforts to address climate change. For example, Informant 5, who had 
decades of experience in the United States Military, described why military institutions 
and personnel are, theoretically, more effective at convincing non-traditional audiences to 
care about climate-security and climate change more generally: 
These guys are not wide-eyed radicals; they don’t fall for every fad and next shiny 
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object. These guys are busy. They go and fight and win America’s war when they 
are called upon to do so. They are concerned with climate change – that ought to 
concern you guys.  Because these guys are not lightweights. They are only 
concerned about shit that’s real. They are only concerned about stuff that’s going 
to impact their basing, their training, their ability to respond. So I think that’s the 
real contribution that we’ve made. People believe us… We’re not doing this for 
fun. We’re not doing this because it’s cool. We’re not doing this because we’re 
liberal; we’re not tree huggers. We’re doing this because we believe this is going 
to affect our ability to base, to train, to respond.  
 
 The allusion to high-ranking US military actors, the US military as an institution, 
and the concept of climate change as factor in US national security has become a 
common thread in the political discourse centered on acting on climate change. This 
framing was an effort to move climate change beyond an abstract risk in far flung places 
to a concrete security issue that stresses US interests. It was evident, for example, in 
President Obama’s speech to the 2015 Coast Guard’s graduating class (Obama, 2015b), 
Secretary Kerry’s speech at Old Dominion University entitled “Remarks on Climate 
Change and National Security” (Kerry, 2015); and President Obama’s 2015 and 2016 
State of the Union Addresses (Obama, 2015a, 2016). For example, in the 2015 address 
Obama noted (2015): 
The best scientists in the world are all telling us that our activities are changing 
the climate, and if we do not act forcefully, we'll continue to see rising oceans, 
longer, hotter heat waves, dangerous droughts and floods, and massive disruptions 
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that can trigger greater migration, conflict, and hunger around the globe. The 
Pentagon says that climate change poses immediate risks to our national security. 
We should act like it.  
 
 Allusions to the connection between climate change and national security, US 
military efforts on climate change, and individuals such as those in CNA’s Military 
Advisory Board34 (e.g., Hagel, 2014a, 2014b), all relying upon the threat multiplier 
discourse, were prevalent in op-eds, speeches, and articles in the weeks and months 
leading up to the December 2015 Conference of the Parties (COP) in Paris. For example, 
on October 22nd, 2015, three weeks before the Paris COP, the Partnership for a Secure 
America (PSA), an organization with an aim “to advance bipartisanship on today’s 
critical national security and foreign policy challenges,” issued a statement and 
advertisement, including a full-page advertisement in the Wall Street Journal, that touted 
bipartisan support of action on climate change based on the security risks it poses. 
The advertisement shown in Figure 2.1 reflects a political argument that rests on 
an overarching discourse of climate-security informed by key aspects of the threat 
multiplier. In it, a man, presumably a member of the U.S. military, is perched in a 
helicopter solemnly scanning a devastating flood of what appears to be New Orleans; the 
American Flag patched to his uniform sits at the forefront of the screen. The message is 
clear, climate change no longer exists in as a future, abstract concern. It is a ‘threat 
multiplier’ challenging US national security at home and abroad. The advertisement is 
signed by a host of dignitaries, government officials, and security leaders. It is of note 
                                               
34 The Military Advisory Board a group of high-ranking, retired military officials advocating for climate 
action from a military perspective 
  
 150 
that much as in the case of those who were interviewed for this article, the 48 signatories 
were mostly comprised of individuals from defense-focused organizations with only one 
from an organization focused on environmental or natural resource management issues, 
Christine Todd Whitman, the Environmental Protection Agency administrator from 2001 
– 2003. Notably, Whitman is a Republican, reflecting this advertisement’s clear efforts to 




Figure 2.1: An Advertisement in the Wall Street Journal Touting the Need to Address 




Evident in the desire to rely upon the military as a neutral arbiter of the 
seriousness of climate change  is the perception that other sectors, in particular the 
environmental sector, is not. It was expressed by multiple research participants, both 
implicitly and explicitly, that the political potency of the connection between climate 
change and security exists in its apparent political centrality and neutrality, but that 
neutrality can come into doubt when it is presented by individuals, organizations, or 
sectors that are perceived to be left leaning on the political spectrum, Informant 1, who 
worked at a think tank focused on defense issues, perceived the climate-security 
discussion as critical in shifting the political landscape on climate change from a left-
leaning issue to a bi-partisan issue. This individual clearly linked the environmental 
sector with a political leaning, and association that would limit the efficacy of climate-
security conversations: 
[We don’t] want to work too closely with them [the environmental community], 
because we want to be – they're portrayed and seen as on the left-leaning side of 
the spectrum – and we want to be bipartisan. So we don’t come out on the policies 
and things more to the left because it would harm some of our credibility with the 
center and the right.    
 
As noted by Informant 7, a researcher with a focus on defense topics who saw the 
connection between climate and security primarily as a political motivator, “In 
conservative circles, if [the climate-security] nexus becomes painted as environmental, it 
is a non-starter.” In other words, though not actively being blocked out, the 
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environmental community is seen as unwelcome in these broader discussions for risk of 
watering down the political potency of the climate-security argument or shifting it from a 
perceived-as politically neutral argument to a concern for left-leaning actors. 
 
A topic of limited importance and utility   
 Though less common than the first two approaches, those who expressed this 
theme explicitly questioned the merit of attempting to address the connections between 
climate change and security. Those invoking this theme did not necessarily question 
climate change’s potential to act as a threat multiplier, but rather whether policy 
institutions had the capacity to address it as such. 
This perspective was notably uncommon in policy documents describing climate-
security. Participants ascribing to this view often acknowledged the existence of a link 
between climate change, conflict, and security, but saw policy efforts targeting these 
linkages as either redundant with broader efforts to address climate change or impossible 
to address. As noted by Informant 23 who worked for the State Department and 
describing what he saw as an unhelpful focus on climate-security linkages: 
There is a specter of climate and security that I’ve sort of evolved over the past 
few years to just throwing up my hands about it. I don’t question the overall 
concept. I think, yes, we are entering a very volatile phase of resource whatever 
you want to call it…. But, again, I think when you take it out of the abstract 
academic debate what does that mean exactly? And what kind of response is that 
going to require? Better forecasting? We need better forecasting anyway. Better 




 Linking climate change to a particular conflict is enormously difficult. It requires 
identifying pathways through which a biophysical event is translated into a human 
impact, often in complex ecologies and economies, and often in spatially unconfined 
places across multiple temporal scales. Because the knowledge base on how (and where) 
climate change does (or does not) affect conflict remains coarse, explicitly acting on the 
connection between climate and security is extremely difficult, and according to some, 
quixotic. Those who voiced this theme raised concerns regarding the opportunity costs of 
shifting of funding and human capital towards addressing connections between climate 
and security. For example, as noted by Informant 27, who worked for USAID: 
I think there is a lot of uncertainty about the links between climate stress and other 
environmental stress and what sparks, what leads to conflict. So reorienting a lot of 
our programming to address a very uncertain linkage, I don’t think is a good idea.  
 
 Though less common than the other two perspectives, the salience of this 
perspective is reflected in the challenges outlined in the first theme, and the fact that the 
second is largely focused on more generic mitigation policy. That is, these participants 
are all reflecting an observed reality that reacting and responding to the links between 
climate change and security –i.e., developing threat minimizers – is at best incredibly 





Continuity of Discourse in the US Policy Community 
 
Naturally, political change can drive changes in policy discourses. The most 
apparent shift to the climate-security political landscape in the US is the election of 
President Donald Trump. Despite some notable changes in policy related to climate 
change more generally, both in the official capacity of the administration (e.g., exit from 
the Paris Accord) and in broader discourses of climate change (e.g., ambiguity in the 
President’s acknowledgement of anthropogenic climate change), the discourses of and 
approaches to the connections between climate change and security appear consistent 
with those that held sway under the Obama administration. There are numerous examples 
that demonstrate the relative stability of the policy discourses around climate change and 
conflict in the context of a transition from the Obama administration to the Trump 
administration.   
For instance, at a public briefing entitled The National Security Implications of 
Climate Change, held on June 5th, 2017, focused on climate change’s role as a threat 
multiplier. The moderator, John Conger, a former Principal Deputy Under Secretary of 
Defense, alluded to the new administration, asked the rhetorical question of whether past 
attention to climate-conflict and climate-security connections from the DoD under 
President Obama were primarily political or whether “there is really a core national 
security issue that drives the DoD’s interest in the impacts of climate change.”  He then 
brought up comments by President Trump’s Secretary of Defense James Mattis to 
demonstrate that the military’s efforts were, in fact, not politically driven. Secretary 
Mattis, reflecting the theme that climate change represents a challenge for adaptation and 
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resilience – in this case altering DoD strategy and efforts to prepare for shifting threats 
and resource access, issued the following statement during his confirmation process 
(Revkin, 2017):  
I agree that the effects of a changing climate — such as increased maritime access to 
the Arctic, rising sea levels, desertification, among others — impact our security 
situation. I will ensure that the department continues to be prepared to conduct 
operations today and in the future, and that we are prepared to address the effects of a 
changing climate on our threat assessments, resources, and readiness.  
 
In a similar vein, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Paul J. 
Selva, at a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on July 18, 2017, described 
potential national risks in the Middle East North Africa region, the Sahel, and the Horn of 
Africa in relation to a changing climate (Revkin, 2017; Werrell & Femia, 2017):  
The dynamics that are happening in our climate will drive uncertainty and will drive 
conflict… you could look at the decimation of the fisheries off Somalia that 
contributed to piracy because the fishermen couldn’t make their livelihood by doing 
what they do best, which is fishing on the fishing grounds off of Somalia. So I think 
we need to be prepared for those. It will cause us to have to address questions like 
humanitarian disaster relief. It will also cause us to have to focus on places where 
climate instability might cause actual political instability in regions of the world we 




The Secretary of Defense and the Vice Chairman both emphasized the need to 
address the security challenges posed by climate change, and in doing so mobilized one 
of the themes common in Obama-era discourse on this issue, suggests that this discourse 
is resilient in the face of substantial political change. However, policy continuity without 
clarity regarding the means of response to this challenge does little to inform concrete 




Amongst those interviewed, the most common theme in the discourse connecting 
climate change and security is that the security risks posed by climate change are a 
question of adaptation and resilience; 26 of 29 respondents (89.7%) reflected it as such, 
as compared with 15 (51.7%) who described climate security as a political argument that 
might raise the profile of climate change-related policy, and three (10.3%) who explicitly 
questioned the importance and feasibility of the issue.35  
 
Table 2.1: The Percentage of Themes Mobilized by Interview Participants Across Sectors 
(n=29) 
 
 Theme 1: A challenge 
of adaptation and 
resilience  
Theme 2: A potent 
political tool for 
elevating climate 
Theme 3: A topic of 
limited importance 
and utility 
                                               
35 I do not include conference participants’ descriptions of the connections between climate and security in 
this instance as I was unable to systematically determine their approach. Anecdotally, however, the 
approaches and discursive reflections of this group aligns very closely with the interview sample.   
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100% 53% 0% 
Development 
(n=10) 
80% 40% 30% 
Environment 
(n=4) 
100% 75% 0% 
Total (n=29) 93% 52% 10% 
 
Table 2.1 demonstrates that among the sectors there are two key differences. First, 
only those in the development sector explicitly questioned the importance of the 
connection between climate change and security (i.e., Theme 3). In total, 30% of the 
development sample questioned whether climate security is a feasible and/or worthy goal, 
as compared to 10.34% of the sample as a whole. This reflects this sector’s greater 
engagement with implementation. Despite high-level statements and directives (e.g., 
Obama, 2016a), ground-level programming targeting climate-security is difficult to 
conceptualize and implement.  Thus, this group did not see the lack of actionable policy 
simply as a challenge to be worked out, but as a roadblock; they were reflecting their 
experiences integrating questions of adaptation and resilience into questions of climate-
security. Though no defense-focused participants reflected this theme, they faced 
comparable challenges in their efforts to identify inflection points that would limit the 
effects of climate-security connections. For example, reflecting the argument that the 
Arab Spring was hastened by climate change, multiple defense participants expressed 
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deep uncertainty about what defense and intelligence agencies could have done to predict 
or mitigate the impacts of climate change on the uprisings. Unlike the development 
actors, however, they were able to pivot their attention to clearer, more straightforward 
adaptation efforts, such as the careful consideration of impacts on basing and training, to 
fill the gaps around tangible action. Second, there was a wide gulf between the number of 
environmental actors who approach climate-security as a political tool (i.e., Theme 2) 
versus the number of actors from other sectors. This latter difference reflects the 
positionality of the environmental community in this discussion and, most likely, the 
need for new more compelling messages related to climate change mitigation.  
Reflecting discussions in the wider climate change risk perception literature 
(Berkhout, 2012; Bradbury, 1989), not only did approaches to climate-security vary 
within sectors, they also varied within organizations. For example, within USAID some 
saw the connection between climate change and security as an important consideration 
for future development efforts (and therefore mobilized the “challenge for adaptation and 
resilience” theme), while others explicitly doubted whether it would have any real impact 
on their individual work or the Agency’s mission (mobilizing “the topic is of limited 
importance” theme). Similar disagreements were seen within the US State Department, 
with some actively considering how climate change affects conflict and how that fits 
within their organizational mandate, and others framing it as a distraction from their core 
focus (i.e., the first and third themes). Critically, across the sample only one person 
mobilized the adaptation and resilience theme and the limited importance theme, 
suggesting significant differences of opinion and approach within these organizations.  
Research participants within the defense sector also disagreed about how precisely to 
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approach climate-security. Amongst those working for the DoD, some argued that since 
climate change was an operational risk, it necessitated efforts that would prevent the 
spiraling of risks in particular places (i.e., adaptation and resiliency efforts). Others 
argued that the unpredictability and complexity of how climate change may affect 
conflict will nullify the effectiveness of predictive actions, and therefore their most 
effective path of action is to address the logistical issues that climate change produces, 
such as impacts on basing, training, and supply logistics. Further, they noted that such 
challenges provide a new, more emphatic message about why Americans should care 
about climate change (i.e., theme 2).  
These trends were largely mirrored in discussions at conference and in program 
documents. For example, the 2015 Quadrennial Defense Review (Hagel, 2014b), which 
outlines the DoD’s vision, priorities, and challenges, emphasizes the need to address 
logistical challenges while alluding to the risks of cascading security concerns as a result 
of environmental change (i.e., the first theme). For example, as noted on page 25: 
The Department’s operational readiness hinges on unimpeded access to land, air, 
and sea training and test space. Consequently, we will complete a comprehensive 
assessment of all installations to assess the potential impacts of climate change on 
our missions and operational resiliency, and develop and implement plans to 
adapt as required.  
 
Likewise, CNA’s 2014 report, ‘National Security and the Accelerating Risks of 
Climate Change’ though focused largely on military readiness to climate-related threats 
(i.e., the first theme), it also reflects the argument that military personnel are a more 
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credible messenger for climate policy more generally. As noted in the Foreword (CNA, 
2014) 
 
When it comes to thinking through long-term global challenges, none are more 
qualified than our most senior military leaders. Not only do they have decades of 
experience managing risk and responding to conflict on the battlefield, but they 
are also experts in geopolitical analysis and long-range strategic planning		
 
Similarly USAID published a climate-conflict annex (Reiling & Brady, 2015) to 
their Climate-Resilient Development Framework  (USAID, 2014), which represented the 
relationship between climate change and conflict and climate change and security in 
measured terms that reflected the demand for adaptation but stopped short of advocating 
for targeted adaptation and resiliency efforts.	Instead, the document stresses conflict-
sensitive adaptation and peacebuilding opportunities. For example, as noted on page XI: 
Unfortunately, there is robust evidence to suggest that a majority of the world’s 
most fragile regions, countries, and communities also will likely be highly 
exposed to the impacts climate change. It is therefore essential that efforts to 
address climate impacts be designed to manage and reduce conflict in these 
communities, and to reinforce those capacities that exist to constructively manage 
conflict. It is reasonable to think that climate change adaptation and mitigation 




Summarily, approaches to climate-security are not defined by one’s sector. 
Moreover, despite the prominence of the first framing, the policy making community 
struggled to precisely articulate what constitutes adapting to climate-security.  
Conclusion 
 
This article is informed by and builds upon the literature examining the discourses 
of environmental security (and more explicitly, climate security). In examining how the 
US-based policy community tasked with addressing the connections between climate and 
security frame the issue and articulate potential responses, this research offers granular 
insight into the character of contemporary climate and security policy discourses and the 
challenges associated with translating those discourses into action.  
Climate change and security in US policy centers on a discourse that constructs 
climate and change and variability as a threat multiplier. Despite this apparent coherence, 
the considerable attention to climate-security paid by policy makers and implementers 
alike has not produced a clear answer to the question of whether the logistical, political, 
and conceptual challenges associated with climate-security linkages, and in particular 
climate-conflict linkages, can be addressed through existing framings of adaptation and 
resilience. While the threat multiplier is a coherent means of making a political argument 
about climate change, this is but one of three themes evident in individuals’ and 
organizations’ approaches to this broad discourse . While each theme is commensurable 
with a broad threat multiplier framing, are not necessarily coherent across themes. This 
incoherence is a source of the challenges to policy and implementation reported across 
the three sectors reviewed in this article. Thus, even the framing of the threat multiplier 
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as a potent political tool for elevating climate change in the policy conversation faces a 
paradoxical challenge. Though it would seem framing climate change in terms of national 
security – perceived as an issue relatable to a conservative audience – this assumption has 
been challenged. Myers et al. (2012) demonstrate that when framing climate change as a 
security issue, as compared with an issue of ecology or public health, it is most likely to 
elicit anger from those who doubt or dismiss the scientific consensus of anthropogenic 
climate change. In this way, while the connection between climate and security offers a 
message on climate change that may be compelling to non-traditional/uninterested actors, 
that message appears to be ineffective, even actively disagreeable, especially if coming 
from the environmental community (Myers et al., 2012).  
Without greater evidence to clarify the questions of how to adapt and build 
resilience in a conflict sensitive manner, there is a significant risk that policy will 
continue down a path of ineffective program promotion, uneven motivation for 
engagement, and strategic mobilization of poorly understood conflict risk for political 
ends. At the same time, ineffective programs might themselves trigger or exacerbate 
conflict (e.g., Dabelko et al., 2013; Reiling & Brady, 2015; Rüttinger et al., 2015; Snorek, 
Renaud, & Kloos, 2014; USAID, 2014). Finally, framing climate-security solely in the 
idea that climate change is a threat multiplier risks ignoring themes in peacebuilding 
literature (e.g., Conca & Dabelko, 2002; Matthew & Hammill, 2012) that note the 
potential of climate change adaptation as a peacebuilding tool, and the importance of 
climate change and natural resource management in post-conflict settings. Such outcomes 
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CHAPTER III: LAND IS THE BIGGEST GUN: CLIMATE CHANGE 
AND THE SHIFTING LANDSCAPES OF KARAMOJA, UGANDA36 
 
                                               




As defined by Mason (2014, p. 807),  “(post)conflict” describes “areas with 
current or recent historical experience of violent conflict and/or foreign military 
occupation.” Though, ‘post-conflict’ is a notably difficult term to define in strictly spatial 
or temporal terms (Baker, 2009, p. 6), post-conflict places face two primary, but distinct 
challenges: economic recovery and reducing the risk of recurring conflict (Collier, 
Hoeffler, & Söderbom, 2008). As I describe below, Karamoja, Uganda is facing both 
challenges. This article examines how the impacts of climate change interact with the 
post-conflict political ecology of Karamoja to produce a new, challenging set of conflict 
dynamics that threaten the well-being of those living there as well as its current stability.  
In this article, I demonstrate that though the overall severity of conflict has 
decreased in Karamoja in recent years, climate change impacts, in particular extended dry 
seasons and increasing inter- and intra-annual variability, in combination with a series of 
social, economic and political factors, are putting pressure on the landscape. The impacts 
of this pressure, in turn, play out in the post-conflict political ecology of Karamoja, which 
in enabling new resource extraction initiatives and land speculation has contributed to the 
region’s exposure to the risk of climate change-affected conflict (climate-conflict), and its 
inability to manage, absorb or mitigate that risk, a situation increasingly labelled fragility 
(see, for example, Rüttinger et al., 2015). The result is a shift in the character of conflict 
in Karamoja. Where once interethnic conflict centered on commercial-scale cattle raiding 
defined large spaces in the landscape, today climate change impacts are contributing to a 
new conflict environment characterized by increasing incidence of small-scale conflicts, 
such as theft and localized resource conflict. As in other case studies focused on the 
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relationship between climate change and conflict in nearby places with similar climatic 
and economic contexts this case highlights the deeply complex spatiality and temporality 
of this relationship (see, for example, Adano et al., 2012; Ide et al., 2014),.  
I begin this paper with a brief review of the literature on the political ecology of 
Karamoja, and the political ecology of climate change and conflict (climate-conflict) 
more generally. I then describe the research methods utilized I this work. Finally, I turn to 
the contemporary factors altering the conflict landscape in Karamoja and the role of 
climate change in altering the conflict landscape.  
 
Climate Change, Conflict, and Fragility 
 
This paper is informed by, and builds upon, the scholarship at the intersection of 
political ecology and environmental security (see, for example, Barnett, 2001; Barnett & 
Adger, 2007; Benjaminsen, Alinon, Buhaug, & Buseth, 2012; Le Billon, 2001; Nordås & 
Gleditsch, 2007; Peluso & Watts, 2001; Raleigh, Choi, & Kniveton, 2015). This body of 
literature has demonstrated that without underlying vulnerabilities driven by political, 
social, and economic power structures, environmental change would have only limited 
impact on conflict dynamics (Barnett & Adger, 2007; Le Billon, 2001; Raleigh, 2010; 
Raleigh & Urdal, 2007).  
As they relate to potential links between climate change and conflict, political 
ecological studies have been central in pushing back on deterministic narratives that 
argue for a direct, causal relationship between climate change and conflict (see, for 
example, Dalby, 2014, 2016a; Floyd, 2008; Gleditsch, 1998; Hartmann, 2010; Hayes & 
Knox-Hayes, 2014; McDonald, 2013; Selby & Hoffmann, 2014a; Swyngedouw, 2010). 
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Instead, this literature demonstrates how climate change affects (or fails to affect) conflict 
in particular places (Ide et al., 2016; Krampe, 2014; Milman & Arsano, 2014; Snorek, 
Renaud, & Kloos, 2014), and calls attention to the risks of securitizing climate change 
and its impacts (e.g., Faris, 2007; Graeger, 1996; Hartmann, 2014; Selby, 2014; Selby & 
Hoffmann, 2014b; Swyngedouw, 2010).  Much of this work has come in the form of case 
studies (Ide, 2017). These studies, which enable a highly granular perspective on the 
relationship between climate change and conflict in particular places, offer insight into 
the mechanisms by which climate change can alter conflict and peacebuilding outcomes 
(e.g., Beck, 2014; Feitelson & Tubi, 2017; Okpara, Stringer, & Dougill, 2017), the spatial 
complexities of the relationship between climate change and conflict (e.g., Busby, Cook, 
Vizy, Smith, & Bekalo, 2014; Devlin & Hendrix, 2014), and the risks of negative conflict 
outcomes as a result of adaptation efforts (Dabelko et al., 2013; Milman & Arsano, 2014; 
Snorek et al., 2014). Using the changes in Karamoja as a case study, I utilize a political 
ecological framing to understand how competing interests, large scale shifts in local 
livelihoods, and climate and environmental change in Karamoja have led to new forms of 
conflict related to land access and land use.  
In adopting this framing, this paper builds on the literature that seeks to better 
understand how environmental change affects fragility in a post-conflict environment 
(e.g., Grimm, Lemay-Hébert, & Nay, 2014; Nay, 2012). Fragility offers a theoretical 
perspective that sharply contrasts with the widely-adopted resilience frameworks 
(Manyena & Gordon, 2015). Whereas resilience is generally accepted to mean the ability 
to withstand shocks and stressors (see, for example, Adger, 2000; Manyena, 2006; 
USAID, 2014; Walker et al., 2004), fragile places are marked by the lack of capacity in 
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that regard (Manyena & Gordon, 2015). For example, in their study on climate change 
resilient development in fragile states, Henley-Shephard and her co-authors (2017) refer 
to fragile socioecological systems as being marked by poor governance, inequity, low 
development, and multiple compounding shocks and stressors that can lead to complex 
crisis.  
Policy institutions focused on foreign policy and development, particularly those 
from the Global North, have widely adopted fragility framings to organize and prioritize 
their work. They make efforts to measure states’ fragility by way of indices that 
incorporate a wide range of variables (see, for example, Cammack, McLeod, Menocal, & 
Christiansen, 2006; Rice & Patrick, 2008). At the same time, fragility has been critiqued 
for its discursive amorphousness and general malleability. For example, as noted by 
Ferreira (2017, p. 1300), ‘the fuzziness of the term and the broadness and vagueness of 
current definitions [of fragility] are frequently highlighted in critical appraisals’ (see also 
Faust, Grävingholt, & Ziaja, 2015; Grimm et al., 2014). Moreover, the ineffectiveness of 
many of the indices (S. Kaplan, 2014), the tendency to focus at the not-always-
appropriate scale of the state (Manyena & Gordon, 2015), and fundamental questions 
about the inherently political and normative framing of describing a country as ‘fragile’ 
(Grimm et al., 2014), highlight the need for more critical examinations of the term itself 
and associated discourses.  
My approach to fragility follows the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development’s (OECD) definition of fragility, which sees it as “the combination of 
exposure to risk and insufficient coping capacity of the state, system and/or communities 
to manage, absorb or mitigate those risks. Fragility can lead to negative outcomes 
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including violence, the breakdown of institutions, displacement, humanitarian crises or 
other emergencies” (OECD, 2016, p. 21). This definition is productive for the question at 
hand because it considers both theoretical drivers of fragility and the cyclical impact of 
related negative outcomes. Places recovering from conflict are often fragile in that sense, 
and therefore face a unique set of challenges related to development and natural resource 
management (Kovach & Conca, 2016; Le Billon, 2008; Maxwell et al., 2010). Karamoja 
is no different. It suffers from the reverberating economic effects of a prolonged conflict, 
the risks of corruption, and remains vulnerable to shocks and stressors that occur 
annually, if not seasonally (Karamoja Development Forum, 2017; Mercy Corps, 2016; 
Stites et al., 2016). Moreover, the ability of local institutions to uphold the peace has been 
called into question. Thus, the potential recurrence of conflict influenced by 
environmental shocks and stressors remains an acute risk for the population of Karamoja. 
Those risks are further amplified by the inherent challenges of integrating sustainable and 
equitable environmental management and ecosystem services into post-conflict recovery  
(Conca & Dabelko, 2002; Jensen, 2013; Kovach & Conca, 2016) and the demonstrated 
risk of poorly managed post-conflict resource extraction leading to higher rates of 
conflict recurrence (Rustad & Binningsbø, 2012; Suarez, Árias-Arévalo, & Martínez-
Mera, 2018).  
By examining how climate change can affect a post-conflict landscape, this article 
addresses questions that bridge the literatures focused on climate change, environmental 
peacebuilding, and post-conflict resource management. Therefore, beyond its illustration 
of the specific situation in Karamoja, this case is of importance to the wider climate-
conflict and environmental security literatures because it illustrates that climate change 
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impacts have become important to the success of post-conflict peacebuilding and 
recovery outcomes (Conca & Dabelko, 2002; Jensen, 2013; Kovach & Conca, 2016; 
Mason, 2014), and further articulates the potential of climate change to negatively alter 
conflict outcomes in fragile settings.  
 
Research Methods  
 
The data in this article were gathered through multiple methods, including a 
survey of local governance officials, participant observation, interviews, and a document 
review.  I also tested the findings from these sources by member-checking the work with 
key stakeholders (Emerson et al., 2011). This approach enabled me to triangulate the 
research findings and thus increase the internal validity of the research (Corbin & Strauss, 
2008).  
A survey of governance officials (n=103) was the primary data source for this 
paper. The survey focuses on the perspectives of local governance officials on 1) climate 
and environmental change; 2) conflict and security; and 3) non-government organization 
(NGO) activity. Responses were then examined both in the aggregate via descriptive 
statistics and via qualitative analysis to identify perceptions of climate change, conflict, 
and climate-conflict connections. The sample was most heavily represented by local 
government officials in Karamoja (n=78). The plurality of the sample (n=45) are Local 
Council 1s (or LC1), representatives in the smallest administrative unit in the country. 
There were also LC3s and staff members (n=13) who represent the subcounty perspective 
and LC5 staff members (n=3) who represent the district level. All LCs are elected. The 
sample also includes peace and security officials, a category that includes members of the 
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Uganda People’s Defence Force (UPDF), peace committee members (groups of officials 
that address questions of peace and security at a range of scales) and local security 
officers (n=16) and technical advisers such as agriculture and natural resource 
management officers (n=9).  
The focus on local government officials, in particular those who were elected and 
represent smaller localities, provided insight into the shifting conflict, economic, and 
physical landscapes in the region as well as the biophysical shifts perceived by this 
population. However, the gender dynamic of the research sample is deeply skewed 
towards men, 96-7. This ratio is representative of the general gender breakdown of local 
representation in Karamoja.37 However while this sample may be representative of this 
particular population, and though my experiences suggested that those I surveyed are 
aware of both the issues facing individuals in their community and the more macro 
aspects of policy and development in Uganda, their lens on local issues is generally 
derived from the point of view of men who understand them through their particular 
social positions. The mixed-methods approach and emphasis on triangulation helped 
account for the data challenges inherent to a sample with a degree of homogeneity in 
participants’ positionality and subjectivity. Specifically, by cross-referencing the survey 
with the other forms of data, I was able to ensure a higher degree of internal validity for 
the inferences drawn from this dataset (Maxwell, 1992).  
The survey respondents, by nature of their roles, interact closely with 
development organizations and the larger government apparatus to which they belong. 
                                               
37 These data are not readily available, however, observations, and conversations with NGO workers who 
regularly work with local governmental representatives suggest that this number is representative of the 
wider LC1 population.   
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Because of the considerable presence of development actors in the region (USAID, 
2016), I explicitly considered the risk of participants simply reflecting development 
discourses in their responses. Therefore, I separated inquiry about climate change from 
inquiry on conflict to avoid influencing responses about the relationship between the two. 
Had respondents perceived my interests to be in the relationship between climate change 
and conflict, they might have emphasized this relationship in the hope of attracting more 
projects or attention. Likewise, I used non-normative prompts (e.g., ranking the impacts 
of climate change, conflict, and NGO activity on a Likert scale and asking for 
descriptions to accompany ratings) to better understand climate change, conflict, and 
development in the region. This type of questioning allowed insight into how respondents 
connected questions of climate change, fragility, and conflict, and provided an effective 
starting point for more nuanced questioning. 
In addition to the survey, I also conducted six months of fieldwork in Karamoja 
alongside Mercy Corps, an international humanitarian and development agency, allowed 
me to conduct participant observation, semi-structured interviews, and informal 
interview-like conversations. Participant observation included going to field sites with 
Mercy Corps staff to meet with program recipients, participating in resilience 
assessments, and attending meetings with governance officials, training and learning 
events, and coordination and planning meetings. While engaged in these activities, I 
participated in a large number of interview-like conversations, primarily with Mercy 
Corps staff, partners, and program recipients. These interactions proved to be a very 
fruitful source of data, as I was able to ask questions based on the immediate context. 
These conversations further contextualized how Karamoja has experienced 
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environmental change and conflict and how the region has evolved in the years following 
disarmament. These observations and conversations served both as an important data 
source and as a means of triangulating the survey data.   
I conducted five formal interviews explicitly covering the relationship between 
climate change and conflict. These focused on specific topics based on an individuals’ 
expertise, for example land use and land policy in Karamoja as a factor in climate-
conflict. These were done with the staff of Mercy Corps and local CBOs partnering with 
Mercy Corps. Because Mercy Corps employees, in particular program officers (most of 
whom are themselves from Karamoja), interact regularly with program recipients in their 
efforts to understand the needs of the communities receiving programming, and because 
they lived and worked through the violent clashes, the disarmament process, and the 
current period of relative stability, they were able to describe their experiences well 
beyond their perspectives as NGO employees. And though these employees hold 
privileged and powerful positions within Karamoja, I tried to control for this by pursuing 
topics couched within the context of their experiences working with communities.  
Because of the increased presence of NGOs in Karamoja, there is ample gray 
literature describing Karamoja, conflict, and climate change. Some of this literature was 
publicly available and some, including program documents, I obtained with permission 
through the Mercy Corps intranet or directly from program staff during my time in 
Karamoja and Kampala. In total I reviewed 59 reports on Karamoja issued by NGOs and 
learning partners spanning from 2008 to 2018. Many of these reports directly examine 
climate-conflict or other topics salient to this research. Therefore, the existing gray 
literature was useful not only for understanding contemporarily challenges in the region, 
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but also in understanding how past conflicts and environmental change have evolved over 
time.  
Finally, in order to increase the internal validity of the findings I presented the 
results to multiple Moroto (n=6) and Kampala-based (n=7) Mercy Corps staff, including 
many staff from Karamoja or who have been working in Karamoja for the better part of 
their career, as a means of member-checking the research. 
 
Research Context: Karamoja  
 
Physical Geography 
Karamoja is the northeastern-most subregion in Uganda. It is comprised of seven 
districts: Kaabong, Kotido, Abim, Amudat, Moroto, Nakapiriprit, and Napak. It is a vast 
space, roughly the size of Rwanda, 27,200 square kilometers, containing semi-arid 
savannah, bush, and mountains with plains in the central and mountains in the east and 
wetter belts to the west.  (Mugerwa, Stephen, & Anthony, 2014; Quam, 2013). Karamoja 
has maximum temperatures ranging from 28-32 ℃(Mercy Corps, 2016) and rates of 
evapotranspiration that generally exceed total rainfall (Chaplin et al., 2017; Mubiru, 
2010). The vegetation, therefore, is dominated by species that thrive in arid environments 
such as seasonal grasses, thorny plants, and small trees.  
The most important component of Karamoja’s physical geography in terms of its 
broader political ecology are the patterns of rainfall and aridity (Bushby & Stites, 2016; 
Stark, 2011; Stites & Huisman, 2010; USAID, 2013). Speaking to the sheer size and the 
climactic diversity in the region, most areas receive between 500–1000 mm per year 
(Nakalembe, Dempewolf, & Justice, 2017; USAID, 2017b), however, peripheral areas of 
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the region receive as little as 350 mm/year and as much as 1500 mm/year. The majority 
of precipitation falls from April to June (Mubiru, 2010). The high degree of rainfall 
variability – inter-annually, seasonally, and spatially – also serves as an important factor 
in defining socioeconomic processes (Mubiru, 2010; Mugerwa et al., 2014; Quam, 2013). 
It also underscores the need for mobility and why, historically, pastoralism and 
agropastoralism were – and to a large extent remain – the most important livelihood in 




Figure 3.1: Karamoja, Uganda, highlighted in red 
 
Donors, NGOs, governance officials, and residents often describe Karamoja as 
experiencing the impacts of climate change.38 The biophysical manifestations of climate 
                                               
38 To avoid ambiguity, when discussing climate variability and change I rely upon the definitions offered 
by the IPCC fifth assessment report (AR5).  Climate change refers to a change in the state of the climate 
that can be identified (e.g., by using statistical tests) by changes in the mean and/or the variability of its 
properties and that persists for an extended period, typically decades or longer (IPCC, 2014, p. 120) 
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change are described largely in terms of increasing variability, a shorter rainy season, and 
a longer, more intense dry season (Egeru et al., 2014; USAID, 2017a). For example, 
Egeru et al. (2014), relying upon National Ocean and Atmospheric Administration 
(NOAA) (1979–2009) global climate data provided by the National Centers for 
Environmental Prediction (NCEP), found increasing variability both temporally and 
spatially in the sub-region, noting the existence of both extreme wet and dry periods in 
the region.  They also note that their results showed variation in variability intensity 
within the sub-region (Egeru et al., 2014, p. 501).  
Though there is agreement that the region is getting warmer with, at minimum, 
1.0°C increases in mean temperature across the subregion (Chaplin et al., 2017; Egeru et 
al., 2014; USAID, 2017a), the precise impacts of climate change in terms of precipitation 
are difficult to pinpoint. This is in part because the natural variability of the region 
complicates identifying which weather changes are driven by anthropogenic climate 
change and which are driven by natural variability, and also because of the limited 
weather-related data collection infrastructure in a vast area. Therefore, understandings of 
climate change in the region are relatively coarse. The difficulty of documenting how 
precisely the climate has changed in Karamoja, particularly in terms of precipitation is 
evident in the ostensibly contradictory messages in the literature. For example, USAID 
and WHO both issued reports using different time periods and found seemingly 
contradictory results. USAID’s climate risk profile describes an observed 15-20% 
                                               
Climate variability refers to variations in the mean state and other statistics (such as standard deviations, the 
occurrence of extremes, etc.) of the climate on all spatial and temporal scales beyond that of individual 
weather events. Variability may be due to natural internal processes within the climate system (internal 





decrease in rainfall (USAID, 2017a), whereas a report produced by the WFP (Chaplin et 
al., 2017) describes an overall increase in rainfall in the area; Egeru et al. (2014) 




Figure 3.2: Average Rainfall (left), Mean Temperature (right) 1981-2000. Source: 
(USAID, 2017a) 
 
There is, however, consistency within this uncertainty: in Karamoja, while the 
exact impacts may vary by locale, the region’s natural variability appears to be 
increasing. In a report produced by the Ugandan Government in collaboration with non-
governmental partners (Chaplin et al., 2017), relying upon the WFP Data Visualization 
Platform (WFP, 2016) for rainfall data, and Royal Netherlands Meteorological Institute 
(KNMI, 2016) for temperature, the authors argue: 
• Average monthly temperatures in Karamoja are increasing – noting, specifically, 




• With the acknowledgment that Karamoja is prone is naturally predisposed to high 
year-to-year rainfall variability, the authors also find that over the past 35 years, 
year-to-year variability is increasing.  
• Average annual rainfall is increasing – for example, the authors find that on 
average it rained 137mm more between 2006-2016 when compared with 1981 – 
1990. However, the increased rain tends to be concentrated towards the end of the 
rainy season (i.e., Sept – Nov). 
 
Historical Conflict in Karamoja 
Though currently stable, until relatively recently Karamoja had been marked by 
intense conflict manifesting predominantly through interethnic cattle raids (Bevan, 2008; 
Eaton, 2007, 2008; Gray et al., 2003; Howe, Stites, & Akabwai, 2015; Kurtz & 
McMahon, 2015; Powell, 2010; Quam, 2013; Stark, 2011). During the peak of conflict, 
in the early-2000s, small arms-related deaths happened at a rate of 60/100,000 people, 
making Karamoja one of the most violent places in the world (Bevan, 2008). There were 
a multitude of overlapping factors driving this violence, the most proximate being a 
proliferation of small arms, the commercialization of cattle raiding (i.e., cattle raiding for 
the purpose of immediate profit), and shocks such as disease and drought leading to high 
rates of cattle loss. The breakdown of traditional governance systems further exacerbated 
the conflict, leading to retaliations and counter-retaliations between ethnically-defined 
pastoralist groups (Bevan, 2008; Eaton, 2007, 2008, Knighton, 2002, 2003; Leff, 2009; 
Mkutu, 2003, 2010). This conflict took place across a large area, and involved a deeply 
complex and often evolving series of alliances; it in many ways defined the landscape 
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(Eaton, 2007, 2008). For example, a 2008 report issued by the Small Arms Survey 
(Bevan, 2008, p. 27) emphasized the diffuse spatiality of the conflict: 
Raids aimed at capturing entire herds prompted retaliatory raids of the same 
magnitude. Violence itself increasingly became a factor in altering migration 
routes. These routes, in turn, became less and less predictable, thereby 
multiplying the potential for further raids and disputes. Warriors travelled ever 
greater distances...With the increasing range of their activities, they were further 
dislocated from their communities for much of the year, and as a consequence, so 
too were the controls on violence that might have been exercised by clan elders. 
 
Cattle raids have long been present in Karamoja (Filipová & Johanisova, 2017). 
Until the mid-20th century, cattle raids were conducted primarily with bows, arrows, and 
spears. These raids were closely governed by elders, conducted with the purpose of cattle 
restocking, territorial exchange, and wealth accumulation (Filipová & Johanisova, 2017). 
However, following the influx of small arms into the region following the fall of Idi 
Amin’s government, and with increasing degradation of grazing land, the ability of elders 
to govern raids diminished, the scope and intensity of raids intensified, and cattle raiding 
became commercialized. Once rare, killings during raids became commonplace (Filipová 
& Johanisova, 2017). As the conflict grew both in spatial scale and in scope, retaliations 
and counter-retaliations became common (Eaton, 2007, 2008). According to Gray et al. 
(2003), more than 70% of deaths for males aged 30-39 in the Bokora and Maheniko 
subtribes she interviewed were the result of cattle raiding. According to (Mkutu, 2007) 
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between 1996 and 2003 nearly 8000 people were killed or injured by small arms in 
Karamoja, though it has been argued that this is a low estimate (Bevan, 2008).  
Cattle raiding had long been perceived as a problem by both colonial and the 
newly independent governments in Uganda, and had prompted disarmament campaigns 
in 1945, 1953, 1954, 1960, 1964 (Bushby & Stites, 2016). The violence changed, 
however, after the fall of Amin and the widespread proliferation of small arms, as well as 
in the face of continuing land degradation. This new, more intense conflict dynamic was 
also met by disarmament campaigns in 1984, 1987,  2001, and 2006 (Bevan, 2008; Stites 
et al., 2016). The most recent disarmament campaign, which began in May 2006 under 
the auspices of the Karamoja Integrated Disarmament and Development Programme 
(KIDDP), were by most accounts successful in its intended outcomes, though extremely 
violent, involving multiple human rights violations (Human Rights Watch, 2007; OPM, 
2007; Stites & Akabwai, 2009). 
 
Livelihood Strategies in Karamoja  
Though historically the majority of the population of Karamoja could best 
described as agropastoralists (Mercy Corps, 2016; Quam, 2013; Stark, 2011; Stites et al., 
2016; Stites & Huisman, 2010), the region’s social, cultural, and economic identity has 
been long been associated with pastoralism (Levine, 2010; Mkutu, 2010). 
Agropastoralism exists on a spectrum, with some households keeping only a limited 
number livestock and relying primarily on agricultural activities with others 
complementing a heavier reliance on pastoralism with a limited amount of crop 
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production (Bushby & Stites, 2016; Mercy Corps, 2016).39 This diversification, and the 
mobility associated with its pastoral components, functions as a hedge against the 
climatic and economic shocks that occur in Karamoja (Bushby & Stites, 2016; Ellis, 




Figure 3.3: Seasonal extremes in Karamoja, as demonstrated by the difference between 
the rainy season, June 2016 (left); and the dry season, March 2017 (right): Photo Credit 
Albin Tveitlan 
 
Reflecting themes in a wider literature focused on pastoralism (see, for example, 
Butt, 2016; Turner, 1999, 2006, 2009) there are currently two contrasting and conflicting 
ideologies about livelihoods in Karamoja (Nakalembe et al., 2017). The government, 
                                               
39 Common crops include maize, sorghum, millet, dry beans, oil seeds, groundnuts, cassava, and sweet 
potatoes (FEWSNET, 2016) 
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particularly the Central Government of Uganda, positions pastoralism as backwards and 
describes sedentary livelihoods focused on crops and the expansion of cropland as the 
future of the region (Nakalembe et al., 2017). Much of the local population, academic 
literature on the region, and regional advocates, however, continue to argue that 
pastoralism and agropastoralism are the most sustainable livelihoods for the region (see, 
for example, Avery, 2014; Levine, 2010; Nakalembe et al., 2017). For instance, many 
people with whom I spoke noted the calls for sedentarization by the current First Lady 
and former Minister of State for Karamoja Affairs, Janet Museveni, and her dismissive, 
and even outright hostile attitude towards pastoralism. Her comments, which research 
participants occasionally framed as a microcosm of the Ugandan government’s treatment 
of pastoralists and Karamoja more generally, were raised with emotional intensity, and 
occasionally anger. For example, as described to me by a research participant who works 
for an international NGO:  
 I have been in many meetings with the First Lady when she was district chair and 
it was always “ag, ag, ag! These people need to put clothes on and stop walking 
around with their silly cattle!” And everyone clapped! And the donors, and 
therefore the NGOs, they bow to the pressure. And, [therefore] they push 
agriculture [as their programming].  
 
Similarly, at a program update meeting, a mid-level government official from 
Karamoja emphatically raised what she believed were unjustified stereotypes of the 
Karamojong and drew considerable applause, arguing “There are too many preconceived 
notions about the Karamojong. But we do grow things! We don’t walk around naked! 
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And we are not just pastoralists!” In other words, the First Lady’s comments were seen as 
part of the reason why Karamoja is marginalized; there is limited appreciation and 
consideration for why pastoralism defines the social and economic landscape.  
 
Contemporary Development in Karamoja 
In the gray literature focused on Karamoja, particularly that associated with 
development organizations, the region is often described as being a forgotten or ignored 
part of Uganda, a place struggling to recover from years of conflict that is now vulnerable 
to the extreme local environment (see, for example, Mubiru, 2010; Powell, 2010; Stark, 
2011).  For example, the Famine and Early Warning Systems Network (FEWSNET) 
offers the following description (FEWSNET, 2016, p. 19).  
Plagued by decades of conflict, instability, cattle raiding, and inconsistent 
climatology, the region is marginalized and underdeveloped. Interethnic conflict 
has historically driven insecurity, instability, and lagging socioeconomic 
advancement. Control for limited resources (water, pasture, etc.) and political 
dynamics are underlying drivers of the poor human development in the region 
 
Given these framings and the area’s overall fragility but relative stability, which 
creates an environment in which development is both needed and possible to implement, 
it is not surprising that Karamoja has seen considerable international development 
funding and activity in recent years. According to the Karamoja Donor Report (USAID, 
2016), which mapped upcoming development activity in the region, development 
agencies had allocated 89.2 million Euro (roughly $110 million US) to be spent in 
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Karamoja in 2017.40  Moreover, Karamoja has undergone considerable change in the past 
decade. Roads have been built, as have dams and other forms of infrastructure; mobile 
phone coverage is now widespread and town centers have relatively consistent electricity 
(Mercy Corps, 2016). As a result of these changes, present-day Karamoja was often 
described by residents and governance officials as being in a period of development. In 
this framing, however, development is not a narrow reference to international aid 
implemented through formal institutions, but a set of broader changes to the economic 
landscape that include but go beyond development aid. 
Though ongoing development changes are generally presented in a positive 
manner, particularly by governmental and non-governmental agencies, they also have 
serious consequences. For example, this period of development, during which access to 
Karamoja has rapidly expanded through an increasing network of paved roads, has 
contributed to the enabling environments that lead to increased land grabs and resource 
extraction, key pressures on the post-conflict landscape (Howe et al., 2015; S. Levine, 
2010; Pecquet, 2014). In addition to being a common refrain amongst research 
participants, this challenge is often reflected in the gray literature. For example, as 
described in Mercy Corps’ assessment of Karamoja’s resilience (Mercy Corps, 2016, p. 
13), “Yet peace has also brought new restrictions on livestock movement, as stability 
encourages land grabs, mining, and expansion of agricultural activities.” 
Moreover the socioeconomic changes have had differentiated impacts on adaptive 
capacity and vulnerability across different groups, most directly having a negative impact 
on men who traditionally would have been pastoralists (Mercy Corps, 2016; Stites & 
                                               




Akabwai, 2010; Stites et al., 2016). Mercy Corps staff would occasionally point out 
instances where men were brewing beer, traditionally a job performed by women, as 
evidence that men were increasingly ‘dropping out’ of pastoralism. These impacts, 
however, were not limited to men. They had reverberating effects that in some cases led 
to alcoholism and household violence. Twenty-three survey participants explicitly 
described household violence and alcoholism (often in tandem) as being a socioeconomic 
effect of climate change (see Figure 3.5).  
Furthermore, many survey respondents framed Karamoja’s development in 
explicitly negative terms. They argued that development only helped those they described 
as ‘educated’ or ‘elite’, who understood and could manipulate the new ‘developed’ 
Karamoja in a way that those without more formal education or relative wealth could not. 
For example, an LC1 from Moroto District argued: 
Development has enlightened us to an extent, but it ends at educated people. It is 
you people who have this pen and paper. Things are better for you. You benefit 
from our thumbprints and do very little for us (see Figure 3.4). 
 
Government officials and NGO workers agreed that new vulnerabilities and forms 
of insecurity followed disarmament. As a result of rapid economic shifts, certain 
populations, most notably those who have relied on skills once essential for living in 
Karamoja, such as pastoralism, firearm proficiency, and indigenous knowledge, have 
been thrust into a system and a landscape that is, to a large degree, unrecognizable and no 
longer values these skills as highly. Survey respondents described a shift in the economic 
landscape following disarmament that seemed to not simply ignore them but actively 
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inhibit them. For example, in a discussion about how the region has changed in his 
lifetime, an LC1 was both dismissive of and frustrated with what many more senior 
politicians describe as ‘progress’ or ‘development’: 
People say there is development. I see the iron sheets. I see the tarmac. But I am 
pale. My muscles are thin. I don’t take milk. Those days, even when there was the 
gun, we were under trees and I looked healthy. I was strong. We were taking 





Figure 3.4: Because most of the population is illiterate, attendance sheets are often 
signed with thumbprints. This was why the survey respondent above described giving 
thumbprints; he understands their value, that educated Karamajong who work for NGOs 
such as my such as my research assistant, and ‘mzungus’ (a common term for white 
foreigners are judged, in part, by how many people come to their meetings. But he 




In other words, despite all the funds and innovations coming to Karamoja, 
vulnerabilities exist in spite of – or perhaps because of – these changes. Though this LC1 
did not discount the dangers or seriousness of past conflicts in Karamoja during the peak 
of conflict, what is often referred to as ‘those days’ by residents of the region, at that time 
he possessed the agency to build resilience to those shocks. The challenges he faces now 
are insidious, difficult to comprehend, and call into question his agency and identity. 
These challenges have led some residents to describe the peace in paradoxical terms: 
while their safety has improved, they have been left exposed to new risks that they are 
less-prepared to face. Climate change, though exogenous, is both representative of and 
embedded in those challenges. In combination with other changes to the landscape 
including large-scale shifts to sedentary agriculture, increasing land grabs, and the 
lengthening of the dry season, his ability and the people in his village’s ability to adapt 
their livelihood to climactic and economic shocks and stressors are diminishing.   
 
A Fictitious or Sustainable Peace? 
 
Before turning to the ways in which climate change currently affects conflict in 
the region, I outline Karamoja’s fragile stability. As described above, Karamoja’s conflict 
landscape has shifted in recent years. The severity of inter-ethnic conflict has declined via 
the disarmament and the strategic use of the UPDF and local police (Eaton, 2008; Mercy 
Corps, 2016; Powell, 2010). As a result, both the data collected for this research and the 
gray and academic literature reflect a safer, more stable Karamoja (Howe et al., 2015; 
Nakalembe et al., 2017; Stites et al., 2016; USAID, 2017a). However, both the data and 
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the literature also reflect that new types of conflict are emerging and that Karamoja is a 
place highly vulnerable to shocks and stressors. For example, as noted in a USAID report  
(USAID, 2017b, p. 10):  
Conflict and violence are endemic in Karamoja, although the conflict dynamics 
are changing.  Historically, inter-ethnic conflict, particularly cattle raiding, was 
the primary threat to personal security in the sub-region. Although inter-ethnic 
tensions are improving, conflicts over land are increasing in frequency, concerns 
about theft and violence within communities and households are on the rise, and 
sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) is reportedly common. 
 
Further, as noted by Mercy Corps (2016, p. 7): 
Cattle raiding is no longer a common source of conflict in Karamoja; however, 
violence has shifted toward the private sphere in the form of gender-based 
violence (GBV) and petty theft. In addition, natural resource conflict, particularly 
over land, has also increased and is likely to intensify with growing competition 
for land, water, and minerals. 
 
These descriptions align closely with the data collected for this paper. For 
example, small arms and cattle raiding, which were the defining factors of conflict in the 
region, barely register amongst survey respondents describing their current security 
concerns (see Figure 3.5, below). Only 11% of respondents listed small arms as a security 
concern, and only 6% identified cattle raids. Instead, new forms of conflict, many with 
roots in land use, environmental change, and decreasing livelihood options for men who 
had traditionally been pastoralists are becoming more prevalent, particularly theft (56%), 
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resource conflicts over pasture and water (55%), and land conflict (52%). Paradoxically, 
many of these forms of conflict have direct links to the prevailing peace. As noted above, 
the conflict in the region had suppressed interest in extracting resources from the region, 
but the relative peace has given rise to pressures now manifest in land grabs and demands 
for resources. Simultaneously, the lingering effects of disarmament and the government-
led push for sedentarized forms of livelihood have negatively affected the region’s 
overall food security by pushing the population towards agriculture in an area better 
suited for pastoralism (S. Levine, 2010; Nakalembe et al., 2017).   
 
 
Figure 3.5: The most prevalent contemporary security concerns as reported by survey 
respondents (n=103): Only those with greater than 20 responses listed. Small arms and 












































































  These shifts create contention not only around whether the current stability is a 
positive or negative outcome, but also whether it is a ‘lasting’ or ‘fictitious’ peace. This 
debate was evident at a monthly coordination meeting of peacebuilding officials I 
attended in Karamoja in October of 2017. The purpose of the meeting, which was held at 
the offices of a Moroto-based CBO, was to ensure different organizations’ efforts were 
not redundant, either topically or geographically. In attendance were 17 representatives 
from NGOs, CBOs, the local government, the central government, and law enforcement. 
During the meeting there was a revealing exchange between participants representing 
different interests. The police representative described the security situation as follows: 
“There have been a few animals stolen here and there, but things are stable. We have 
deployed soldiers at many of the places where there is cattle raiding.” This led to a 
comment by the chair of the working group, who represents a local CBO: “Land grabbing 
is the bigger concern now [bigger than cattle raiding]. And my compliments to the UPDF 
for doing a good job keeping a lid on things.” At this point a senior peacebuilding officer 
with an international NGO replied: “It is a fictitious peace. If UPDF leaves, the peace 
will go with it.” By this, the peacebuilding officer meant there are pillars supporting a 
stable Karamoja, namely a reduction in weapons (via the disarmament) and a presence of 
the UPDF, and that those factors are artificial, or at least temporary, and obscure 
underlying challenges. Furthermore, should any of these pillars falter, so too would the 
peace. This was a common viewpoint amongst the peacebuilding representatives in the 
area.   
 This exchange lays out the multiple ways the current stability can be interpreted 
among those tasked with promoting and/or enforcing it. First, the chair’s comment 
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demonstrates there is a general consensus that conflict has shifted from cattle raids and 
retaliations to issues over land, a central theme in the remainder of this paper. Second, 
law enforcement officials who, by the nature of their job, are focused on present-day 
enforcement see stability; peacebuilding and conflict mitigation-focused officials, 
focused on threats to mid- to long-term peace, see new sources of conflict under the 
surface that will require further peacebuilding. Though this disagreement was left 
unresolved as the chair raised the next item on the agenda, it reflects a stark and 
unanswered question facing governmental and non-governmental institutions tasked with 
enforcing and maintaining a peace in stability: to what extent is Karamoja vulnerable to 
widespread conflict?  
The peacebuilding officer’s observation underscores the sense that the current 
stability is fragile. This was also evident in Mercy Corps’ peacebuilding programming. 
For example, while developing an annual work plan, Mercy Corps officials, many from 
the region and all with years of experience in peacebuilding and conflict mitigation in 
Karamoja, outlined what they saw as key threats to the region. The came to a quick 
consensus that a loss of funding for the UPDF, a significant influx of arms (for which 
there are multiple pathways, most likely South Sudan), electoral violence, or even an 
extreme enough climatic event could collapse the region’s stability. Furthermore, when I 
asked a senior Mercy Corps employee focused on peacebuilding in the region his opinion 
on the exchange referenced above, he emphatically supported the fictitious peace 
argument. He stressed that the current stability is an illusion that makes peacebuilding 
efforts harder as the central government, which holds considerable authority, conflates 
peace and stability. Therefore, in the context of apparent regional stability, peacebuilding 
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efforts (and associated budgets) are ignored by central authorities. He described the 
current focus on law enforcement as a pathway to peace as having great potential to 
backfire as it leaves unresolved current and past grievances in its suppression of the 
population. He argued that the only way to a ‘sustainable peace’ is a concerted effort 
focused on dialogue, truth and reconciliation sessions with the backing of the central 
government, and explicit efforts to address the livelihoods challenges that followed 
disarmament. He pointed to the increased incidence of cattle theft during the most recent 
election as evidence of this fragility – when the police were focused elsewhere, there 
were raids in areas that had, until then, been peaceful.  
 
Pressures on the Landscape 
 
In this section I outline the different factors that are putting pressures on the 
landscape in Karamoja. Though climate change is one of those factors, to understand the 
place-specific connection between climate change and conflict in Karamoja, it is critical 
to situate the impacts within a wider political economy (see, for example, Barnett & 
Adger, 2007; Benjaminsen, 2016; Peluso, 2008; Raleigh et al., 2015; Raleigh & Urdal, 
2007). I begin this section with descriptions of the socioeconomic factors that are 
interacting with climate change and altering conflict outcomes before turning to a 
discussion primarily focused on climate change as a factor in conflict in Karamoja. In 
doing so, I frame climate change not as an independent variable that can be understood as 
a driver of conflict, but part of a broader tapestry of factors that alter conflict outcomes in 




Land Conflict in Karamoja: Land Rights and Land Access 
As described above, in Karamoja the cause of insecurity, conflict, and violence is 
no longer experienced predominantly through intertribal conflict, cattle raids, and small 
arms, but instead through the competing interests in and demands on the land.  Or, as 
succinctly explained by a Mercy Corps program manager who is from Karamoja, “Land 
is now the biggest gun.” He made this comment in a matter-of-fact tone, stressing that 
what followed disarmament wasn’t a clean shift to progress and prosperity, but instead a 
fragile state ironically enabled by the peace.  
Research participants across all positionalities consistently framed land (broadly 
conceived) as a common denominator in contemporary conflict in Karamoja. These 
concerns exist at scales ranging from the local to the regional, with a wide range of 
intersecting conflict drivers. Survey participants most commonly referenced land grabs, 
commercial land acquisition, border conflict, and conflict with the Uganda Wildlife 
Authority (UWA) as manifestations and/or drivers of land conflict.41 For example, an 
LC1 from Moroto District, in the context of a discussion of his primary security concerns, 
described how land grabs of what had traditionally been communally-owned land 
represented an existential threat to his and his constituents’ security. In a resigned, even 
exasperated tone, he explained, “Land conflict between companies and communities is 
my biggest concern. The companies come with licenses that you, the owner of soil, you 
don’t know about and you can lose your rights to the land.” However, reflecting points 
made by Li (2014), research participants  often described ‘land’ and ‘land conflict’ in 
                                               
41 An in-depth examination of the complexities of land rights and land tenure systems is outside the scope 
of this research. For a more in-depth discussion of land and land rights in Karamoja, see, (FAO, 2015; 
Filipová & Johanisova, 2017; Human Rights Watch, 2014; Omolo, 2010; Pecquet, 2014).  
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wide-ranging terms that often alluded not only to the land itself, but also to particular 
resources associated with land – most often water and pasture. Residents, government 
officials, and NGO officials all used ‘land conflict’ as a catchall term for the different 
conflicts that take shape around land use, land rights, and land access. For example, when 
asked about his primary security concerns, a UPDF official described how the effects of 
climate change, coupled with decreasing mobility, can lead to localized conflict over 
resources, saying “Land conflict is the biggest security concern, because every person 
will try hard to get greener and moist places for his family to cultivate crops, which may 
not be enough since greener paces are now reducing.”  
These two quotes reflect how the security landscape is changing in Karamoja. 
There are new drivers of insecurity largely embedded in threats related to land access and 
land use. Though the resultant conflicts are far less severe than conflict in the past, these 
risks reflect the fragility of the region. Moreover, the observations of both the UPDF 
official and the LC1 display the paradox that post-disarmament stability has contributed 
to the contemporary fragility and the land-related manifestations of insecurity. As 
described by a Karamajong Mercy Corps employee whose job focuses on land and rights: 
Now people are appreciating the value of land, and there are people who are 
taking advantage of the peace in Karamoja to come and grab land and utilize it. 
They could not come during those days because they knew Karamojongs were 
wild people and we were armed, so they could not enter the area. Now that there’s 
peace, now they also have access to come inside. Because those days they could 





Closely related to land access and land rights is resource extraction. The Mercy 
Corps program manager who argued that land is now the biggest gun went on to describe 
how companies focused on mineral extraction, and those looking to take advantage of the 
increasing marketability of the land, coupled with the exploitability of the land rights 
system in Karamoja, led to land grabs in region, emphatically described: 
All these land problems in Karamoja started after disarmament. Before 
disarmament, people in Karamoja didn’t have interest in land. They were 
typically nomads; pastoralists. No one was thinking of the value of land. After 
disarmament, speculators came in, people started prospecting that there are 
minerals in Karamoja. Secondly, even internal investors, the biggest land grabbers 
were the elite class, the educated class, fellow Karamojongs. 
 
Karamoja is endowed with gold, limestone, uranium, marble, graphite, gypsum, iron, 
wolfram, nickel, copper, cobalt, lithium, and tin (Human Rights Watch, 2014; Mercy 
Corps, 2016; UIA, 2016). Like many post-conflict areas rich in resources, the discovery 
of valuable resources has led to high rates of land speculation and the granting of 
concessions by the government to both foreign and domestic mining companies such as 
Dow Marble, Tororo Cement, Jan Mangal, and East Africa Gold  (Human Rights Watch, 
2014). As a result, Karamoja has experienced high rates of extraction following the 
establishment of a relative peace (Bruch et al., 2009). This has, in turn, exacerbated 
conflict risk by producing a new set of challenges for the area. As described by a senior 
member of the Mercy Corps team, and further reflecting the paradox of insecurity 
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following the stabilization of Karamoja “our land was secure from insecurity because of 
the insecurity.” Typical of post-conflict contexts, Karamoja’s management of resources is 
both pivotal and perilous (see, for example, Bruch et al., 2009; Le Billon, 2001; Rustad & 
Binningsbø, 2012; Suarez et al., 2018; UNEP, 2015 for broader discussions on post-
conflict resource management). It is pivotal because resource governance is an important 
determinant of the durability of peace and stability and the reoccurrence of conflict 
(Rustad & Binningsbø, 2012). But it is also perilous because in post-conflict development 
settings there is often a low prioritization of environmental management over 
socioeconomic recovery, a reliance upon primary production, and contestation over land 
rights and land management. Therefore post-conflict areas are prone to high rates of 
environmental degradation, land grabbing, and resource extraction 
(Beevers, 2012; Bruch et al., 2009; Rustad & Binningsbø, 2012; Suarez et al., 2018; 
Unruh & Williams, 2013).  
The pursuit of resources and the ability to take advantage of nebulous land rights 
has served as a powerful draw for large scale land grabs. Land grabs conducted just 
within the boundaries of Ugandan law have had two notable impacts as it relates to the 
shifting conflict landscape. First, they increase discontent with what is often described as 
the elites (foreign nationals and educated Karamajong), who are perceived as taking 
advantage of the land system to their advantage. Second, they act as a form of pressure on 
the landscape that, when coupled with other challenges, affects localized conflicts such as 
theft, resource access and conflict. Survey respondents and NGO officials described the 
ways in which land grabs limited mobility for pastoralists and/or led to encroachment of 
pastoralists onto agricultural land, contributing to increased incidence of theft and 
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localized conflict in Karamoja. A Mercy Corps employee, whose job is focused on 
mobilizing and training communities on land rights, described the frustrating and, at 
times, overwhelming challenges facing community mobilization when there are so many 
land-related pressures: 
[Outside companies are coming] because of the mining and minerals: powerful 
interests from Kampala come in and secure the land rights because up until now it 
has been communal. [Sometimes] people will migrate due to the harsh climate 
and that they will go 50 km and then set up in a new place where they have 
resources for their cattle.  The risk, though, is that while they are gone powerful 
interests become interested in what is underneath the land. Then they become 
squatters on their own land, with only limited rights.   
 
Shifts in Livelihoods  
A fundamental change in the region over the past decade is a rapidly growing 
population focused on sedentary livelihoods, most often agriculture (S. Levine, Peters, & 
Fan, 2014; Mercy Corps, 2016; Nakalembe et al., 2017). Multiple factors have combined 
to push the population of Karamoja toward sedentary forms of livelihoods. This includes 
land use policy related to modernization (Nakalembe et al., 2017) and shifts of customary 
land to state use for mining, forestry, wildlife conservation and mineral exploration 
(Human Rights Watch, 2014; S. Levine, 2010; Stites & Huisman, 2010). For example, as 




Karamoja’s main livelihood strategies and the social, ecological, and economic 
systems that underpin them are in transition. While the government’s most recent 
disarmament campaign brought relative stability…this period also witnessed a 
catastrophic decline in Karamoja’s livestock population on which communities 
have traditionally depended for food, income, and collective identity. Largely out 
of distress, households are turning towards agriculture, natural resource 
extraction, urban livelihoods, and out-migration to meet basic needs. 
 
These shifts, however, have potentially hindered overall food security in the 
region.  Despite a 299% increase in cultivated cropland between 2000 – 2011, there has 
been no increase in per capita food production (Nakalembe et al., 2017, p. 9). But the 
conversion of land to agriculture has limited pastoralists’ mobility and productivity, 
(FAO, 2015; Mercy Corps, 2016; Nakalembe et al., 2017) enflaming land-related 
tensions and increasing the risks for competing claims to land (Mercy Corps, 2016). 
 
Placing climate into conflict in contemporary Karamoja 
The perception of atmospheric changes in Karamoja amongst the research sample 
of the, aligned with the literature reflecting biophysical change in Karamoja (Chaplin et 
al., 2017; Egeru et al., 2014; USAID, 2017a). Namely, survey respondents described the 
impacts of climate change largely in terms of when the rains come: 88% of the sample 
described the primary effect of climate change as drought and 100% of the respondents 
noted either the increased unpredictability of precipitation or drought. These impacts 
were described in distinct but overlapping terms. Both focused on water access, and for 
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some, pasture availability, but drought emphasized a shortening of the rainy seasons 
while unpredictability emphasized uncertainty about when the rains would start and the 
means in which they would fall (e.g., intense and short vs sporadic and long). For 
example, as noted by an LC1 from Moroto District who described a feeling of frustration 
with increasingly unpredictable weather patterns: 
Those days, people start clearing and planting in February because good rains 
started at that time or the beginning of March. By May or June we would start 
eating fresh foods like beans. But these days, rains begin in May, worse this 




Figure 3.6: Perceived Biophysical Changes (data source: survey questions focused on 



































Socioeconomic Change and Conflict Outcomes  
These biophysical changes create acute pressure on social and economic systems. 
Because erratic rainfall and extended dry seasons are seen as the primary climate-related 
challenges in Karamoja, it is not surprising that the most commonly-listed socioeconomic 
effects of climate change reported by survey respondents revolve around food insecurity 
and relate directly to these biophysical shifts. These include impacts on the productivity 
of agriculture (reported by 69% of respondents) and/or pastoralism (57%), migration 
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Whereas the literature on Karamoja demonstrates that the larger, sprawling 
conflicts of the past reflected the overlapping challenges of a breakdown of the traditional 
systems governing cattle raiding, an influx of small arms, and escalating retalitions and 
counter relations (see, for example, Eaton 2007, 2008), the data collected for this paper 
suggest that the new manifestations of conflict, which are far more localized and far less 
severe, are linked to increasing pressures on the landscape that have followed the 
stabilization of Karamoja. Insofar as climate change produces biophysical impacts that 
exacerbate such pressures, for example by increasing the intensity of climate variability, 
it is another source of pressure. For example, a Chief from Kaabong described the most 
pressing security changes in his community as theft, which he believed could be 
explained by the changing weather patterns, saying: 
Due to lack of anything to eat because the drought affects crops, people are forced 
to steal from other. This results in revenge and increasing conflicts and animal 
theft. 
 
Local government and NGO officials described how these pressures have 
produced increases in theft, clashes between pastoralists groups, clashes between 
pastoralists and agriculturalists, and in some cases, the pastoralists and the state (i.e., 
UWA). For example, an LC1 from Moroto district noted how communities from drier 
areas tend to migrate to places of relative abundance, saying: 
This year and last year [2016 and 2017] were terrible. Many Turkana, Pokot, Pian 
moved to Nakonyen for pasture and water. This created struggle of these 




And as described by a UPDF official based in Kaabong describing a similar phenomenon 
but in a different area: 
People get poor harvest due to delayed rains and long dry spell which affects crop 
performance. With this, people are now forced to turn to environment for survival 
and also moved to other areas like Kitgum, South Sudan which has led to 
increased conflicts over land in those other areas. These are people who have 
become enemies and thieves, because they steal in Karenga and then run to South 
Sudan, just as they steal livestock or kill in South Sudan and then move to 
Karenga. It becomes hard for the security to trace them because they keep 
switching places 
 
These claims, and the data more generally, speak to the considerable overlap in 
survey respondents’ reporting of security risks and the socioeconomic outcomes of 
climate change. As seen in Figure 3.9, theft, resource conflict, and even household 
conflict were consistently, yet independently, described both as security concerns and 
climate change impacts. This overlap suggests that the many stressors that residents of 
Karamoja must navigate are deeply intertwined. This, in turn, suggests a connection 
between the stresses and insecurities produced by climate variability and the stresses and 
insecurity produced by changes to the wider political economy. Despite discourses that 
often frame climate change as driving conflict there is not necessarily a clear chain of 
causality. Nor is it clear that the wider political economic changes are having a larger 
impact on conflict dynamics when comparted the effects of climate change. Rather, in 
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Karamoja, the relationship between climate change and insecurity is best understood as 
one defined by overlap and interaction resulting in a spiraling fragility and insecurity.  
For many government officials, NGO workers, and residents in Karamoja, climate 
change impacts were an important part of the new forms of localized conflict manifesting 
in post-conflict Karamoja. For example, when asked about how weather changes were 
being experienced in his village, an LC1 from Moroto District described how, in ‘those 
days’, violent conflict was the biggest challenge to food security. In a resigned tone, he 
described how, at present, extended, more intense dry seasons and unpredictable weather 
were his biggest challenges. This LC1, like those who questioned the outcomes of this 
period of development, was happy to see conflict decreasing in severity, but was deeply 
concerned that new forms of vulnerability were manifesting. Strikingly, he, like the 
Mercy Corps program officer, used language that compared the contemporary changes to 
‘the gun’: 
In the past, rains were okay. People used to get fruit but it was only the gun which 
prevented people to cultivate, but now, the sun has become another gun. I think 
the witch doctor who used to refuse with rain might have died, because the rain 







Figure 3.8: Current Security and Current Socioeconomic Concerns in Karamoja (n=103) 
 
The gun as a metaphor brings to the fore the fact that recent changes in Karamoja, 
including climate change, are what Nixon, (2011, p. 2), describes as ‘slow violence’, or  
‘violence that occurs gradually and out of sight, a violence of delayed destruction that is 
dispersed across time and space, an attritional violence that is typically not viewed as 
violence at all.’ In the eyes of many residents, contemporary environmental change has 
become part of a complex of challenges that together are at least comparable to the 




In this article, I demonstrated the ways in which climate change interacts with, 
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paper provides a lens into the ways in which environmental change can interact with 
post-conflict fragility. Where Karamoja once experienced sprawling, severe conflict with 
high rates of violence, disarmament and the subsequent pressures on the landscape have 
produced a new conflict dynamic which manifests in much more localized terms. These 
shifts are driven by an interwoven set of issues including shifts to sedentary agriculture, 
commercial resource extraction, and increasing climate variability/shifting weather 
patterns being driven by climate change.  
Central to understanding the shifting forms of conflict in Karamoja is an 
acknowledgement that these manifestations of conflict are paradoxically linked to the 
prevailing stability in the region that followed the disarmament. As such, the example of 
Karamoja further highlights the importance of post-conflict environmental and resource 
management, including addressing potential climate change impacts in post-conflict 
settings (Conca & Wallace, 2009; Kovach & Conca, 2016). As is clear in this research, 
ignoring the risks of climate change and resource management risks jeopardizing 
peacebuilding efforts and could potentially shift how conflict manifests in the context of 
place.  
Finally, this article raises difficult questions about the deeply complex scales of 
climate-conflict. The case of Karamoja illustrates the observation made in the wider 
climate-conflict literature that the location of acute climate change impacts is not 
necessarily where (or when) associated conflict outcomes emerge (Detges, 2014; 
Gemenne et al., 2014; Ide et al., 2014; Salehyan, 2014). This research, therefore, 
redoubles these calls for a more concerted examination of the spatial and temporal scales 
of climate-conflict. Interventions that seek to address the joint challenges of climate 
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change, conflict, and fragility, require the ability to discern locally-specific pathways 
from climate change to conflict. Without these place-specific pathways, our 
understandings of the relationship between climate change and conflict are limited to 
broad terms and imprecise framings that cannot productively inform efforts to address 
this connection in the places where such conflicts manifest. 
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CHAPTER IV: CONFLICT IN ABUNDANCE AND PEACEBUILDING 
IN SCARCITY: SCALE AND NON-LINEARITY AS FACTORS IN 




                                               




Over the past decade, both academic and policy communities have given 
significant attention to the potential connections between climate change and conflict 
(e.g., Adger et al., 2013; Department of Defense, 2015; Gleditsch, 2012; Gleditsch & 
Nordås, 2014; Hagel, 2014; McDonald, 2013; Obama, 2014; Reiling & Brady, 2015; 
Salehyan, 2014; Stark, 2014; UNGA, 2009). And though much has been written on the 
degree to which climate change does or does not affect conflict (e.g., Buhaug et al., 2014; 
Hsiang, Burke, & Miguel, 2013; Hsiang & Meng, 2014; Selby & Hoffmann, 2014), there 
has been considerably less attention to understanding what it means to respond to the 
joint challenges of climate change and conflict in development practice. That is despite 
explicit efforts to integrate climate-conflict and climate-security concerns into policy 
(see, for example, Obama, 2016; UNGA, 2009). This paper addresses this gap by 
examining the barriers facing development practitioners in their efforts to address the 
links between climate change and conflict.  
I ground this research in the efforts of Mercy Corps, an international NGO that is 
largely focused on complex crises (Levine, Wolfe, & Nicholson, 2016; Mercy Corps, 
2018; Sagara & Hudner, 2017), as they sought to address the joint challenges of climate 
change and conflict. Specifically, I focus on two programs Mercy Corps implemented in 
Karamoja, Uganda: Building Resilience Against Climate Extremes and Disaster 
(BRACED) and the third iteration of Peace in East and Central Africa (PEACE III). 
Those programs offer a contrast: BRACED is a climate change-centric program that 
exists in the backdrop of conflict/post-conflict dynamics; PEACE III is a conflict 
mitigation and peacebuilding program that is seeking to integrate climate change into the 
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core goals of the program, namely peacebuilding and conflict mitigation. The focus on 
these specific programs allows me to trace how contemporary policy discourses of 
climate change and conflict produce barriers to the design and implementation of 
effective interventions on the ground. Activities within these projects also demonstrate 
that when the climate-conflict nexus is reframed more broadly than just as a threat 
multiplier, development implementers are able to address climate-conflict with programs 
focused on cooperation and peacebuilding (e.g., Beck, 2014; Gemenne et al., 2014; Ide, 
2018; Krampe, 2014; Matthew, 2014; Matthew & Hammill, 2012; Wolf, 2009) 
In this paper, I demonstrate that the disparity between demand for development 
programming addressing the conflict risks of climate change and the distinct lack of 
clarity regarding what such programming might entail can largely be explained by three 
overarching challenges. First, the near-ubiquitous ‘threat multiplier’ discourse represents 
the relationship between climate and conflict in a unidirectional manner that closes off 
discussion of alternative understandings of and approaches that might generate 
productive interventions.  Second, the climate-conflict relationship operates at multiple 
scales, with climate impacts often occurring in one place, producing conflict outcomes in 
another, and with most project scales too small to encompass these complex and often 
disconnected geographies. Third, the inherent complexity of any climate-conflict 
interaction, coupled with the unique challenges of program governance in conflict and 
post-conflict settings, leads to a series of logistical and conceptual barriers that 
complicate program design and implementation.  
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Within these three overarching challenges are more specific – and overlapping – 
barriers that plague efforts to address the relationship between climate change and 
conflict have produced a series of overlapping barriers to learning and action, including: 
• The complexity and ambiguity of conceptualizing climate-conflict responses in 
traditional framings of development 
• The potential incongruence between the scope of the issue and the scope of 
implementing capacity 
• The temporal divide between acute and longer-term environmental change  
• The impact of metrics and measurements as factors steering programming  
• The logistical and security concerns inherent in conflict-related programming  
 
This paper is organized as follows, I begin by briefly situating this research in the 
climate change and conflict and development literatures before turning to the research 
methods. I then describe the spatial, logistical, and conceptual barriers that complicate 
development efforts targeting climate-conflict utilizing detailed examples to illustrate key 
findings. These descriptions are illustrated by empirical examples drawn from fieldwork 
conducted alongside Mercy Corps. I conclude the analysis with a discussion of the clearer 
paths for development intervention that emerge when the narrow “threat multiplier” 
framing climate change and conflict is widened. 
 
Background: Climate-Conflict, Discourses, Barriers, and Scale   
 
 In 2007, the Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) issued a report entitled, National 
Security and the Threat of Climate Change that described climate change as a ‘threat 
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multiplier’ (CNA, 2007).  That term, and the associated discourse, are now nearly 
ubiquitous in the wide-ranging US Government policy communities tasked with 
addressing climate-conflict interlinkages (Abrahams & Carr, 2017; Gemenne et al., 2014; 
Gilmore, 2017).43 The threat multiplier framing suggests that climate change will not 
independently cause conflict, but can hasten, trigger, and/or exacerbate conflict and 
conflict risk (CNA, 2007; Johnstone & Mazo, 2011; UNGA, 2009). The threat multiplier 
discourse, while helpful in moving away from simplified causal arguments which can 
overemphasize the role of climate change impacts in a particular conflict, has been shown 
to be limiting as it ignores other ways climate change and conflict interact (Abrahams & 
Carr, 2017). These include that climate change impacts can serve as an impetus for 
peacebuilding (Conca & Dabelko, 2002; Conca & Wallace, 2009; Dinar et al., 2015; 
Gemenne et al., 2014; Ide, 2018), the role of conflict in climate change vulnerability 
(Adger et al., 2014; Gemenne et al., 2014) and the potential of adaptation efforts to 
trigger conflict (Dabelko et al., 2013; Milman & Arsano, 2014; Snorek, Renaud, & 
Kloos, 2014). 
The literature on climate change and conflict can be conceptualized as a subset of 
the wider environmental security literature (Floyd, 2008). It invokes the branch of 
political ecology that examines how environmental degradation does – or does not – 
affect conflict (Barnett & Adger, 2007; Le Billon, 2001; Peluso & Watts, 2001), and how 
the sources of that degradation are themselves shaped by larger political-economic 
processes (Barnett & Adger, 2007; Blakie & Blaikie, 1985; Carr, 2013). As has been 
demonstrated across a wide range of political ecological studies, the spatial and temporal 
                                               
43 CNA recently reframed climate change to a ‘conflict catalyst’ (CNA, 2014). Despite this change, the 
threat multiplier framing continues to dominate the policy landscape. 
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scales at which a particular topic or case is examined alters how that topic or case is 
understood (e.g., Barnes, 2015; Brown & Purcell, 2005; Carr et al., 2015). The 
relationship between climate change and conflict is no exception, as it engages myriad 
stakeholders and processes that operate across diffuse spatial and temporal scales 
(Barnett & Adger, 2007; Busby, 2008; Gleditsch, 2012). Therefore, meaningful 
understandings of climate-conflict relationships require a nuanced appreciation of the 
ways in which these processes and people interact in particular contexts and across 
particular scales (Carr et al., 2015; Detges, 2014; Gleditsch, 2012; Ide & Scheffran, 2014; 
Meierding, 2013; Salehyan, 2014; Scheffran et al., 2012).  
This conceptual framing of the geographic and temporal specificity of climate 
change and conflict relationships highlights a critical lack of evidence to inform the 
productive design of programs and interventions in particular contexts. While there is 
general agreement that climate change will not lead to conflict between states, at other 
scales of analysis there is limited agreement about the extent of climate-conflict 
relationships (Adger et al., 2014; Gemenne et al., 2014; Salehyan, 2014). Furthermore, 
arguments both emphasizing and refuting the impacts of climate change on conflict are 
either framed at a very broad scale without considering how their scale of analysis might 
shape research findings, or extrapolated from one context to another without adequate 
consideration of the validity of such a practice (Ide, 2017; Ide & Scheffran, 2014; Lewis 
& Lenton, 2015). As argued by Buhaug (2015, p. 4) 
Over-aggregation in time and space implies blending important data signals with 
noise and obstructs the detection of systematic co-variation patterns in the data—




Despite calls for more explicit consideration of scale in academic research 
examining the relationship between climate change and conflict, the consideration of 
temporal and spatial dimensions in this literature, in policy formation, and in 
implementation, remains sporadic at best (Gemenne et al., 2014; Salehyan, 2014). As 
noted by Salehyan (2014, p. 2), “Much of the confusion in the literature stems from the 
fact that analyses are often conducted at different scales, making comparisons across 
studies quite difficult.”  
This paper addresses multiple gaps in the climate-conflict and climate-security 
literature. First, this paper provides direct insight into the quotidian processes by which 
broad discourses are translated directly into development programming. Second this 
research offers insight into how the complexities of scale inherent to climate change-
conflict relationships present a fundamental barrier to the design and implementation of 
adaptation efforts aimed at minimizing the risk of conflict. Third, by outlining the 
conceptual and institutional barriers to addressing the relationship between climate 
change and conflict, this paper provides direct insight into more productive means of 
designing and implementing meaningful interventions that address place-specific threats 
of conflict and climate change vulnerability (Biesbroek et al., 2013).  
 
Research Methods  
 
I utilized a mixed-methods approach for data collection. Data sources included 
participant observation, interviews, a survey, and a document review focused on gray 
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literature and program documents. Participant observation was the primary method used 
in this research. Because this paper is focused on the identification of barriers to 
development efforts targeting the conflict threats associated with climate change, the 
research findings draw heavily from approximately nine months working alongside 
Mercy Corps staff in various offices.44 A central premise of the research design was that 
development does not happen solely at the field site. As such, fieldwork extended beyond 
Karamoja to Mercy Corps offices in Kampala, Nairobi, Washington, D.C., and 
organizational headquarters in Portland, Oregon. Spending time at multiple offices 
enabled me to understand how the discourses of climate-conflict travel across time and 
space to become policy, programming, and ultimately something that exists on the 
ground.  
While observation-based data are central to this article, I triangulated that data 
with data gathered through a suite of other methods. Though I conducted some formal 
semi-structured interviews with key informants (n=10), some of the richest data came 
from interview-like informal conversations that emerged in the context of project 
activities I was observing. This proved very fruitful as I was able to ask questions and 
engage in conversations based on the immediate context. Due to their informality and 
unplanned character, those interactions resemble unstructured interviews, though their 
spontaneity suggests they are better characterized as conversations. The data were also 
supplemented with interviews with government and policy officials (n=29) on US 
governmental approaches to climate security (Abrahams, forthcoming). 
                                               
44 February 2016 – March 2016 – primarily in Nairobi, KE; Wajir, KE and Moroto, UG; October 2016– 
November 2016 – primarily in Moroto, UG and Kampala, UG; January 2017 – March 2017 – primarily in 
Moroto, UG and Kampala, UG; October – November 2017 – primarily in Moroto, UG and Kampala, UG. 
Additionally, I conducted two different visits to Portland, Oregon in June of 2017 and January 2018. 
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In order to better understand the Karamoja context, I conducted a survey focused 
on government officials in the region (n=103). The survey focused on the perspectives of 
local governance officials, primarily Local Council 1s (LC1s)45, on 1) climate and 
environmental change; 2) conflict and security; and 3) NGO activity. The focus on local 
government officials was purposeful. My experiences suggested that this population is 
aware of both the issues facing individuals in their community and the more macro 
effects of policy and development. Moreover, because the majority of LC1s live in their 
respective communities, they could speak to both the day-to-day and the existential 
challenges facing their areas as well as how climate change, conflict, and development 
relate to those challenges. This allowed considerable insight into the shifting conflict, 
economic, and physical landscapes in the region. Furthermore, their roles required 
interaction with my primary research topic: the development apparatus in the region.  
The gray literature utilized in this research includes internal documents from the 
two Mercy Corps programs, such as quarterly and annual reports, initial grant documents, 
internal memos, and documents from partners. Many of those documents were provided 
to me directly by Mercy Corps. I was also given access to Mercy Corps intranet, which 
allowed me to download these reports and other Mercy Corps material. I collected 
artifacts such as handouts at meetings, attendance lists, and program activity summaries 
used in reporting. Finally, I utilized reports, briefs, and policy documents available on the 
Internet related to the research topic. Taken together, these documents and artifacts 
                                               
45 LC1 stands for Local Council 1. It is the most localized elected representative within the Uganda system. 
They represent villages and report to an LC3 (who represents the sub-county) who in turn reports to an LC5 




provided insight into the organization’s approach to the relationship between climate 
change and conflict, and development more generally.  
To facilitate my analysis of why certain barriers existed, how they affected 
programming, and the extent to which they affected climate-conflict response, I utilized 
qualitative software (MAXQDA). I used this software to organize the data, which 
included detailed field notes, gray literature, interview transcripts and program 
documents, by different themes such as the different pressures facing the organization; 
the different types of interactions amongst different types of stakeholders; the role of 
scale in responding to climate-conflict; and different perspectives on climate-conflict. 
This enabled me to identify key patterns across the different data sources, and, as needed, 
further refine data analysis.  
The codes were developed deductively during an initial review of the data, then 
refined to create a simpler schema (Emerson et al., 2011). This process was done twice. 
The coding structure was then utilized to review specific combinations of topic whereby I 
created a more granular set of codes. From there, key patterns were identified and 
examined based on specific criteria.  In total there are 20 primary codes, each with a 
range of 1-17 sub-codes. The data were coded for descriptive factors (e.g., location and 
program), local variable (e.g., hazards and conflict patterns), relationship dynamics (e.g., 
central government interactions with implementing agencies), and a host of themes that 
relate closely to the papers in this dissertation (e.g., pressures on the landscape, barriers to 
implementation, scale, and Mercy Corps processes). 
To enhance the validity of the findings, I member-checked the research after 
completing data collection by presenting my preliminary findings to key Mercy Corps 
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personnel in the Moroto, Uganda and Kampala, Uganda offices, as well as domestic 
offices in Portland, Oregon, and in Washington, DC (Emerson et al., 2011). In all cases, I 
presented the work and then facilitated a discussion with the staff on hand. While there 
was only limited disagreement with the research findings, this proved useful as it always 
led to nuanced conversations between people in the room that clarified my 
interpretations. In addition to confirming the findings, this process also helped clarify the 
differences in Mercy Corps perceptions of climate-conflict across different institutional 
positionalities.  
 
Climate Change and Conflict: Spatial Complexity and Implementation 
Challenges  
 
Throughout data collection, research participants from different sectoral, 
geographic, and disciplinary perspectives expressed a common framing of climate-
conflict linkages: climate change was negatively affecting conflict outcomes (usually 
framed as a threat multiplier).  This framing was followed by an explanation of a need to 
address the link (often expressed in terms of ‘threat mitigation or ‘threat minimizers’) and 
uncertainty as to how and where to ‘minimize’ or ‘mitigate’ climate-conflict links.  
The discursive framing of the climate-conflict relationship rests upon two implicit 
assumptions, both of which are called into question in this research. The first is the notion 
that scarcity is always a driver of conflict. The second is that scarcity and conflict overlap 
spatially and thus can be addressed with geographically targeted programming. The 
former is a long-contested issue in the broader environmental security and political 
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ecology literature (e.g., Dalby, 2009; Peluso & Watts, 2001). The second, though 
challenged (e.g., Detges, 2014), has received less attention from the academic 
community.  
In most documented instances of climate-conflict interactions, there is little 
spatial continuity between climate change impacts and the sites in which those impacts 
contribute to conflict. Rather, at the scales typical of development practice, climate 
change impacts are experienced in place A, conflict outcomes are experienced in place B, 
and, in some cases, key social, economic, and political processes that translated climate 
impacts into conflict outcomes extend across and transcend both the sites of impact and 
conflict (Gemenne et al., 2014; Salehyan, 2014). Those spatial patterns were evident in 
Karamoja, where climate change is part of an tapestry of political ecological factors 
exerting pressure on the landscape and leading to localized small-scale conflict. The 
effects of climate change have led to a longer dry season and a shorter, more intense 
rainy season. Those biophysical impacts, taken in combination with changes in land use 
and land access, have led to increasing pressure on the landscape, which has produced 
localized conflicts largely centered on resource access and theft (Mercy Corps, 2016; 
Powell, 2010; Stites & Akabwai, 2009). However, it was often not the places that most 
acutely felt the effects of climate change where there was conflict, rather it was in 
proximate places of relative abundance (see also Detges, 2014).  For example, survey 
respondents consistently noted a preponderance of conflict and theft during the dry 
season in and around Teso, an area on the border of Uganda’s greenbelt as well as 
localized conflict in areas of relative abundance near the Kenyan border (which receives 
considerably less rainfall) between the Turkana (of Kenya) and Ugandans.  
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All of which raises an important question: if scarcity is what translates environmental 
change to conflict, why is it that the sites of scarcity are often not the sites of conflict? 
Indeed, how is it that sites of relative abundance seem to experience resource conflicts? 
These questions are germane to the organizations tasked with addressing climate-conflict, 
as it speaks to their ability to identify the sources of conflicts they seek to minimize or 
mitigate, and therefore to design appropriate interventions that might achieve such goals. 
In the following subsections I describe the specific barriers that produce uncertainty and 
complicate development efforts targeting the joint challenges of climate change and 
conflict. 
  
Conceptualizing Climate-Conflict Response: Complexity and Ambiguity  
In October 2016, PEACE III convened a two-day meeting in Kapenguria, Kenya, 
to train stakeholders and partners on how to integrate climate change and conflict into 
their peacebuilding work. The meeting, entitled Integrating Climate Change Adaptation, 
Natural Resource Management in the Karamoja Cluster: A Roll-Out and Sensitization 
Workshop for Stakeholders, had the stated purpose of identifying the ways in which 
PEACE III could address climate change and conflict. In attendance were elected 
officials from Kenya and Uganda, including the PEACE III-defined zones of Amudat, 
West/North Pokot, Turkana, South Omo, and Karamoja, representatives from Ugandan 
governmental agencies, Mercy Corps employees, and staff of partner NGOs and CBOs. 
In total there were 27 participants packed into a hotel meeting room. For two days, the 
organizer walked the group through exercises, presented on the risks climate change can 
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Figure 4.1: PEACE III Areas of Operation, Source of Figure (PEACE III 2016) 
 
At the end of the second and final day of the workshop, the moderator broke the 
attendees into four groups based on geographic zones. He then tasked each group with 
identifying initiatives that would address the links between climate change and conflict in 
their communities – this was done with the intent of identifying locally appropriate 
interventions that might then be funded. All four groups, despite working independently, 
came up with the same intervention: sensitize their community to charcoal extraction as a 
means to curb deforestation. This, each group explained, would limit deforestation and 
therefore the biophysical changes that are shifting weather patterns and are driving 
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conflict.  In other words, they had attributed local conflict to environmental change, and 
the environmental changes in question not to global commerce or carbon emissions from 
the Global North, but to their own activities.46   
 
 
Figure 4.2: A completed template from the PEACE III workshop. Note that the issue 
identified is charcoal production, not larger drivers of climate change that might present 
conflict challenges 
 
While I do not question that there are social and/or environmental benefits to limiting 
timber extraction or charcoal production, there is little evidence to suggest that 
sensitizing communities to charcoal production would do anything to address climate 
                                               
46 It is of note, PEACE III did not follow through with these interventions. A PEACE III official asked me 
to review the action plans; I expressed my concerns regarding its possible limitations and the focus on 
charcoal. He largely agreed with me, noting that this conceptual challenge is a common problem they have 
faced since being tasked with addressing climate change, specifically a lack of personnel with climate 
expertise, and a general lack of understanding of the issue. Aligning with my experiences in the region, he 
further noted that they often see a conflation of charcoal and climate change.  I later asked a senior 
BRACED official about this conflation, she explained to me that contextualizing climate change for the 
community had been difficult and it was often framed by development agencies in the context of 
deforestation.  
INTEGRATING CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION, NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT AND CONFLICT 
MANAGEMENT 
DRAFT MOROTO DISTRICT STAKEHOLDERS INTERVENTION ACTION PLAN 
























Stakeholder 1: Moroto 

















Objective 1:  
Integrate climate 
change, natural 
resource and conflict 
into the district 
development plan 
 
Objective 2:  
Promote the  




To build community 
awareness on the 
interrelatedness of 
natural resource, 






Letter to LDC and NRM Office 






Meetings with the community and other stakeholders 





Tactic 3:  
Stakeholder trainings  
NRM, C.C & conflict mitigation consultative  meetings 
Community sensitization forums 
 
 




change, conflict, or any connections between the two. The carbon emissions from 
community-scale production are negligible in the scheme of global emissions, the amount 
of land cover change is likely less than the changes that result from commercial resource 
extraction and pressures to shift into sedentary agriculture.47 It would seem unlikely that 
charcoal is bringing about changes in the hydrological cycle extreme enough to alter 
conflict outcomes. Therefore, sensitization offers little, if any, climate-conflict benefit 
and increases the risk of further marginalizing the already economically-marginal girls 
and women who dominate charcoal production. As described by a senior PEACE III 
official in reference to past efforts to sensitize communities to charcoal production: 
They [communities reliant upon charcoal production] were asking us, ‘you are telling 
us to stop cutting trees to burn charcoal!?’ Where do you want us to get money 
from!? And it’s not even us. It’s people who come from Nairobi with trucks to come 
and ferry this charcoal. It’s not us, it is them who are bringing us money.’ 
 
I use this example not to criticize the group, the facilitator, or the program, but to 
highlight how the threat multiplier framing of climate change’s role in conflict, 
particularly the ways in which it implicitly assumes a spatial overlap between the sites of 
scarcity/environmental challenge and the site of conflict, creates challenges in 
conceptualizing place-specific programming. This example also further demonstrates that 
when a particular conflict is attributed to climate change, one must understand not only 
the sources, magnitude, and severity of any changes and their associated impacts, but also 
the pathways by which those impacts affect conflict outcomes or create opportunities for 
                                               




peacebuilding in a particular place. Without this understanding, responding to climate-
related conflicts becomes extremely difficult. In the case of this workshop, the facilitators 
and the group did not explore either the biophysical changes or the pathways by which 
those changes were translated into conflict. Further, their task – address climate-conflict 
in their community – explicitly bounded their spatial framing of climate change-conflict 
linkages. As a result, the participants, partners, and indeed Mercy Corps found 
themselves focused on the challenges that they could see in their community. Further, 
reflecting pressures I will discuss below, they all described achievable (and quantifiable) 
programming very typical of ongoing development efforts in the region.  
 
Scale of the Issue, Scales of Implementation 
I presented the preliminary findings of this research at Mercy Corps headquarters 
in Portland, Oregon in January of 2018. In attendance were eight senior members of 
Mercy Corps, representing technical support teams, geographically-focused senior 
programmatic management, and organizational leadership. I described how, in Karamoja, 
there had been widespread attention to charcoal as a driver of climate change in 
Karamoja. I also explained that there had been very limited discussion of the impacts of 
commercial resource extraction that followed the prevailing peace in the area, even 
though commercial resource extraction is likely having a greater effect on landscape 
degradation when compared to charcoal-driven deforestation.  I argued that, based on my 
time in Karamoja, it might be unreasonable to expect an NGO that focuses on ground-
level vulnerabilities and works directly with communities to address an issue as complex 
and wide-ranging as land grabs that were being driven, in part, by commercial resource 
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extraction pressures that transcended Karamoja. That notion was questioned by multiple 
members of leadership and led to a detailed discussion regarding the organization’s 
vision for its work, whether the organization can resolve this sort of multi-layered 
problem, and the varied pressures Mercy Corps staff feel from a wide range of 
stakeholders, including donors and the intended beneficiaries of their work. In arguing 
that the organization can and should take on such challenges, a member of the Energy, 
Environment, and Climate (EEC) team emphasized the organization’s often-expressed 
focus on being innovative and its lead-do-not-follow ethos, arguing “even if we’re taking 
a risk, we need to be trying to address issues at scale, because if we’re not thinking about 
this issue, no one else is.”  
 This discussion with Mercy Corps staff illustrates the gap between the wide 
variety of ways in which vulnerabilities emerge in particular places and the constrained 
means NGOs, and development more generally, have to address them. Some of Mercy 
Corps’ leadership expressed the view that if commercial resource extraction is creating 
vulnerability to environmental change, which in turn was contributing to humanitarian 
crises, then commercial resource extraction is what they ought to target with 
interventions. Others noted that their traditional focus, and their strength, is at the 
community level, and focusing on large-scale challenges risks jeopardizing their efforts 
to address the most vulnerable groups within populations. Moreover, there was 
uncertainty about donor willingness to fund high-risk but potentially high-impact 
initiatives, in part because of difficulties of reporting on the progress of such work and 
the donor demand for achievable projects – an issue further examined below. Finally, as 
was also expressed to me in the different Uganda offices, though they would like to work 
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to address resource extraction, it is a sensitive topic and one that could jeopardize their 
relationships with key government officials – relationships needed to operate in 
Karamoja. Thus, it was clear, that even within a single development organization with a 
broadly shared ethos, notions of agency, ‘the socioculturally mediated capacity to act’ 
(Ahearn, 2001, p. 112), were subjective, political, and contestable (see also Barnes, 
2015).   
While demonstrating that views within Mercy Corps are far from monolithic, this 
discussion also illustrates how efforts to identify appropriate development responses do 
not happen in a vacuum. Questions about scale (social, temporal, and spatial), 
institutional priorities, and the balance of achievability and effectiveness govern the 
selection and design of interventions. Those institutional questions become particularly 
acute in the context of climate change and conflict, where there may not be enough 
information to allow for clear answers that  inform the character of programs on the 
ground and address whether such programs should be undertaken in the first place. 
 
Temporal Divides: Climate Change and Conflict    
Much was discussed and debated during the annual planning meeting of Mercy 
Corps’ Environment, Energy, and Climate (EEC) Technical Support Unit (TSU) team in 
June of 2017. The meeting, which was held in a bright comfortable space in Mercy 
Corps’ headquarters in Portland, covered topics ranging from the most efficient use of 
internal communication tools, the impacts of biophysical change in places where they 
work, partner performance, and the impacts of personnel changes in the organization. 
Steering much of their discussion, however, were the myriad challenges and frustrations 
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facing the TSU in their efforts to integrate ecosystem and environmental-centric priorities 
into an organization that focuses primarily on complex crises, including, increasingly, 
conflict and post-conflict settings.  
The EEC team is spread across offices in multiple cities, therefore these sorts of 
meetings are rare and valuable opportunities for them to convene in person, plan, and 
discuss strategy. That the team spent much of their time discussing how to best message 
and sell their expertise within Mercy Corps as well as to external stakeholders speaks to a 
wider challenge in the humanitarian aid community. Despite the organization’s 
acknowledgement of the importance of environmental sustainability in complex crisis, 
and its adherence to do-no-harm principles (e.g., Mercy Corps, 2018), for Mercy Corps, 
and development and relief organizations more generally, there exists a series of factors 
that push the organization away from longer-term environmental issues toward shorter-
term concerns and outcomes (Henley-Shephard et al., 2017). These factors include 
community priorities in the backdrop of acute crisis, the complications of measuring 
environmental change and adaptation to that change, the role of metrics-driven 
evaluation, funding silos, and a lack of personnel with environmental backgrounds. 
Moreover, for Mercy Corps, an organization that conducts a significant amount of work 
in conflict and post-conflict contexts, there is also the core challenge that the immediacy 
of conflict often relegates climate change (and environmental priorities, more broadly) to 
a lower institutional priority, even if the environment is seen as the root of a particular 






Figure 4.3: Example of Resilient Design Agriculture 
 
The conceptual challenges that emerged in the meeting in Portland could be seen 
quite clearly on the ground in Karamoja. The following example illustrates the BRACED 
project’s challenges with resilient-design agriculture in Karamoja, particularly how the 
temporal immediacy of acute stresses can push community priorities out of alignment 
project goals that include longer-term environmental benefits. On February 07, 2017, 
near to the peak of the dry season, John (a pseudonym), a BRACED program officer on 
the natural resource management (NRM) team, returned from the field. The project he 
was then implementing, known as resilient-design agriculture, seeks to increase the 
productivity of agriculture by manipulating the land to retain water and increase 
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agricultural output. John’s focus on this project was to work with the community to 
prepare the site for the upcoming rainy season in order to be ready for planting season in 
March. On this day, he was uncharacteristically visibly frustrated. When we spoke, he 
described how around that time of year, communities become extremely focused on 
short-term challenges. As a result, programming focused on mid-term or longer-term 
time horizons became more difficult to implement.  
John’s core frustration was that despite the community previously expressing 
excitement for the project, he struggled to recruit community members for its final stages. 
John believed this challenge could be explained by the lack of immediate benefits of the 
project in the face of acute crisis (i.e., food insecurity). This made selling the long-term 
benefits of the program a largely uphill battle, despite the fact that it was designed to 
address the dry season challenges that drove the community’s focus to the short term.  
John, who is Karamajong, was sympathetic to the community’s challenges during the 
extended dry season, noting, “During this time, they may only be taking water.”48 Yet he 
saw this lack of participation as flawed reasoning, noting “it is short-term thinking” 
driven by both acute crisis and structures of remuneration within Mercy Corps and 
development more broadly.  
 By no means are these temporal challenges specific to Mercy Corps or Karamoja. 
In fact, Karamoja, which is accessible and relatively stable, likely represents a best-case 
scenario for addressing climate-conflict linkages through development programming. It is 
therefore telling that the challenges described above were experienced across 
humanitarian organizations in the region. A research participant who worked on climate 
                                               
48 The verb ‘taking’ in the context refers to both eating and drinking; it is synonymous with ‘consuming’. 
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change for a different humanitarian agency described her challenges integrating climate 
change into their work in a similar manner. Specifically, she described how places with a 
history of conflict or actively experiencing conflict are more vulnerable to climate-related 
shocks, but the ability to implement efforts to mitigate those shocks are impeded by those 
very contexts: 
Humanitarian [agencies] who respond to the immediate disaster have been very 
reluctant to go beyond their immediate mandate: To be reactive and responsive… 
And the climate change programming that is happening in those countries is not 
necessarily linking up to that. First of all it’s not necessarily occurring in 
countries, the LDCs [least developed countries] have the lowest capacity to get 
funding, right, to do these types of programs.  It’s the middle-income countries, 
like the Philippines, who are really good at getting funding for climate work; for 
having climate change adaptation plans. It’s fragile, poorly functioning countries 
that have very poor governance, that are not getting a lot of climate change 
funding. There is not a lot of programs going on because of security issues, but 
yet they are the ones where the impacts of climate change are the worst on 
humans. 
 
Another version of this challenge was evident amongst policy officials working 
on the relationship between climate change and conflict. A wide range of research 
participants, including people working for development donors, development 
implementers, and defense organizations, noted that in the context of conflict, climate 
change is not going to be a political priority relative to the more immediate need to 
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respond to or otherwise mitigate conflict. For example, as described by a policy official 
working for a research institute heavily involved with climate-conflict: 
The challenge is that these are generally, [though not always] high-likelihood and 
low-risk events. They are gradual and insidious and there are other things 
garnering peoples’ attentions. This ranges from the risk of nuclear attacks to the 
issues ongoing in Syria, Israel, Russia, etc. And basically, we [the policy and 
defense community] tend to skew towards headlines and not trend lines. Climate 
change and security is about trend lines. It gets pushed to the back burner because 
it can be dealt with on somebody else's watch.  People are going to worry about 
what is nipping at their heels, not gradual, more opaque issues. 
 
Development programs and interventions are designed to address challenges 
facing particular communities over well-defined spatial and temporal scales. The 
complexity of the relationship between climate change and conflict render such temporal 
and spatial definition very challenging. But the urgency of acute complex crises, 
including conflicts that are seen as enhanced or triggered by climate change impacts, 
drive the focus of communities and agencies towards spatially and temporally confined 
outcomes. Rather than attempt to program around a spatially complex challenge that 
might not fully manifest for decades such as climate change, organizations will prioritize 
addressing immediate concerns in specific places, even when climate change or other 
environmental stressors are perceived to be at the root of a particular conflict, (Abrahams, 
2014; Kovach & Conca, 2016). Those responses create institutional expectations and 
implicit priorities that, in turn, limit agencies’ ability to build and employ political and 
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financial capital to address the biophysical shift that might be at the heart of the acute 
crisis at hand.  
   
Program Governance: The Governmentality of Metrics    
In February of 2017, we arrived at what is known as a ‘model village’ where the 
many components of the BRACED – gender, governance, markets, natural resource 
management, and land-focused advocacy – were being implemented.  After the roughly 
30 minute car ride, BRACED program staff, senior BRACED personnel, and 
representatives from the donor and fund manager hopped out of the land cruisers and 
were immediately greeted by no less than 100 community members. The community 
sang and danced to celebrate our arrival, an event that was notably well-choreographed 
(Figure 4.4). The donor visit, long-planned and logistically complex, consisted of 
presentations from program staff, meetings with government officials, demonstrations of 
how R&D and permagardens were implemented, and sit-downs with representatives from 
land committees. Like the performance that greeted our arrival, the visit was also well-
choreographed. Throughout their visit, the donor representatives visited field sites, 
chatted with program staff, asked questions of program recipients, took pictures, and 
audited supplies. By the end of their visit, the representatives were visibly exhausted and 
sunburnt.  
Among Mercy Corps’ BRACED staff, there was widespread agreement that the 
visit had gone well. The reports that followed suggested that the donor organization was 
indeed impressed. Multiple BRACED staff members beamed about an email they 
received from the country director that lauded their efforts. The team’s considerable 
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effort to run a smooth, effective donor visit was further validated when they were 




Figure 4.4: The Choreographed Dance at the Model Village Visit 
 
This outcome, however, was far more than the product of one good field visit. 
Long before the donor visit, in a board room in Nairobi, an evaluation specialist 
representing DfID described the sort of programming that would best achieve the goals 
defined by DfID and lead to Mercy Corps being judged positively. He stressed 
achievable, cross-cutting programs that would speak to the broad goals of the program 
and allow resilience to be measured in the timespan of the grant.  He described the 
clusters, outcomes, and results that Mercy Corps ought to target though never giving 
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direct instructions. By the end of the meeting, a whiteboard had been filled with the sorts 
of targets, outcomes, and results that would lead to Mercy Corps being judged positively 
by the evaluators and donor.  
Mercy Corps program staff were then tasked with developing specific and 
measurable ways to judge the efficacy of the programs. They did so in consultation with 
field staff and Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) officers. Thus, the outcome of the 
discussion in Nairobi functioned both as guidelines and confines by which program 
directors, managers, officers, and M&E specialists positioned ground-level work. Over 
the following months, the program was revamped and reorganized following shifts in 
personnel and changes in geographic focus. There was considerable focus on achievable 
and measurable outcomes that spoke to the goals outlined in this meeting. The 
whiteboard’s influence, therefore, continued throughout the life of the program.  
In the weeks leading up to their arrival, I traveled with multiple BRACED team 
members to find sites that, with these revamped goals in mind, would best demonstrate 
the effectiveness of the program to the donors and evaluators during their time in Moroto. 
Program officers checked programmatic progress and met with program recipients to 
help ensure that the donors were taken to sites where BRACED funds were being 
effectively implemented. Places lacking visible progress, or that had struggled to properly 
implement programs, were deemed best to avoid. Thus, the on-the-ground choreography 
of the donor visit was not a one-day performance, but the outcome of a series of decisions 






Figure 4.5: Following a meeting with an evaluation consultant, a white board in Mercy 
Corps’ Nairobi Office is filled with ideas and categories that were intended to steer 
programmatic efforts towards positive evaluation 
 
When placed into the larger context of program management, the donor visit 
reveals a great deal about how both donors and implementers understand the challenge at 
hand, how best to address it, and how to measure the impacts of efforts to address the 
challenge. The goals of the donor, the fund manager, and the evaluator all coalesced 
around the development of a shared understanding of what the effective use of program 
  
 307 
funds looks like. Or, as plainly stated by one of the fund manager representatives in an 
interview, ‘our role is to ensure delivery of the projects and that taxpayer money is well 
spent.’ Behind this statement, however, are many assumptions, including that a project 
can be measured and judged effectively.  
Identifying and measuring effectiveness is a ubiquitous yet nebulous challenge 
facing development organizations. Andrew Natsios, a former Administrator of USAID 
(from 2001-2006), describes how ‘obsessive measurement disorder’ complicates 
development and leads to more risk adverse forms of programming (Natsios, 2010). 
While considerable resources are dedicated to understanding, measuring, and reporting 
on program efficacy (Carr-Hill, 2013; Natsios, 2010), those metrics can, intentionally or 
unintentionally, function as tools of coercion governing how a program is translated from 
concept to implementation (Carr-Hill, 2013; Carr, 2013). In particular, as Natsios (2010) 
notes, if the outcomes of monitoring and measurement are punitive, obsessive 
measurement can lead organizations and individuals to emphasize programs that are 
likely to meet measurement targets (thus protecting their funding and jobs) whether or 
not particular interventions actually achieve development goals or deliver meaningful 
benefits to target communities.  
Adding to challenges of program governance is the question of how policy 
communities, development in particular, approach and fund cross-sectoral issues. In 
interviews, multiple policy-focused officials stressed that because climate-conflict 
connections cross sectors, agencies, and priorities, the cross-sectoral nature of climate 
conflict was, in and of itself, a fundamental barrier to addressing the nexus. For example, 
as described by a State Department employee regarding climate change, water, and 
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security, framing it as an issue that will be hard for the organization to address with 
policy, in large part, due to the cross-sectoral nature: 
You know it’s a tough thing to focus on, obviously it’s a security issue, it’s an 
economic issue, it’s a human rights issue, for many, it’s a gender issue; but it is 
incredibly cross-cutting and its non-standardized. So it’s not exactly an easy topic 
to internalize within this building. 
 
The cross-cutting character of climate-conflict challenges creates institutional 
issues because, as explained by a USAID employee, this issue lacks a clear funding 
source due to the ‘stove piping’ of development funding structures. 
One of the more bureaucratic, but most common problems is that it [climate 
change and conflict] is a really cross-cutting set of issues. And we aren't really 
well-funded and our ways of allocating money aren't really well designed to cope 
with cross-cutting issues. We have an ear mark for climate adaptation work and 
the work that happens under it has to be attributable explicitly to a certain set of 
criteria which defines what adaptation looks like to climate drivers. Right? That’s 
what the money is for. And it’s what you have to do. So blending that with other 
objectives is tough. 
 
Development outcomes are influenced by efforts to quantify and measure their 
efficacy. Climate-conflict challenges, by nature of their complex scales and cross-
disciplinary character, present unique challenges for developing and implementing policy 
and programming targeting this specific issue. Moreover, as a result of the inherent 
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complexity of climate-conflict connections, and the malleability and interpretability of 
the threat multiplier framing, there exists considerable space for metrics and reporting 
requirements to influence development inputs and outcomes. Thus, perhaps more than 
other topics with more straight-forward spatial and temporal dynamics, programming 
targeting climate-conflict both complicates and is complicated by efforts at program 
governance.  
 
Logistics and Security 
In October of 2017 members of the PEACE III team, myself, and a handful of its 
partners were en route to a program site in northern Karamoja, when about one hour into 
the drive the Land Cruiser began bumping along the dirt road. The seven of us in the car 
immediately knew what had happened: a flat or ‘punctured’ tire. In Karamoja, punctures 
are little more than an unavoidable annoyance, not unlike traffic in Kampala. The dirt 
roads strewn with sharp rocks and (according to the drivers) the poor-quality tires that 
suffer at the combination of friction and heat combine to make this sort of event 
inevitable. We pulled over and the driver, who is notably practiced at changing tires, 
climbed to the roof, passed down the jack, threw down the spare tire, climbed down, and 
within moments, the car was jacked up. However, this time something had gone wrong: a 
lug nut was stuck (Figure 4.6). The nut lay obstinately motionless as we each tried our 
hands at solving the problem – brute force proving inadequate. With no feasible ride 
coming soon, for the next hour we improvised, brainstormed, and exhausted our 
shoulders trying to pry it off. Finally, with the aid of some extracted engine oil and all the 
torque two of us could muster, the nut slipped off.  Minutes later, we were back on the 
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road. In total, this process took 85 minutes. In my experience, tires normally were 
changed in under eight minutes.49   
This incident was annoying and slightly inconvenient – it turned a 3.5 hour ride 
into 5 hours, but it was little more than a reality of being a development organization in a 
place with poor infrastructure. Karamoja is currently stable (Stites et al., 2016), if it had 
been 10 years prior, however, this incident would have been something far more serious. 
Prior to disarmament, Karamoja was a dangerous place for NGOs operating in the region. 
And, as described by Barclay (2018), implementing in a conflict zone requires many 
considerations and contingencies due to the inherent risk of operations. Demonstrating 
the seriousness and dangers of working in Karamoja in years past, multiple people in the 
car had been attacked in ambushes, and at least one of them had been shot. When we 
returned from the field visit, I asked one of the senior staff members what it would have 
meant if we had gotten the flat tire 20, 10, or even 5 years ago. He sighed, shook his 
head, and said, “It would have been a disaster. It would have been a complete disaster.” 
Senior PEACE III personnel stressed to me that different precautions would have 
been taken in years past or in different PEACE III operational zones. Field teams would 
have driven in a convoy, they would have worn flak jackets, satellite tracking would have 
been on the car, they would have had a satellite phone, and they likely would have taken 
another route (the flat occurred in what was once a notably dangerous area). It is also 
likely we would not have been in the car in the first place. In large part because of 
security risks, field visits in areas experiencing conflict are tightly monitored. In the past, 
                                               
49 In my experience that field visits over two hours were more likely than not to result in flat tires. Though 
not technically part of the research, upon seeing how fast the drivers were at changing flats, timing them 
became a custom. 
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staff based in the Moroto office would not go to the field unless it was deemed absolutely 
necessary. Because organizational security concerns, which are issues for which the 
country director is responsible, can limit the mobility of project staff, local partners with 




Figure 4.6: The Stuck Lug Nut 
 
All of these concerns, costs, and preparations embodied in the risk of an 
inevitable flat tire raise important questions about where NGOs can effectively and safely 
operate when addressing climate-conflict concerns. I spoke with multiple organizations 
  
 312 
who posited that climate change was exacerbating conflict related-challenges and/or 
programming  in particular places – Somalia, Yemen, and Chad being the most 
referenced – but had low confidence in their ability to implement in these places, in large 
part because of the complications of security and access.   
Staff working on PEACE III also described the psychological toll of working in 
the field. In their annual reflection meeting, which was attended by about 40 people, all 
either directly employed by the grant or working in direct partnership with the program 
implementers. The focus of the meeting was to describe key lessons and challenges over 
the initial implementation stages of the program. Strikingly, many were rooted in the 
fundamental challenges of working in places where conflict is inherent, though some of 
these were logistical (e.g., working within the security policies of individual 
organizations), the team long reflected on the psychological challenges and dangers of 
their work. For example, a senior member of Mercy Corps with more than a decade of 
peacebuilding and conflict mitigation who was working on Kenya-centric 
implementation, described the fear of going to specific field sites, emotionally confessing 
to the group “Whenever there are guys with AK-47s, it can be scary. I don’t want to be a 
martyr.” 
 Though logistics and security are obvious challenges, they are worthy of explicit 
consideration as they raise important questions about how policy framings of the 
relationship between climate change and conflict are translated into particular 
interventions.  How, where, and, indeed, whether there is a window to address climate-
conflict are central questions in assessing an organization’s ability to address the conflict 
challenges associate with climate change. For example, if the design of effective 
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interventions requires understanding context-specific pathways from climate change 
impacts to conflict outcomes, but systematic research on these contexts cannot be 
conducted as sites cannot be safely accessed, how can an organization proceed? Far from 
rhetorical, this question was often discussed and complicated PEACE III efforts in South 
Sudan and southern Ethiopia.  
 
Opportunities: Climate change as an opportunity multiplier  
 
The dominant policy discourses around climate change and conflict frames 
climate change as a threat multiplier. This framing defines climate change as having only 
one sort of effect on conflict: exacerbating conflict risk or impacts. Implementation 
efforts targeting the relationship between climate change and conflict are, in turn, 
challenged by the ability to both conceptualize and respond to climate change as a threat 
multiplier. These discursive and logistical barriers interact closely with the spatiality of 
the issue and highlight why despite high demand to ‘mitigate’ or ‘minimize’ climate 
change as a threat multiplier, the complex scales that the issue raises directly challenge 
agencies’ ability to do so.  Yet in the climate-conflict literature, the connection between 
climate change and conflict is clearly defined as a multidirectional phenomenon that does 
not only result in conflict, but also can also lead to cooperation, or have no effect at all on 
conflict outcomes (e.g., Abrahams & Carr, 2007; Adger et al., 2014; Dabelko et al., 2013; 
Dinar et al., 2015; Gemenne et al., 2014; Tubi and Feitelson, 2016). Recognizing that 
climate change might present opportunities for cooperation and peacebuilding opens up 
both policy and implementation approaches to the conflict risks of climate change, and 
offers a path forward for development and adaptation programming.  
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Opportunities in peacebuilding and post-conflict NRM  
 In Loyoro, a town in Northern Karamoja roughly 10km from Kenya, hand-dug 
holes pock the landscape. They range from approximately 20 – 30 feet deep and 10 – 40 
feet across. Some have collapsed, others stand dormant, and a handful have 
approximately six to eight girls and women standing and sitting upon tiered layers 
(Figure 4.7). The holes are dug every dry season and fill back in with the seasonal rains. 
The women in those holes had formed a make-shift assembly line whereby one would fill 
a jerrycan with water, pass it up to the next, to the next, until the water was eventually 
dumped into shallow pots that were then used to water cattle. This process went on for 




Figure 4.7: Turkana Women Extracting Water in Northern Karamoja 
 
These efforts to water cattle have peacebuilding implications. The women who 
were extracting the water are Turkana, from western Kenya, but the land belongs to the 
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Dodoth, an ethnic group who reside predominantly in the northern reaches of Karamoja. 
The two groups had historically been rivalrous and both groups are still prone to localized 
conflict and rhetoric that frames the other as a source of insecurity (Howe et al., 2015). 
For example, the Kaabong LC5 (the senior-most district official) was elected in 2016 on 
a campaign focused on efforts to keep the Turkana out of the district. Furthermore, the 
Turkana, being from Kenya, were not subject to the disarmament and therefore remain 
armed, while the Dodoth were subject to the disarmament process. This arms imbalance 
also adds tension to the relationship. However, while the Turkana women and girls 
painstakingly pulled water from the sunken earth in Dodoth territory, Dodoth and 
Turkana community members and members of the Uganda People’s Defence Force 
(UPDF) wandered past without incident. Those outcomes were built on a multitude of 
peacebuilding efforts, including a resource sharing agreement (RSA), which PEACE III 
staff helped broker (see Figure 4.8).  
This agreement speaks to how framing climate change as an opportunity for 
peacebuilding can open new implementation lenses that better address the complex 
spatiality and temporality of climate-conflict. By focusing on cooperation, this agreement 
speaks to the different climate-related needs of groups from different places in essence 
bridges the separate spaces that experienced the most acute climactic and conflictual 
impacts. The structure of the RSA is such that the Turkana essentially rent access from 
the Dodoth, thus providing a more controlled mechanism for resource sharing and 
management. The Turkana then have the right to dig the holes in order to access the 
water for their cattle. At the time of my field visit, the agreement had been in place for 
roughly one year and, according to PEACE III staff, has had a central role in maintaining 
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the peace between those communities. This observation is not to suggest RSAs are a 
panacea to climate-conflict connections. There are challenges, such as knowing who to 
include in the agreement and maintaining and adjusting agreements as circumstances as 
seasons shift.  However, the RSA reinforces the idea that climate change can be 
harnessed in peacebuilding efforts, thus demonstrating why climate-conflict interventions 
need to be thought about more broadly than just mitigating the exacerbated risk brought 
on by those changes (Gartzke, 2012; Ide, 2018; Krampe, 2014; Matthew, 2014; Matthew 









Conclusion: Programming for Climate and Conflict  
 
That climate change can act as a threat multiplier is both a compelling and 
powerful discourse with growing impact in policy and academic communities. As has 
been demonstrated in this research, however, the framing of climate change as a threat 
multiplier becomes increasingly problematic as conversations move from policy into 
programming and eventually on-the-ground interventions. While certainly logical and, to 
an extent, supported by evidence, this discourse is limiting. Climate change may result in 
conflict, but it can also result in cooperation. Further, climate change adaptation efforts, if 
not conflict-sensitive, risk inadvertently triggering conflict (Dabelko, et al., 2013; Snorek 
et al., 2014). By framing the relationship between climate change and conflict as only one 
where climate drives conflict risks misses clear opportunities for development 
programming.  
The impacts of climate change on conflict outcomes come through complex, 
locally-specific intersections of biophysical impact and economic, social, and political 
processes. These processes and impacts are not confined to a particular place. The threat-
multiplier framing, however, when combined with the implementation pressures under 
which development organizations work, implicitly pushes both policy and 
implementation actors and organizations toward framings of the climate change-conflict 
relationship where causes and outcomes are viewed both spatially contained and 
overlapping. The result is the potential for inappropriate or ineffective interventions, 
which in turn risk furthering or even triggering negative outcomes.  
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Inappropriate or ineffective interventions are not inevitable or inherent in efforts 
that seek to address the relationship between climate change and conflict. For example, as 
was the case in the peacebuilding efforts in Loyoro, development programming framed 
around the identification of peacebuilding opportunities created by climate change 
impacts can better account for the context-specific realities that shape the 
interrelationships between climate change and conflict, while allowing organizations to 
navigate the complex realities of development implementation. As illustrated here, a 
wider policy and spatial framing of the climate-conflict relationship can enable 
development implementation that encompasses the potential for opportunities as well as 
challenges.  
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Key Takeaways from Each Paper 
This dissertation addressed the broad question: How do the discourses of climate 
change and conflict travel across time and space to become policy, programming, and 
ultimately a development initiative that exist on the ground? To answer this question, I 
broke the research into three separate papers.  The first examines how the US policy 
community approaches, understands and seeks to address the discourses of climate-
security.50 The second examines the ways in which climate change affects conflict 
outcomes in Karamoja, Uganda. And the third, using the efforts of Mercy Corps in 
Karamoja as a case study, examines the realities and opportunities in addressing climate-
conflict from a development perspective. 
The first paper addresses the question: How do US policy actors and institutions 
approach, understand, and seek to address to climate-security challenges. This paper 
demonstrates the ways in which the policy community internalizes the issue of climate-
conflict. I identified three primary approaches taken by individuals working on issues that 
relate directly to climate-security: 1) A challenge of adaptation and resilience; 2) A 
potent political tool for elevating climate change in the policy world; and 3) A topic of 
limited importance or utility. These categories offer more than just a taxonomy of the 
issue, rather they provide a foundation for understanding how the discourses of climate-
security get translated into policy and programming. I also demonstrate that though the 
relationship between climate change, conflict, and security is a subject of ongoing 
                                               
50 Climate-security being a slightly broader framing than climate-conflict 
  
 357 
academic debate,51 policy communities have largely accepted the idea that climate 
change is a security concern, most often framing this relationship as a ‘threat multiplier’ 
– that is, climate change, though not an independent driver of conflict, enhances the 
vulnerability to, or risks triggering or exacerbating, conflict and insecurity (CNA, 2007).  
The first paper also demonstrates that while the threat multiplier discourse has 
been critical in pushing back on more causal framings of the connection between climate 
change and conflict, it does not prescribe clear policy responses to climate-conflict 
challenges. Indeed, the most common framing of the climate-conflict relationship tended 
to follow a very common narrative: First, describing climate change as a threat multiplier, 
second, describing a need to minimize or mitigate the threat multiplication impacts, and 
third, having difficulty prescribing means of addressing this ‘threat multiplication’. This 
framing led me to ask why, despite widespread interest and demand, organizations were 
struggling with how to address climate change and conflict (i.e., the motivation for the 
second and third papers). 
Though this question eventually resulted in a connection to Mercy Corps, it was a 
challenge to find a suitable partner and program to study. In retrospect, the challenges I 
faced in finding a partner, reflected many of the challenges facing development 
organizations. That is, the reason there were so few organizations that were implementing 
programming that explicitly sought to address climate-conflict mirror the reasons for the 
challenges described in the third paper, including difficulty conceptualizing development 
responses, concerns about safety and logistics in fragile or conflict-prone areas, and 
                                               
51 See, for example, (Benjaminsen, 2016; Buhaug et al., 2014; Buhaug & Nordkvelle, 2014; 
Burke et al., 2015; Hsiang, Burke, & Miguel, 2014; Kelley et al., 2015; Nordkvelle, 2014;  
Salehyan, 2014; Selby et al., 2017) 
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institutional challenges inherent to an issue that spans a wide range of operational and 
political interests.  
Though I was fortunate to have the partnership with Mercy Corps that allowed me 
to examine their work in Karamoja, it is worth highlighting what could be viewed as a 
limitation. In terms of addressing climate-conflict, Mercy Corps and Karamoja are in 
many ways the best-case scenarios. Mercy Corps prides itself on being innovative and 
forward thinking, a reputation that was often described to me by people outside of the 
organization as well as within it. Karamoja was, at the time of study, relatively safe and 
stable. With the increasing presence of extractive industries, infrastructure has 
significantly and rapidly improvement. Put simply, unlike Wajir, Kenya where I 
conducted preliminary fieldwork, it is easy and safe to get around in Karamoja. However, 
I think the case of Mercy Corps in Karamoja is broadly useful because these are the best-
case scenarios. The challenges and barriers identified throughout this dissertation are 
compelling because if these challenges exist for Mercy Corps in Karamoja, then surely 
they are even more pronounced elsewhere and with less functionally equipped agencies. 
Furthermore, the extensive member checking of my findings with senior programmatic 
personnel with direct experience in a wide array of countries suggests that the barriers I 
identified in addressing climate-conflict in this project speak to concerns in other 
contexts. Nonetheless, an important area for further inquiry would be a comparison of my 
work in Karamoja to in places facing more severe climate-conflict connections.   
The second paper examines how the impacts of climate change interact with the 
post-conflict political ecology of Karamoja. This paper demonstrates that though 
Karamoja continues to stabilize following years of severe conflict, the effects of climate 
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change have negatively affected conflict outcomes emerging from the region’s post-
conflict political ecology. For years, conflict in Karamoja had been defined by interethnic 
cattle raiding and the presence of small arms. Now, conflict in the region is defined 
largely by a series of pressures on the land including an increasing shift to sedentary 
livelihoods, land grabs, commercial resource extraction, and increasing climate 
variability. Those pressures have led to more localized conflict including theft, resource 
conflict, and household conflict, all of which are more prevalent during the increasingly 
extreme dry season.    
In addition to outlining the means by which climate change interacts with and 
alters conflict in Karamoja, this paper highlights the importance of understanding the 
pathways from climate change to conflict outcomes if we are to better understand and 
address this relationship in a particular time and place. By examining a causal chain 
linking how climate change leads to a biophysical impact, how a biophysical impact leads 
to a socioeconomic impact, and how a socioeconomic impact affects conflict, I was able 
to gain a clearer view of how, where, and indeed if climate change alters conflict 
outcomes. By walking through the pathways from climate change to conflict it was clear 
that the increasing variability/increasing intensity of dry season, when coupled with a 
series of changes in land use and livelihood viability, was decreasing food security and 
access to key resources. This, in turn, led to increasing theft and conflict over resources. 
Central to understanding the shifting forms of conflict in Karamoja, though, is an 
acknowledgement that these manifestations of conflict are paradoxically linked to the 
prevailing stability in the region that followed the disarmament.  
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The third paper examines the barriers and opportunities facing development 
practitioners in their efforts to address the links between climate change and conflict. By 
tracing how the discourses of climate-conflict shift across time and space to become 
policy, programming, and ultimately interventions that exist on the ground, I illustrate 
that the disparity between demand for development programming addressing the conflict 
risks of climate change and the distinct lack of clarity regarding what such programming 
might entail can largely be explained by three overarching challenges. First, the 
unidirectionality of the near-ubiquitous ‘threat multiplier’ discourse, which presents 
climate change as a driver of conflict, and closes off discussion of alternative 
understandings of and approaches that might generate productive interventions.  Second, 
the climate-conflict relationship operates at multiple scales, with climate impacts often 
occurring in one place, producing conflict outcomes in another, and with most project 
scales too small to encompass these complex and often disconnected geographies. Third, 
the inherent complexity of any climate-conflict interaction, coupled with the unique 
challenges of program governance in conflict and post-conflict settings, leads to a series 
of logistical and conceptual barriers that complicate program design and implementation. 
Within these three overarching challenges are more specific – and overlapping – barriers 
that plague efforts to address the relationship between climate change and conflict have 
produced a series of overlapping barriers to learning and action, including: The 
complexity and ambiguity of conceptualizing climate-conflict responses in traditional 
framings of development; The potential incongruence between the scope of the issue and 
the scope of implementing capacity; The temporal divide between acute and longer-term 
environmental change; The impact of metrics and measurements as factors steering 
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programming; and The logistical and security concerns inherent in conflict-related 
programming. Building on the environmental peacebuilding literature (see, for example, 
Conca & Dabelko, 2002; Gemenne, Barnett, Adger, & Dabelko, 2014; Ide, 2018; 
Krampe, 2014; Matthew, 2014; Wolf, 2009), I also demonstrate that when the climate-
conflict nexus is reframed as presenting both potential opportunities and threats, 
development implementers are able to address climate-conflict with programs focused on 
cooperation and peacebuilding .This is highlighted by the paper’s final example, 
whereby, with support from Mercy Corps, once-rivalrous pastoralist groups with a 
history of inter-ethnic and cross-border conflict, developed a resource sharing agreement 
in part to address their challenge of increasing climate variability and a prolonged dry 
season. 
 
From Rhetoric to Response: Key Themes Across the Dissertation 
 
By nature of the research design, I was afforded vantage points from which to 
observe the ways the discourses of climate-conflict became policy prerogatives, how 
policy prerogatives became program design, and how program design ultimately became 
a project that existed in a particular time and place, in this case present-day Karamoja.  
Clear across all stages of this work, and linking the preceding manuscripts, is the salience 
of scale in climate-conflict, the paradox of how the ‘threat multiplier’ discourse both 
oversimplifies and blurs the legibility of the relationship between climate change and 
conflict, and the need to further deconstruct climate-conflict in the context of particular 
places.   
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Far from separate issues, these topics demonstrate why, despite so much attention, 
there have been only limited tangible efforts to address climate-conflict. The collective 
understanding of the issue has failed to reach a threshold whereby it precisely informs 
what can be done, with the exception of mitigating greenhouse gas emissions and 
building resilience to climatic shocks and stressors. The former, though obviously 
critically important, is an issue that extends far beyond climate-conflict narratives. 
Further, the argument that conflict risk is the primary reason to mitigate emissions carries 
with it a risk of securitization and therefore the risk of legitimizing extreme measures in 
the name of security that violate democratic norms and/or further reinforce power 
differentials within and across states (Hartmann, 2014; Methmann & Rothe, 2012; Oels, 
2015; Oels, 2012; Selby, 2014).  
Resilience is a vague, malleable concept and though it seems intuitive at a global 
level, its utility as an implementation framework can be evasive. For example, the 
interpretability of resilience was a point of frustration for the Mercy Corps team focused 
on climate change, who felt that too often field teams became focused on what is most 
achievable rather than what is most effective; instead of programming that addressed 
future climatic shocks, the focus was on short-term community needs and on-farm 
productivity.  A critical question to ask, then, especially for development organizations 
tasked with addressing climate-conflict is what can be done to address climate-conflict in 
a realistic manner? 
Though this dissertation does not directly answer that question, it does inform it. 




1) Expand conceptualizations beyond climate change as only a threat multiplier. 
This project, and the wider literature (e.g., Conca & Dabelko, 2002; Ide, 2018; 
Krampe, 2014; Matthew & Hammill, 2012), demonstrate that climate change 
impacts can be harnessed to further peacebuilding and cooperation. For 
example, resource sharing agreements offer organizations the ability to 
consider and bridge some of the complexities of scale inherent to the 
emergence and management of climate conflict. Moreover, as was evident in 
Karamoja, the ways in which post-conflict areas are vulnerable to a host of 
resource-related challenges, highlights the salience of post-conflict resource 
management that incorporates potential impacts of climate change.  
2) Identify locally-specific causal pathways from climate change to conflict. 
Understanding how, if at all, climate change affects conflict only begins with 
the acknowledgment that climate change is always part of a wider political 
ecology. It requires being able to identify the ways in which climate change 
alters biophysical processes, how biophysical changes alter socioeconomic 
outcomes, and how socioeconomic outcomes affects conflict within this 
political ecology. This spatial complexity will limit the scope of what 
particular NGOs will able to achieve, especially for development 
organizations who are operating at relatively localized scales. However, 
knowing how and where climate change alters conflict outcomes in the 
context of a particular place will offer considerable clarity to those who are 
tasked with addressing it. For example, in Karamoja, acknowledging climate 
change is largely leading to dry season theft and resource conflict in places of 
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relative abundance provides some clarity to the programs being implemented 
in this region. 
3) Explicitly consider questions of scale. Due to the ways in which places are 
tied to one another via markets and mobility, climate change impacts in one 
place are likely to affect conflict in other places. By explicitly acknowledging 
this spatiality, and actively working to develop programs and projects that 
bridges these disconnects, organizations are more likely to have successful 
outcomes and minimize risk of maladaptations or backdraft effects.  
 
The central contribution of this dissertation as a whole is to elucidate the 
challenges facing institutions who have the mandate of addressing climate-conflict and 
wider climate-security connections. While the lessons of this project have academic 
implications, the evident challenges facing practitioners in conceptualizing and 
addressing the link between climate change and conflict, should serve as an argument for 
the policy and implementation community to critically examine how their efforts are 
affected by the discourses, scales, and mechanisms of climate-conflict and climate-
security.  
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